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NOTES
Administrative Law-Constitutional Law-Is Governmental Policy
Affecting the Employment of Homosexuals Rational?
"I accept the moral responsibility to account to my God for my own
conduct. I accept the moral responsibility to account to my fellow men
for any conduct which causes them 'demonstrable harm.' I ask only
that a spirit of tolerance prevail in the exchange."'
Thus spoke the plaintiff in Schlegel v. United States2 in contesting
his removal from an Army Civil Service position for immoral and indecent conduct. Schlegel was specifically charged with having engaged
in four homosexual acts with three different men over a period of a year.
These alleged acts became known to intelligence officials during a routine
background investigation by the Army for upgrading his Secret security
clearance to Top Secret. To sustain his removal, the Court of Claims had
to find that Schlegel's conduct affected his job, reflected discredit upon
the employing installation, or detrimentally affected the efficiency of the
service.8 Furthermore, since the plaintiff was a veteran, he fell within the
ambit of protection afforded by the Veterans' Preference Act4 so that his
removal had to promote the efficiency of the service.
'Schlegel v. United States, No. 369-63 at 30-31 (Ct. Cl., Oct. 17, 1969). The
quotation is from the findings of fact.
2416

F.2d 1372 (Ct. Cl. 1969), cert. denied, 38 U.S.L.W. 3403 (U.S. April 21,

1970).
'Id. at 1373-77. The court followed the guidelines of
CIVILIAN PERSONNEL REGULATIONS

DEP'T OF THE ARMY

S1.3-3c(2) (1961) in setting out the tests for

justifying removal. Id. at 1377.
Judicial review of administrative actions is an uncertain area of the law.
It seems clear that an abuse of discretion or arbitrary actions are subject to correction by the courts, especially when they may have a stigmatizing affect. See
Slochower v. Board of Education, 350 US.. 551 (1956); Wieman v. Updegraff,
344 U.S. 183 (1952). But see Murray v. Macy, Civil No. 67-382 (N.D. Ala.,
Nov. 27, 1967), aff'd sub nom. Anonymous v. Macy, 398 F.2d 317 (5th Cir. 1968)
(per curiam), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1041 (1969).
Additional procedural problems, such as the rights of the accused to subpoena
and to cross-examine witnesses, are generated by administrative actions. Such
difficulties existed in Schlegel and in the other principal cases discussed in this
note, but consideration of them is beyond its scope. See generally Note, Administrative Law--Evidence-Hearsay and the Right of Confrontation in Admin-

istrative Hearings,48 N.C.L. Rv. 608 (1970).
"5 U.S.C. § 7512(a) (Supp. IV, 1965-68). The Act provides that a veteran
can be discharged from the Civil Service only for such cause as will promote the
efficiency of the service.
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The court found that the burden of establishing compliance with the
Act was satisfied by the testimony of the plaintiff's superiors that the
morale and efficiency of the office would have been affected by his continued presence. Moreover, the court reasoned that since homosexual acts
are immoral and indecent, efficiency would inevitably be adversely affected
by allowing one who had engaged in such acts to remain in Civil Service.'
6
The Court of Claims distinguished on the facts Norton v. Macy,
an earlier decision by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.
In Norton two of the three judges rejected the government's contention
that, once the label "immoral" is plausibly attached to an employee's offduty conduct, further inquiry into an adequate rational cause for his
removal is unnecessary. 7 The plaintiff, a veteran, committed what the
court believed to be a homosexual advance by feeling the leg of a stranger
who had accepted a ride from him and by inviting the man to his apartment for a drink. Following the incident with the stranger, the plaintiff
admitted to government investigators that he had engaged in mutual
masturbation with other males in high school and college; had homosexual
desires while drinking; and occasionally had undergone a temporary
blackout after drinking, during two of which occasions he suspected that
he might have engaged in homosexual activity.' The Civil Service Commission considered this evidence sufficient to warrant dismissal from
the service, but the court, disagreeing, stated that a reasonable connection
between the alleged conduct and the efficiency of the service had to
416 F.2d at 1378.
417 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
TId. at 1165. The court also refused to adhere to the decision of the Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Anonymous v. Macy, 398 F.2d 317 (5th Cir.
1968), that courts have no authority to review on the merits a determination by
the Civil Service Commission of fitness of an employee. Id. at 1163-65.
The plaintiff in Anonynwns had nearly nineteen years of federal service and
was a postal-window clerk in a small Alabama town whose citizens held him in
high regard. A sailor, while in the brig of a Naval base in Florida, had admitted
having participated with him in homosexual acts; and the plaintiff, questioned by
authorities shortly thereafter, confessed to other private consensual acts that were
in no way connected with his job. A psychiatrist testified that a wound received
in World War II had rendered the employee impotent and had ultimately led to
his participation in homosexual activities, which were not sufficient to classify
him a pervert or sexual deviant. The psychiatrist further testified that the employee was of gentle disposition and low sexual drive and was far less likely to
act violently than the average adult male; too, the acts would in no way affect his
ability to perform his job. Nevertheless, the plaintiff's confession led to his discharge and a losing struggle in the federal courts. Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari
at 3-12, Murray v. Macy, 393 U.S. 1041 (1969) (petition denied).
8 417 F.2d at 1162-63.
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be demonstrated to justify discharge. 9 However, the court limited its
decision to the particular circumstances involved and stated flatly that
it was not holding that homosexual conduct may never be cause for
dismissal of a federal employee protected by the Veterans' Preference
Act.10 Nor did the court conclude that potential embarrassment from an
employee's private conduct could not affect the efficiency of the service.'1
Indeed, the court manifested this circumscription in Norton a scant
five months later in Adams v. Laird.1 2 The majority in Adams upheld the
denial to the plaintiff, employed by private industry in defense-related
work, of a Top Secret security clearance and the suspension of his Secret
clearance based on findings of homosexual conduct. His conduct had
come to light during the background investigation to examine the
appropriateness of upgrading his security clearance.13 One judge, objecting to the assumption that all homosexuals are security risks, dissented
vigorously on the ground that no relationship between the alleged homosexual conduct and Adam's ability to protect classified information had
been demonstrated.' 4
Notwithstanding Adams and Schlegel, Norton represents a new dawn
in the plight of homosexual federal employees, for it threatens a heretofore unquestioned federal policy of regarding homosexual acts as an
ipso facto basis for dismissal from the Civil Service." This policy stems
9

Id. at 1162. But see Dew v. Halaby, 317 F.2d 582 (D.C. Cir. 1963). Note,
however, the court's treatment of this case in Norton. 417 F.2d at 1166.
10 See note 4 supra.
an agency cannot support
11417 F.2d at 1168. "What we do say is that ...
a dismissal as promoting the efficiency of the service merely by turning its head
and crying 'shame."' Id. The court pointedly distinguished the type of embarrassment or discredit that financial irresponsibility of a governmental employee would
create. The effect in such an instance is more ascertainable and concrete than a
general tarnishing of an agency's antiseptic public image. Id. For an incisive
analysis of homosexuality and the efficiency of the Civil Service, which presaged
Norton by one month, see Note, Government-Created Employment Disabilities of
the Homosexual, 82 HARv. L. REv. 1738 (1969).
10420 F.2d 230 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 38 U.S.L.W. 3404 (U.S. April 21,
1970). Two of the judges who decided Norton sat on the court in Adams. The
dissenting judge in Norton voted in the majority in Adams, and the other judge,
who was with the majority in Norton, dissented strongly. It is interesting to speculate what would have happened had the third judge in Adans been the second judge
who voted with the majority in Norton.
IsId. at 232-34. Without the proper security clearance, Adams was effectively
precluded from technical occupations for which he was highly qualified. Id. at
241; Affidavit No. 1 of Robert Larry Adams, filed in the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia, March 8, 1968.
1*5 420 F.2d at 240-42.
1n Scott v. Macy, 349 F.2d 182 (D.C. Cir. 1965), the court overruled a dis-
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primarily from public repugnance to homosexual behavior" and represents a fear by the government of the loss of public confidence and of the
discomfiting effect on other employees if known homosexuals are allowed
to remain in employment.17 As indicated by Adams, a fear of compromise
of classified information is also often involved.
missal by the Civil Service Commission of an employee on a general charge of
homosexual conduct. The Commission did not specify the exact acts with which
the employee was charged, and the court held that the basis for dismissal was impermissibly vague. Dictum indicated that the court would demand for the Commission to show how the individual's conduct related to his occupational fitness.
Id. at 184-85. A similar result obtained in a subsequent action brought by the
Commission against Scott based on the same alleged conduct. The court did not
feel that the earlier problem of ambiguity had been resolved and reversed again.
Scott v. Macy, 402 F.2d 644, 647-48 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
Dissenting in both cases, the current Chief Justice of the United States, who
then sat on the court of appeals, indicated that it was unnecessary for the Commission to relate the alleged homosexual conduct with suitability for federal employment; disqualification based solely on homosexual conduct, he contended, was
not arbitrary. 349 F.2d at 189-90, 402 F.2d at 652. Cf. Wyngaard v. Kennedy, 295
F.2d 184 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (per curiam). But see Boutilier v. Immigration and
Naturalization Service, 387 U.S. 118, 125-35 (1967) (dissenting opinion).
" A recent Louis Harris poll reported that sixty-three per cent of the people
of the nation regard homosexuals as harmful to American life. The Homosexual:
Newly Visible, Newly Understood, TImE, Oct. 31, 1969, at 61 [hereinafter cited
as TimE, Oct. 31, 1969]. This poll was in accord with one taken a short while
earlier. Slovenko, Sexual Deviation: Response to an Adaptational Crisis, 40 U.
CoLo. L. REv. 222, 233 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Slovenko].
' See Scott v. Macy, 402 F.2d 644, 648-49 (D.C. Cir. 1968) ; Note, GovernmentCreated Employment Disabilitiesof the Homosexual, supra note 11, at 1741-46.
The Civil Service Commission has indicated that it would admit homosexuals in
service as soon as the general public comes to view them with less repulsion. The
Commission claims that it avoids expelling homosexuals with many years of
service and excludes only those whose homosexuality is a matter of public
knowledge or record. Id. at 1742, 1745-46. In the principal cases discussed in this
note, however, the homosexual acts of the plaintiffs became a part of the public
record only after the government took action against them. See also note 7 supra.
Illuminating federal policy is a letter from the Civil Service Commission to
the plaintiff's attorney during the litigation in Murray v. Macy, Civil No. 67-382
(N.D. Ala., Nov. 27, 1967), aff'd sub nom. Anonymous v. Macy, 398 F.2d 317
(5th Cir. 1968) (per curiam), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1041 (1969). The letter
quoted in part another letter, addressed to the Mattachine Society, from Commission
Chairman John W. Macy, Jr., dated February 25, 1966:
Suitability determinations also comprehend the total impact of the applicant
upon his job. Pertinent considerations here are the revulsion of other employees by homosexual conduct and the consequent disruption of service
efficiency, the apprehension caused other employees by homosexual advances,
solicitations or assaults, the unadvoidable [sic] subjection of the sexual
deviate to errotic [sic] stimulation through on-the-job use of common toilet,
shower, and living facilities, the offense to members of the public who are
required to deal with a known or admitted sexual deviate to transact
Government business, the hazard that the prestige and authority of a
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The federal policy contributes significantly to the stigmatization
suffered by those whose homosexual conduct is uncovered. Such stigmatization usually not only results in the loss of job and reputation but
also severely hinders the search for a new job. One caught engaging in
homosexual conduct suffers the alienation of friends and family and may
be forced into the "gay" world by social ostracism even though the conduct may have been an isolated incident caused by curiosity, seduction,
or other reasons. Engaging in homosexual acts may render one particularly vulnerable to extortionists; to criminal assaults; to harassment
by police and private citizens; and, perhaps most disconcertingly of all,
to official and community indifference to his trammeled rights.,,
In this light, the pragmatic mind must seek a rationale for the
penalizing intolerance of homosexual behavior because constitutional
repercussions may result if no rational basis can be found: while the
Constitution imposes no direct restraint on private irrationality, through
the due process clause it does forbid irrational governmental deprivation
of liberty and property.'9 Other constitutional mandates 20 may also be
affected by a determination that the general federal 2' policy works irraGovernment position will be used to foster homosexual activity, particularly among the youth, and the use of Government funds and authority
in furtherance of conduct offensive both to the mores and the law of our
society.
Appendix D to Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari, Murray v. Macy, 393 U.S. 1041
(1969) (petition denied).
"See W. CHURCHILL, HOMOSEXUAL BEHAVIOR AMONG MALES 226 (1967)
[hereinafter cited as CHURCHILL]; A. ELLIS, HOMOSEXUALITY: ITS CAUSES AND
CURE 87-90 (1965) [hereinafter cited as ELLIS]; P. GEBHARD, 3. GAGNON, W.
POMEROY, & C. CHRISTENSON, SEX OFFENDERS: AN ANALYSIS OF TYPES 623
(1965) [hereinafter cited as GEBHARD]; A. KINSEY, W. POMEROY, & C. MARTIN,
[hereinafter cited as
SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN MALE 663 (1948)
KINSEY/MALE]; E. SCHUR, CRIMES WITHOUT VICTIMS 83 (1965) [hereinafter
cited as ScHuR]I; Cantor, Deviation and the Criminal Law, 55 J. CRIM. L.C. &
P.S. 441, 449-51 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Cantor]; Slovenko at 236 n.41.
"'There is controversy over the application of substantive due process to protect individuals within the public sector against arbitrary governmental action.

See Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional

Law, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439 (1968).
2
The right to privacy, as illumined by such decisions as Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), may be invaded by governmental efforts to ferret out
homosexuals. But note the dictum contained in Justice Goldberg's concurring
opinion to that case. Id. at 498-99. Also, the constitutional sanction against cruel
and unusual punishment may be violated by criminally punishing private, adult,
consensual homosexual practices. See Perkins v. North Carolina, 234 F. Supp.

333, 337 (W.D.N.C. 1964).
"1Of course, state and local governmental policies and laws would be similarly
affected by the fourteenth amendment.
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tionally to severely penalize homosexual behavior ipso facto without
regard to individual circumstances.
To determine rationality, one must seek knowledge of the causes
and ramifications of homosexual behavior. At the start, one should understand that not all those who manifest homosexual behavior are truly
homosexual. A substantial number of persons, who are basically heterosexual, engage in homosexual acts for a variety of reasons, including
curiosity, seduction, or peculiar situational demands such as those confronting prisoners whose sexual outlet is limited. Still others may participate in homosexual conduct simply because they seek any convenient
relief for their sexual drive and are not particular about the means.
The terms "homosexual" and "homosexuality" properly describe only
22
persons who are dominantly or exclusively homosexually oriented.
Some authorities believe that man is born with a neutral sexual disposition that is subjected to environmental conditioning leading to a
particular preference. They would agree with Kinsey that "[t]here is
nothing known in the anatomy or physiology of sexual response and
orgasm which distinguishes masturbatory, heterosexual, or homosexual
reactions." 23 According to this theory, humans are born with a potential
2
2 GROUP FOR THE ADVANcEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY REPORT No. 30 at 2-3 (Jan.
1955) [hereinafter cited as GRouP]; KINSEY/MALE at 615-66; Bowman and Engle,
A Psychiatric Evaluation of Laws of Honosexuiality, 29 TEMP. L.Q. 273, 313
(1956) [hereinafter cited as Bowman and Engle]; Glueck, An Evalutation of
the Homosexual Offender, 41 MINN. L. REv. 187, 194 (1957) [hereinafter cited
as Glueck].
Kinsey's research revealed that, as a minimum, thirty-seven per cent of American males have had at least one overt homosexual experience to the point of
orgasm between adolescence and old age. Ten per cent are more or less exclusively homosexual for at least three years between the ages of sixteen and
fifty-five, and four per cent are exclusively homosexual throughout their lives after
the onset of adolescence. These figures are probably understatements. KINSEY/
MALE at 623-25, 650-51.
Kinsey reasoned that the incidence and frequency of homosexual behavior,
similar throughout all strata of American society, militated against the view that
erotic sexual reactions between individuals of the same sex are abnormal or
unnatural. KIwsEY/MALE at 659. He is reported to have remarked that "[tlhe only
kind of abnormal sex acts are those that are impossible to perform." CHURCHILL
at 69. For a criticism of Kinsey's reasoning, see Kubie, Psychiatric Implications
of the Kinsey Report, 10 PSYCHOSOMATIC MEDICINE, Mar. 1948, at 95.
There is no evidence that homosexuality involves more males, or fewer males,
today than it did among earlier generations. Furthermore, if all persons with
any trace of homosexual history were eliminated from today's population, there
is no reason for believing that the incidence of homosexuality in the next genera-

tion would be materially reduced.

KINSEY/MALE

at 631, 666.

"A. KINSEY, W. POMEROY, C. MARTIN, & P. GEBUARD, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR
IN THE HUMAN FEMALE 446-47 (1953) [hereinafter cited as KINSEY/FEMALE].
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to respond erotically to sexual stimulus without regard to the gender
of the source; man has come to prefer a heterosexual outlet only because
of the conditioning effect of his culture."4 Therefore, sexual gratification
with a member of one's own sex may be considered just as "natural" a
response as with a member of the opposite sex, but the latter inclination
may predominate in a given society by virtue of historically developed
norms that are taught and adhered to by custom from generation to
generation. 25
Other authorities would not be content with this view of homosexual
behavior as far as the dominant or exclusive homosexual is concerned.
They would agree that homosexuality is not a product of any known
hormonal or chromosomal factors2" but would contend that there must be
something amiss in the basic constitution of the homosexual since he undertakes great personal risk in pursuing his sexual inclination to the exclusion
of the less portentous offerings of heterosexual relief. Perhaps man may
learn through conditioning to enjoy one erotic stimulus more than others,
but he also learns the mores of his society and the personal risks of flouting
them. American society is extremely hostile to the homosexual,2 and
hence it is enigmatic that some Americans persist in and prefer a homosexual outlet for the basic sexual drive.2s To explain this enigma, these
authorities assert that homosexuality appears to be a product of personality development of such a subtle nature as to avoid a conscious recognition and to preclude a conscious choice. 20 Beyond this basic premise,
there is considerable divergence of opinion on causative factors, but at
least two general schools of thought emerge.
Present-day adherents of basic Freudian theory8 0 insist that adult
"See CHURCHiLL at 101-05; ELLIS at 78; KINSEY/FEMALE at 446-47, 481;
Marmor, Introduction in SEXUAL INVERSION: THE MULTIPLE ROOTS OF HOMO-

SEXUALITY 9-16 (J. Marmor ed. 1965) [hereinafter cited as Marmor].
" For general discussions of the historical, religious, and anthropological aspects
of homosexuality, see CHURCHILL at 199-210; GROUP at 1-2; KINSEY/FEMALE at
481-83; Taylor, Historical and Mythological Aspects of Homosexuality in SEXUAL
INVERSION, supra note 24, at 140; Bowman and Engle at 276-78. See also Note,
The Law of Crime Against Nature, 32 N.C.L. REV. 312 (1954).
2" CHtURcHILL at 105; GROUP at 3, 6; Pare, Etiology of Homosexuality: Genetic
and Chromosoinul Aspects in SEXUAL INVERSION, supra note 24, at 70; Perloff,
Hormones and Homosexuality in SEXUAL INVERSION, supra note 24, at 44.
" KINsEY/FEMALE at 477, 483. Cf. CHURCHILL at 199-210; Szasz, Legal and
Moral Aspects of Homosexuality in SEXUAL INVERSION, supra note 24, at 128.
See ELLIS at 78-84; GROUP at 2; Marmor at 11.
GROUP at 3; Marmor at 11-15; Cantor at 442.
Freudian theory has been described as "the departure point for all subsequent
explorations." C. SOCARIDES, THE OVERT HOMOSEXUAL 22 (1968). Dr. Socarides
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homosexuality represents an arrest of, or a pressured regression to, a
universal childhood phase of personality development that is homoerotically oriented-a phase of maturation wherein the child's instinctive
disposition for social intercourse and sexual exploration leans toward
those of his own sex.3 ' On the other hand, proponents of modern
psychoanalytic theory challenge the idea that adult homosexual preference
manifests a carry-over of a childhood phase. Rather, they assert that
adult homosexuality represents an unconscious, incapacitating anxiety
toward heterosexual relations. Homosexual release of the basic sex drive
is easier than confronting this deep, unfathomable anxiety. 2
Briefly stated, an important difference between these theories is that
the latter interprets heterosexuality as a basic tendency of man and
homosexuality as a manifestation of some psychological obstacle to heterosexual adaptation.3 Those who adhere to the former theory admit of no
basic heterosexual tendency while regarding homosexual adaptation,
though at odds with cultural expectations, as the probable resultant of
the interplay of environmental influences and the process of maturation.34
Whatever theory, or amalgamation of theories, is followed, there is
significant support for the belief that the underlying impediment to heterosexual orientation is rooted in personality development. Early environmental circumstances, especially within the immediate family,"3 and other
socio-economic and cultural forces amass to shape personality; and some
subtle interplay among numerous, multifarious factors affects the course
of development. One may broadly conclude, then, that an enigmatic quirk
in personality development, quite beyond the control of the individual,
ultimately leads to a homosexual predisposition2 6
is critical of Freud's view that homosexuality cannot be considered an illness. For
a capsule form of Dr. Socarides' concepts, see TIME, Oct. 31, 1969, at 66-67.
Freud's view is concisely set out in A Letter from Freud, 107 Am. J. PSYcHIATRY
786 (1951).
1 See, e.g., Marmor at 2, 9-10; L. OVESEY, HOMOSEXUALITY AND PSEUDOHOMOSEXUALITY 15-18 (1969). See also ScHur at 72-73.
" See, e.g., Bieber, Clinical Aspects of Male Homwsexuality in SEXUAL INVERSIoN, supra note 24, at 248; GRouP at 3; Marmor at 10-12; ScHUJR at 72-73.
But see CtuRcHIlL at 260-322; Marmor at 16.
s' See sources cited note 32 supra.
8, See sources cited note 31 supra.
Frequently found in the personal history of a homosexual is a passive or
hostile father and a domineering mother. Parental influences, particularly during
the early years, appear to be a very important factor in the development of a
homosexual bent. See Group at 3; ScnuR at 74; Glueck at 196-201.
" The presentation in the text was an over-simplification of a very complex problem. There are many unknown quantities and many variations of theories involved
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The prognosis for reversing the homosexual penchant is dismal. All
men carry a latent homoerotic potential, but most successfully repress it
in their subconscious.3 7 Homosexuals, on the other hand, cannot repress
it because of the deep, underlying forces, instilled during youth, that
work against heterosexual adaptation. Psychotherapy may overcome
these forces if the patient both consciously and unconsciously really desires, but it is seldom that his subconscious can abandon the role dictated
during the development of his personality. Hence, psychotherapy, a long
and difficult process, may be curative for only a few homosexuals and
beneficial to others only in the sense of enhancing social adjustment.88
Moreover, there is universal agreement that criminal and civil penalties
for, and societal hostility toward, homosexuality greatly hinder social
adjustment.3 9
in the development of homosexuality in an individual. For general discussions on
causation, see ELLIS; KINSEY/FEMALE at 447-48; L. OVESEY, HOMOSEXUALITY AND

(1969); SEXUAL INVERSION: THE MULTIPLE ROOTS OF
(J. Marmor ed. 1965); Glueck; Slovenko; TIME, Oct. 31, 1969,

PSEUDoHOMOSEXUALITY
HOMOSEXUALITY

at 66-67.

Homosexuals have become weary from having their sexual penchant analyzed.
As put by the founder and president of the Washington Mattachine Society:
[H]omosexuality has been defined into a sickness or disorder through subjective personal, social, moral, cultural, and religious value judgments cloaked
and camouflaged in scientific language... [H]omosexuality cannot properly be considered to be a sickness, disorder, or pathology, nor a symptom
of any of these, but must be considered a preference, orientation, or propensity that is different from heterosexuality.
Kameny, The Federal Government vs. The Homosexual, THE HUMANIST, May/
June 1969, at 20. Kameny's views are also set forth in TIME, Oct. 31, 1969, at
66-67.
" GROUP at 2; Glueck at 194. Many psychiatrists believe that those who denounce homosexuals the loudest are plagued by fears of their own latent homosexuality. GEBHARD at 638 n.4; ScHUR at 113.
" See E. BERGLER, HOMOSEXUALITY: DISEASE OR WAY OF LIFE 10, 302 (1956);
GRouP at 3-4; ScHUR at 72; R. SLOVENKO, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR AND THE LAW 91
(1965); Bowman and Engle at 280.
"" See, e.g., ELLIS, at 87-88; GEBHIARD at 623; Marmor at 20; Cantor at 448-51;
Glueck at 203; TIME, Oct. 31, 1969, at 64.

Many eminent commentators have long recognized the need for relaxing criminal penalties for homosexual acts. Commonly, they reject the idea that such
sanctions effectively serve any worthwhile societal goals; rather, they believe
that much social harm may be caused by treating private, consensual homosexual
conduct as criminal. The moral foundation of the sanctions is regarded as an inadequate basis for the laws although reform is neither considered an approval nor
condonation of homosexuality nor a likely inducement for homosexual practices.
However, violations of public decency or other notorious acts, such as offensive
solicitation or the seduction of youth, are considered a proper concern of the law.
See generally F. CAPRIO & D. BRENNER, SEXUAL BPHAVIOR: PSYcHO-LEGAL
ASPECTS 162 (1961); CHURcHILL at 215-34; GREAT BRITAIN, COMMITTEE ON
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The spectrum of personality of the homosexual is as wide and diverse
as that of the heterosexual,4" and his homoerotic bent alone reveals absolutely nothing of his character and social adjustment. This penchant is
at most an indication of a unique constellation of factors influencing his
personality development that has led to his particular sexual propensities.
To say that the homosexual state demonstrates abnormality or perversity
is to beg the question. The pertinent inquiry is: what is his character,
and how well adjusted socially is he? Authorities are in agreement that
this query is answerable only by considering the homosexual individually
in his own setting, just as a heterosexual must be personally considered
in evaluating characterand social adjustment.4 1
At present the federal government does not adequately consider indi-vidual circumstances before harshly penalizing an employee for homosexual conduct. Failing to do so, in light of modern knowledge about
homosexual behavior, may therefore be deemed unreasonable and the
policy adjudged as irrational.12 That the policy is founded on public
opinion makes it no less irrational. Admittedly, the government must
be concerned with public confidence, but it must also recognize that it
OFFENSES AND PROSTITUTION, THE WOLFENDEN REPORT 42-48
(Amer. ed. 1963); H.L.A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY, AND MORALITY (1963); MODEL
PENAL CODE § 207.5, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955); MODEL PENAL CODE
§§ 213.2-.6, 251.1-.3 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962) ; Note, Deviate Sexual Behavior
Under the New Illinois Criminal Code, 1965 WASH. U.L.Q. 220; Note, Private
Consensual Homosexual Behavior: The Cri-ne and Its Enforcement, 70 YALE L.J.
623 (1961).
"'Hooker, Male Homosexuals and Their Worlds in SEXUAL INVERSION, supra
note 24, at 86-87; Marmor at 19. See also GEBHARD at 623, 642. There are probably more neurotics among homosexuals than among heterosexuals, but this fact
HOmOSEXUAL

is inevitable in a hostile society. Marmor at 19; Cantor at 450.
"See, e.g., GEBHARD at 623; GROUP at 6; Hooker, Male Homosexuals and
Their Worlds in SEXUAL INVERSION, supra note 24, at 86-87; Marmor at 5, 16-19.
" See GROUP at 6; Marmor at 21; Szasz, Legal and Moral Aspects of Homosexuality in SEXAL INVERSION, supra note 24, at 128, 138; Henkin, Morals and the
Constitution: The Sin of Obscenity, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 391, 407-11 (1963).
A recent report prepared under the auspices of the National Institute of Mental
Health not only urges reform of penal sanctions against private, consensual homosexual practices but also urges tolerance of homosexuals by both private and
public employers. The distinguished task force that prepared the report included
this poignant remark:
The extreme opprobrium that our society has attached to homosexual
behavior has done more social harm than good, and goes beyond what is
necessary for the maintenance of public order and human decency. Homosexuality presents a major problem for our society largely because of the
amount of injustice and suffering entailed in it, not only for the homosexual but also for those concerned about him.
TIME, Oct. 24, 1969, at 82.
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often sets the trend in public attitudes and that its present policy toward
homosexuals tends to perpetuate hostility rather than to promote tolerance.4 3 Similar reasoning pertains to the problem of morale of employees.
Susceptibility to blackmail seems to be the primary reason for denying
homosexuals a security clearance, but that rationale breaks down in the
case of a professed homosexual who is not apprehensive of public disclosure of his sexual inclination. Furthermore, susceptibility to blackmail largely stems from the homosexual's fear of losing his job, a fear
created in great part by present government policy. Heterosexuals may
become vulnerable to extortion too, but there is no reason to believe that
they could resist coercion any more successfully than homosexuals. 44
Adverse public attitudes toward homosexual conduct are not likely
to mollify within a short period of time, but the federal government
must weigh individual rights against popular prejudices. Through
prudent personnel management, the Civil Service could beneficially employ
homosexuals while minimizing the anxiety of the public and of fellow
employees. 5 For instance, counseling by a superior official might have
4
had a desirable restraining influence on the plaintiff in Norton v. Macy G
and possibly could have prompted him to seek professional help. He was
not employed in a position requiring him to meet the public, and whatever homosexual potential he may have had was not a part of the public
record.
The plaintiff in Schlegel v. United States47 presents a more difficult
problem due to his security clearance and the findings as to his particular
acts. He had been found to have used slight force once in an unsuccessful
attempt to accomplish sodomy on an unwilling partner, and the objects
" ScHUR at 110. See also Hyams, The Spurious Problem, NEW STATESMAN,
June 25, 1960, at 945-46; Wolfenden, The Homosexual, and the Law, Ahead of
Public Opinion?, NEw STATESMAN, June 25, 1960, at 941.

"'See Marmor at 21-22; Wicker, The Undeclared Witch-Hu1nt,

HARPER'S,

Nov. 1969, at 108; Note, Governmient-Created Employment Disabilities of the
Homosexutal, supra note 11, at 1749-51.
"'For a reasoned plan by which the federal government could smoothly alter
its present policy toward homosexuals, see Note, Government-CreatedEmploymeut
Disabilities of the Homosexual, supra note 11, at 1742-46. See also Bowman and
Engle at 316; TIME, Oct. 24, 1969, at 82.
The New York City Civil Service Commission has recently adopted a policy
of accepting homosexual workers except for some positions such as penitentiary
guards and playground attendants. Note, Government-Created Disabilities of the
Homosexual, supra; note 11, at 1745 n.30.
,6417 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
' 416 F.2d 1372 (Ct. Cl. 1969).
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of all his ascribed homosexual advances were young servicemen.48 These
disturbing circumstances must be balanced, however, with his excellent
record of over eleven years of governmental service that was free of
trouble with the law.49 Again, perhaps counseling or a transfer would
have had an ameliorative effect.5"
In Adams v. Laird" the court's decision was partly based on findings
that the plaintiff had engaged in homosexual acts with two fellow employees. 2 Admittedly, sexual affairs among employees, whether homosexual or heterosexual, may create problems at the place of work. In
Adams' case, however, there was no complaint against him, and his
homosexual propensities were not a matter of public knowledge. In order
not to lose his considerable technical skills but at the same time not
to endanger security requirements, the government might reasonably have
required him to present positive proof of his reliability in safeguarding
classified information, including perhaps a psychiatric evaluation.
As recognized in Norton, a homosexual may be a source of embarrassment to the Civil Service, as when he engages in notorious conduct. His personal behavioral traits may present other problems with
which the Civil Service should not have to cope. But Norton projects the
idea that job performance and compatibility with others turn on the whole
of a person's personality and integrity rather than solely on his private,
discreet sexual conduct. An individual's character and social adjustment,
his past work performance, the notoriety of and reasons for his conduct,
the nature of the job, and the alternative corrective measures available
should as a minimum be considered by the government before imposing
severe penalties on one merely for homosexual behavior. In short, individual conduct must be individually treated; to do less may produce the
8
1Id. at 1373-74, 1383.
"' Schlegel v. United States, No. 369-63 at 19-20 (Ct. Cl., Oct. 17, 1969) (findings of fact).
"IDEP'T OF THE ARmY CIVILIAN PERSONNEL REGULATIONS S1.3-1b(3) (1961),
as quoted by the court in the findings of fact, Schlegel v. United States, No. 369-63
at 28-29, states:
Before proceeding with an action affecting an employee's employment or
pay status, consideration should be given to the possibility of correcting
the situation by counseling or training the employee, or through utilization
of a reassignment or an oral or written reprimand. In many instances, such
action will remedy the situation and, at the same time, will save the cost
of replacement or work disruption which attends the actions of removal or
suspension.
420 F.2d 230 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
02Id. at 234.
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ill-effects of stigmatization and the needless loss of valuable skills to the
country.
WILLIAM B. CRUMPLER

Admiralty-Dockside Injuries under the Longshoremen's and
Harbor Workers' Compensation Act
In Nacirema Operating Co. v. Johnson1 three longshoremen had been
attaching cargo from railroad cars located on piers to ships' cranes for
loading onto the vessels. One longshoreman had been killed when cargo
hoisted by a crane knocked him to the pier or crushed him against the
side of the railroad car. The other two had been injured in the same
accident.
Deputy Commissioners of the United States Department of Labor
denied claims for compensation under the Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act2 in each case on the ground that the injuries had not occurred "upon the navigable waters of the United States,"
as required by the statute. The federal trial courts upheld the commissioners' decisions. 3 The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
in Marine Stevedoring Corp. v. Oosting4 reversed. The Supreme Court
on certiorari reversed the Fourth Circuit and held that the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act did not cover longshoremen injured on docks, piers, or bridges. The basic reasons for the
Court's denial of coverage to the longshoremen in Nacirema is best
explained by the historical development of state and federal jurisdiction
over maritime workers.
Although inadequate common-law remedies for injured workers led
to the adoption of state workmen's compensation statutes following the
industrial revolution,5 there was no corresponding federal development
1396 U.S. 212 (1969).
233 U.S.C. §§ 901-50 (1964).
'Nacirema Operating Co. v. Johnson, 243 F. Supp. 184 (D. Md. 1965);
Traynor v. Johnson, 245 F. Supp. 51 (E.D. Va. 1965).

' 398 F.2d 900 (4th Cir. 1968).
'The statutes of Washington, Iowa, and New York were constitutionally
sustained in aspects not concerning the extent of their coverage. Mountain Timber
Co. v. Washington, 243 U.S. 219 (1917); Hawkins v. Bleakly, 243 U.S. 210
(1917); New York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917). See G. GILmOra
& C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 3,37 (1957).
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in admiralty." Moreover, an attempt to extend state workmen's compensation to borderline maritime cases was struck down in 1917 by the
Supreme Court in South Pacific Co. v. Jensen.7 In Jensen a longshoreman was killed while operating a truck on a gangway connecting a vessel
with a pier. After New York permitted recovery under its compensation
statute, the Supreme Court reversed and held that both the situs of the
accident and the nature of the work being performed were maritime and
that any attempt to apply a state act to such facts was an unconstitutional
interference with the uniformity of federal maritime law. Congress
attempted twice to circumvent the ruling in Jensen by legislation authorizing state compensation acts to cover such cases," but both efforts were
declared unconstitutional. In Washington v. W. C. Dawson & Co.'0
the Court suggested that Congress enact national legislation covering
maritime workers whom the state could not constitutionally protect.'1
Meanwhile, the Court, possibly realizing the harshness of a strict
application of Jensen,began to make exceptions to the rule. The maritimebut-local exception was created in Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia.'" The
Court held that state workmen's compensation and wrongful death acts
could validly apply to maritime activities that were of "local," as opposed
to "national," concern. The reasoning was that application of state law
in such cases would "not work material prejudice to the characteristic
features of the general maritime law, nor interfere with the proper
harmony and uniformity of that law as to international and interstate
relations."' 13 Unfortunately, what constitutes a maritime-but-local exception is often unclear.
The second important exception to the rule in Jensen was developed
The United States Constitution places admiralty and maritime matters in the
original federal jurisdiction. U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2.
"244 U.S. 205 (1917).
'Act of Oct. 6, 1917, 40 Stat. 395; Act of June 10, 1922, 42 Stat. 634.
' Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1920); Washington v.
W.C. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219 (1924).
10264 U.S. 219 (1924).
" Id. at 227. The Court stated:
Without doubt Congress has power to alter, amend or revise the maritime
law by statutes of general application embodying its will and judgment.
This power, we think, would permit enactment of a general Employees' Law
of general provisions for compensating injured employees, but it may not be
delegated to the several states.
12257 U.S. 233 (1921).
1 0Id. at 242. The Court allowed coverage of a
longshoreman working on an
incomplete vessel in navigable waters because of the "local" nature of his work.
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in Industrial Commission v. Nordenholt Corp.1 4 and confirmed by subsequent decisions. 5 In this line of cases, the Court emphasized that state
workmen's compensation laws were applicable to injuries occurring on
docks, piers, and similar structures permanently affixed to the shore and
extending over navigable waters because they are considered extensions of
the land. The Court reasoned that since admiralty jurisdiction for torts
does not encompass injuries occurring on land or its extensions,", workers
injured on docks and piers could legitimately be covered by state compensation statutes. Hence, while a longshoreman was within the broader
maritime jurisdiction for contracts by virtue of the status of his employment, he came within the domain of state law if the injury occurred upon
the land or an extension of the landY' Consequently, the cumulative effect
of the two exceptions declared in Garcia and Nordenholt was to allow
coverage under state workmen's compensation statutes if the injury
occurred on a dock, pier, or similar structure permanently affixed to the
land or, if the matter was sufficiently "local," on navigable waters.
In 1927, in answer to the Court's earlier suggestion, Congress passed
the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act to provide
a recovery under federal law for injured maritime workers. The Act
provided compensation
in respect of disability or death of an employee, but only if the disability
or death results from an injury occurring upon the navigable waters
of the United States (including any dry dock) and if recovery for
the disability or death through workman's compensation mnay not be
8
provided by State law.'
Seemingly there are two prerequisites for an award under the Act: (1)
that the injury occur upon the navigable waters of the United States and
(2) that no compensation can be paid under state law;v. The interpretation of f-iese two provisions has since been the subject of extensive
litigation. 9
14259 U.S. 263 (1922).
15
See, e.g., Swanson v. -Manor Bros., 328 U.S. 1 (1946) ; T. Smith & Son v.
Taylor, 276 U.S. 179 (1928)..
"See Cleveland Terminal & Valley R.R. v. Cleveland S.S. Co., 208 U.S. 316
(1908).
1The vature of the contract determines maritime jurisdiction over contracts,
but it is the sitits of the tort that is the test for maritime jurisdiction. See Industrial Comm'n v. Nordenholt, 259 U.S. 263 (1922).
33 U.S.C. § 903(a) (1964) (emphasis added).
See, e.g., Avondale Marine Ways, Inc. v. Henderson, 346 U.S. 366 (1953);
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It is apparent from the legislative history of the Act that Congress intended for state coverage to be as extensive as possible and for the federal
statute to provide relief only in cases in which there is no state remedy."
But, as has been pointed out, it is often unclear how far state coverage
extends, particularly under the maritime-but-local exception created by
the Court. To alleviate the harshness that could have resulted from a
mistake in the choice of forums in difficult borderline cases,2 - the
Court in Davis v. Department of Labor and Industries22 enunciated the
"twilight-zone" doctrine. The effect of Davis was to grant presumptive
validity to both federal and state compensation statutes in cases -involving
waterfront mishaps if a reasonable argument could be made that either
remedy was applicable. Thus the injured harbor worker could elect either
state or federal compensation in "twilight-zone" cases.' However, the
"twilight-zone" doctrine was not considered to apply to injuries to longshoremen on piers or docks, and the injured worker could not choose the
24
federal Act as his remedy.
In 1962, the Court went further and judicially deleted from the
Longshoremen's Act the prerequisite that compensation under it is
allowed only in cases in which the state may not provide an award.
Ignoring the express language of the Act, the Court in Calbeck v.
Travelers Insuraiwe Co. 5 stated that
Parker v. Motor Boat Sales, Inc., 314 U.S. 244 (1941); Nicholson v. Calbeck, 385
F.2d 221 (5th Cir. 1967); Houser v. O'Leary, 383 F.2d 730 (9th Cir. 1967).
2An investigation of the legislative intent underlying the statute revealed that
the original version of the bill provided:
This act shall apply to any employment performed on a place within the
admiralty jurisdiction of the United States except- to employment of local
concern and of no direct relation to navigation and commerce; but shall
not apply to employment as master and member of the crew of a vessel.
S. Rep. No. 973, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1927). The phraseology "local concern"
was objected to by the chairman of the Senate Committe because "to create an
exemption for 'employment of local concern' threatened to perpetuate the very
uncertainties of coverage that Congress wished to avoid." Calbeck v. Travelers
Ins. Co., 370 U.S. 114, 122-23 (1962).
"1Two such borderline cases are Hahn v. Ross Island Sand & Gravel Co., 358
U.S. 272 (1959) and Parker v. Motor Boat Sales, Inc., 314 U.S. 244 (1941).
22317 U.S. 249 (1942).
See, e.g., Hahn v. Ross Island Sand & Gravel Co., 358 U.S. 272 (1959). The
Court said that as to cases within this "twilight-zone," Davis, in effect, gave "an
injured waterfront employee an election to recover compensation under either the
Longshoremen's Act or the Workmen's Compensation law of the State in which
the injury occurred." Id. at 273.
2'See 2 LARSON,, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 410 (1952). Injuries on docks or piers were considered clearly within state jurisdiction and not
borderline cases to which the "twilight-zone" doctrine could apply.
22370 U.S. 114 (1962).
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our conclusion is that Congress invoked its constitutional power so
as to provide compensation for all injuries sustained by employees on
navigable waters whether or not a particular injury might also have
been within the constitutional reach of a state workmen's compensation
law.2 6
The claimants in Calbeck had been injured while working on incomplete
vessels lying in navigable waters, but they were allowed recovery tinder
the Act. Previously, workers injured while engaged in such work were
allowed compensation only under state laws because such employment
was considered clearly maritime but local in nature.2
The result of
Calbeck was to extend the area of overlapping federal and state coverage
and increase the occasions when a claimant had a choice between federal
and state compensation remedies.
Just as the earlier exceptions to Jensen left open the question of how
far seaward state workmen's compensation could extend, Calbeck failed
to answer how far toward land the federal remedy extended. Cases
following Calbeck generally interpreted the Longshoremen's Act to
require that the injury occur on the navigable waters of the United States.
Thus injuries suffered on docks and piers were not generally thought to
give rise to federal compensation.2 8 Then in 1968 the Fourth Circuit
became the first court of appeals to extend coverage of the Longshoremen's Act to injuries consumated on a pier when it decided Oosting.
The issue confronting the Fourth Circuit was stated by Judge Sobeloff,
the author of the majority opinion in Oosting, to be "whether an injury
on a pier falls within the coverage of the Act."2" In a three-pronged
opinion the majority held that (1) the Longshoremen's Act is status and
not situs oriented and covers all longshoremen working under the same
contract regardless of where the injury occurs; (2) the Admiralty Extension Act,30 which extends admiralty jurisdiction over torts to cover
20
2 2 Id. at

117 (emphasis added).
The factual situation in Calbeck was the same as that in Grant Porter-Smith
Ship Co. v. Rhode, 257 U.S. 469 (1922), in which the maritime-but-local doctrine
was applied.
8 Nicholson v. Calbeck, 385 F.2d 221 (5th Cir. 1967) ; Houser v. O'Leary, 383
F.2d 730 (9th Cir. 1967) ; Travelers Ins. Co. v. Shea, 382 F.2d 344 (5th Cir. 1967).
But see Michigan Mutual Liab. Co. v. Arrien, 233 F. Supp. 496 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
" 398 F.2d at 902. See Note, Dockside Injuries Under the Longshoremen's
and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 3 GA. L. REv. 622 (1969) (approving
the court's holding); Note, The Ambiguous, Amphibious Employee: The Relationship Between the Longshoremen's Act and State Compensation Legislation, 18
HAsT. L.J. 891 (1967) (disapproving the court's holding).
" 46 U.S.C. § 742 (1964).
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injuries occurring on the land that are caused by a vessel on navigable
waters, impliedly extends coverage of the Longshoremen's Act to the
same degree, and (3) an injury occurring on a pier extending over
navigable waters is an injury occurring "upon navigable waters" and
thus is within the coverage of the Longshoremen's Act.
The majority's first contention was that the Longshoremen's Act,
irrespective of the situs of the injury, was intended by Congress to cover
injuries to longshoremen by virtue of their employment. Judge Sobeloff
found support for this position in the Supreme Court's holding in Calbeck
that "Congress intended the compensation act to have a coverage coextensive with the limits of its authority."3 1 Moreover, interpreting
the coverage of the Longshoremen's Act to extend to the broad jurisdiction of admiralty over workers' contracts would seem to comply with
3 that the statute
the Supreme Court's mandate in Reed v. The Yakad
should be liberally construed to avoid harsh and incongruous results. Indeed, it would seem to be "harsh and incongruous" to permit recovery
to a longshoreman on a ship and to deny it to his fellow worker on a
nearby pier when both were injured by the same crane.3 3
The majority also relied heavily on the language in Michigan Mutual
Liability Co. v. Arrien 4 "that 'upon navigable waters' [as used in the
Longshoremen's Act] is to be equated with 'admiralty jurisdiction.'" 3 5
But this decision was not based on the theory of the worker's status; on
the contrary, the court found that "upon navigable waters" was impliedly expanded by the Admiralty Extension Act of 1948. 6 It should
also be noted that the Supreme Court in Calbeck implicitly accepted the
validity of applying the test of the situs of the injury to determine
whether an employee is covered by the Longshoremen's Act.ST

The second approach taken by the majority in Oosting was that the
Admiralty Extension Act of 1948, by extending the jurisdiction of
admiralty over torts to include all injuries caused by a vessel that were
consumated on land, also impliedly expanded coverage of the Longshoremen's Act. But the trial court in Johnson v. Traynor3 s had exhaustively
GCalbeck v. Travelers Ins. Co., 370 U.S. 114, 130 (1962).
"373 U.S. 410, 415 (1963).
"398 F.2d at 903.
"233 F. Supp. 496 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). This decision also had permitted recovery
under the Longshoremen's Act for injuries suffered on a pier.
8r Id. at 501.
"Id. at 502.

See Calbeck v. Travelers Ins. Co., 370 U.S. 114, 115-17, 124-27 (1962).

"243 F. Supp. 184 (D. Md. 1965).
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studied this possibility and concluded that the legislative history of both
statutes, the express coverage of the Extension Act, and the administrative
interpretations of the compensation statute clearly negate an implied
extension of coverage of the Longshoremen's Act. Moreover, a House
report made in 1958 concluded that longshoremen are protected by "state
safety standards when performing work on docks and in other shore
areas."39 Hence it is not surprising that most courts confronted with
this issue have agreed with the opinion in Johnson that the Extension
Act cannot be construted to extend the coverage of the Longshoremen's
40
Act.
In the third prong of his opinion in Oosting, Judge Sobeloff reasoned
that by virtue of D'Aleman v. Pan American Airways41 the scope of the
phrase "upon navigable waters" used in the Longshoremen's Act extends
to injuries occurring above such waters.4 2 D'Aleman, however, involved interpretation of the phrase "on the high seas" used in the Death
on the High Seas Act.4 3 While the Second Circuit in D'Aleman did
expand the phrase "on the high seas" to cover a cause of action arising
,in a plane flying above the ocean, the value of the case as precedent for
Judge Sobeloff's position is at best dubious.
Chief Judge Haynesworth, dissenting in Oosting, rejected all three
of the majority's arguments. 44 He admitted the "incongruity" of a
remedy that depends on where a worker who frequently passes between
a ship and the dock happens to be when injured, but proposed that the
dock's edge is at least a clear and convenient place to draw a line between
application of state and federal compensation remedies. Even under the
approach of the majority in Oosting, incongruities are easy to anticipate.
For example, a longshoreman can be injured several miles from shore
on an errand for his employer unconnected with maritime work. "If the
line is moved shoreward of the dock's edge, short of inclusion of every
longshoreman wherever he may be and however he may be injured, it is
bound to be vague and fuzzy and a fruitful source of contention and
litigation... .45
" H.R. Rep. No: 2287, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1958).
"oE.g., Houser v. O'Leary, 383 F.2d 730 (9th Cir. 1967) ; Atlantic Stevedoring
.Co. v. O'Keefe, 220 F. Supp. 881 (S.D. Ga. 1963); Revel v. American Export
Lines, Inc., 162 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Va. 1958).
"1259 F.2d 493 (2d Cir. 1958).
42398 F.2d at 908.

'846 U.S.C. §§ 761-67 (1964).
"Id. at 909-14 (dissenting opinion).
"Id. at 912-13 (dissenting opinion).
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Perhaps the most telling point in the dissenting opinion was made in
an analysis of congressional intent in passing the Longshoremen's Act.
Quoted was a Senate report in which it was stated that "injuries occurring
in loading or unloading are not covered unless they occur on the ship or
between the wharf and the ship so as to bring them within the maritime
46
jurisdiction of the United States."
When the case was taken on appeal, the logic of the dissent in Oosting
was accepted by a majority of the Supreme Court in its decision in
Nacirema. Rejecting all three prongs of Judge Sobeloff's opinion, the
Court asserted that
construing the Longshoremen's Act to coincide with the limits of
admiralty jurisdiction-whatever they may be and however they may
change-simply replaces one line with another whose uncertain contours can only perpetuate on the landward side of the Jensen line, the
same confusion which previously existed on the seaward side. 47
The decision in Nacirema approving Chief Judge Haynesworth's rationale
is laudable in that it provides a definite line beyond which the federal
compensation remedy will not extend shoreward to overlap state coverage
of longshoremen and harbor workers.
Remaining after Nacirema is concurrent federal and state jurisdiction
over navigable waters in cases in which a worker's injury stems from a
transaction that is maritime but local in nature. It is now desirable to
eliminate this overlap. After all, the exception allowing state coverage to
extend beyond the shoreline to encompass transactions on navigable
waters was justified mainly on the ground that there was no federal remedy
when the maritime-but-local doctrine was created. The federal remedy
under the Longshoremen's Act is clearly available after the Supreme
Court's decision in Calbeck to a longshoreman or harbor worker injured on navigable waters as a result of his employment. The line drawn
in Nacirerna should now be applied by the Court to limit the coverage
of both the state and federal remedies. Under such an application of
Nacireza, the state remedy would be available only for injuries suffered
on shore or on structures that can be considered an extension of the land.
The federal remedy under the Longshoremen's Act would be applied
only to provide compensation for injuries suffered on maritime waters.
"'S. Rep. No. 973, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1927). See note 20, supra for a
general discussion of the legislative history of the Longshoremen's. Act.
17 396 U.S. at 223. (The three dissenting justices agreed with Judge Sobeloff.)
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Such a result would provide a definite line to enable lawyers and judges
to determine with certainty whether an injured longshoreman is covered
under the federal or the state act.
GEORGE HACKNEY EATMAN

Attorneys-Admission to the Bar-Consideration of the
Constitutionality of Bar Examiners' Inquiries into Political
Associations and Beliefs
Bar examiners for years have considered the "subversive applicant"
an inherent danger to the legal profession' and have all but avowed a duty
to deny him the privilege to practice.2 Although most, if not all, states
have a requirement of a finding of "good moral character" and some form
of constitutional oath prior to admission,3 some states have made demanding inquiries into the loyalty of applicants in bar-examination character
questionnaires. 4 Bar-admission committees face increasing numbers of
applicants whose interests in law reform, civil rights, and other "causes"
present sharply divergent political views from those of the traditionally
conservative bar.5
IRemarks of Samuel J. Kanner, Chairman of the Florida Board of Bar Examiners in 54 BRIEF 154-55 (1959) (tracing the downfall of many constitutional
governments to "subversive elements" infiltrating the bar) [hereinafter cited as
Kanner Remarks]; Address of George T. Cronin, Secretary of the National Conference of Bar Examiners in 32 Ba EXAMINER 84-85 (1963) [hereinafter cited
as Cronin Address].
'"The right to deny the privilege to practice to such an applicant appears
to be fundamental." Cronin Address at 85.
In this great democracy of ours, we, as bar examiners, are, therefore,
intrusted with what might well prove to be the key to the preservation of
what we know as a "way of life." . . . If we, as bar examiners, can successfully eliminate the subversive applicant . . . we will have prevented the infection of the bar. . . . This is our responsibility and task.

Kanner Remarks at 154-55.
'7 C.J.S. Attorney and Client §§ 7(b), 12 (1937) ; Brown and Fassett, Loyalty
Tests for Admission to the Bar,20 U. CHI. L. REv. 480 & n.1 (1953) [hereinafter
cited as Brown and Fassett]. See also Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366
U.S. 36, 40 & n.4 (1961).
'"Twenty-eight states report a character examination procedure that usually
includes a personal appearance."

SuRvEY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION, BAR EXAMINATIONS AND REQUIREMENTS FOR ADMISSION TO THE BAR 257 (1952). See gen-

erally Brown and Fassett at 483-87.
'Note, Constitutional Limitations on the Process of Admission to the Bar,
N.Y.U. INTRA. L. REv. 135, 152 (1969). See generally Larson, The Lawyer as
Conservative,40 CORNELL L.Q. 183 (1955).
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Recently a group of New York law students, applicants for the New
York Bar,6 and several organizations of lawyers and law students7
challenged the statutory regulations governing admission to that bar.'
After disposing of several procedural problems,9 Judge Friendly, expressing the majority's view in Law Students Civil Rights Research Council,
Inc. v. Wadmond,'° wrote what must be considered the most significant
opinion limiting the scope of bar-admission inquiry since the first
decision in Konigsberg v. State Bar of California."
The portion of section 90(1) (a) of the New York Judiciary Law
providing that an applicant for the state bar must possess the "character
and general fitness requisite for an attorney"'12 was found by Judge
Friendly to be constitutional. He analogized this language to the "good
moral character" approved by the Supreme Court in its second decision
3s
in Konigsberg v. State Bar of California.
Judge Friendly quoted
Konigsberg II as standing for the proposition that the requirement for bar
'The individuals had passed the required written examination.
"Law Students Civil Rights Research Council, Inc.; Columbia Law Students
Guild; and New York City Chapter of the National Lawyers Guild.
' The plaintiffs invoked the court's jurisdiction under the judiciary Act of 1948,
28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1964) to enforce the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (1964), which provides:
"Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress."

A three-judge court was convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1964).
' The procedural issues are beyond the scope of this note. The court found
standing, Law Students Civil Rights Research Council, Inc. v. Wadmond, 299 F.
Supp. 117, 122 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); found that the remedy sought was appropriate,
id. at 123; and declined to abstain on the merits. Id. at 124.
10299 F. Supp. 117 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), prob. juris. noted, 38 U.S.L.W. 3253
(U.S. Jan. 13, 1970).
1 353 U.S. 252 (1957).
1 N.Y. JuDIciARY LAw § 90(1) (a) (McKinney 1968) states in full:
Upon the state board of law examiners certifying that a person has
passed the required examination, or that the examination has been dispensed
with, the appellate division of the supreme court in the department to which
such person shall have been certified by the state board of law examiners, if
it shall be satisfied that such person possesses the character and general

fitness requisite for an attorney and counsellor-at-law, shall admit him to
practice as such attorney and counsellor-at-law in all the courts of this
state, provided that he has in all respects complied with the rules of the
court of appeals and the rules of the appellate divisions relating to the
admission of attorneys. (emphasis added)
12366 U.S. 36 (1961).
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applicants to possess good moral character could not "well be drawn
in question."'" Although there is some doubt that Konigsberg II actually
stands for that point,' 5 Friendly was probably correct in avoiding the
issue, since it was not squarely raised by the plaintiffs in his court.
Judge Friendly for the majority also held constitutional rule 9406
of article 94 of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules, which
requires that the applicant "furnish satisfactory proof to the effect . ..
that he believes in the form of government of the United States and is
loyal to such government." In light of Speiser v. Randall,'0 a 1958
Supreme Court decision, rule 9406 raises a serious question about the
constitutionality of the burden of proof imposed upon an applicant for
the New York Bar. In Speiser, the Court held that a California statute
requiring a loyalty oath as a prerequisite to a veteran's tax exemption
placed an unconstitutional burden of proof on veterans by limiting their
freedom of speech and denying due process. Judge Motley, dissenting in
part in Law Students, found Speiser a binding precedent:
Here an applicant for admission to the bar has the burden of proving
that he is loyal to the government. If in the opinion to some members
of the character committee he should fail in this burden, he is denied
the requisite certificate. This means that the applicant is denied the
opportunity to enter the profession for which he has spent large sums
of money and much time in study. "So far as I am concerned the
consequences to the applicant whether considered from a financial
standpoint, a social standpoint, or any other standpoint I can think of,
constitute a more serious 'penalty' than that imposed upon Speiser,"
Konigsberg v. State Bar of California ...366 U.S. at 77 ...Mr.

Justice Black dissenting.
If, as in Speiser, the state cannot constitutionally impose upon a
veteran seeking a tax exemption the burden of proving loyalty to our
government, by what reasoning can the state constitutionally impose
such burden on one seeking a license to practice law ?17
14299 F. Supp. at 124.

'n Konigsberg was denied admittance to the bar for obstructing the investigation
into his background, not for lack of good moral character. The exact quotation in

Konigsberg 11 reads: ".

.

. is not, nor could well be, drawn in question here."

366 U.S. at 41 (emphasis added). Obviously, Mr. Justice Harlan, writing for
the majority in Konigsberg II, intended his remark to convey the thought that the
requirement of "good moral character" could not be drawn into question in that
case.
18 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
'

299 F. Supp. at 148 (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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Speiser was distinguished by the majority in Law Students, however, on
the ground that lawyers are within a limited class of persons who could
create a serious danger to the public if evilly motivated."8
Certain questions included in the questionnaires promulgated by the
bar-admission committees under the authority of the above statute and rule
were also challenged. It is in an analysis of the validity of these questions that the court confronted the central issue of Law Students: Does
the state exert a chilling effect on the associational and expressive rights
of applicants by demanding an answer to broad political questions as a
prerequisite to admission to the bar? Two of the questions survived the
constitutional challenge, and they require little discussion:
27(b) Can you conscientiously, and do you, affirm that you are,
without any mental reservation, loyal to and ready to support the
Constitution of the United States ?19
32(a) Have you read the Canons of Ethics adopted by the American and New York State Bar Associations?
(b) Will you conscientiously endeavor to conform your professional conduct to them ?2o
But three others were found to be improper.
The first and most significant was Question 26:
Have you ever organized or helped to organize or become a member of or participated in any way whatsoever in the activities of any
organization or group of persons which teaches (or taught) or advocates (or advocated) that the Government of the United States or any
State or any political subdivision thereof should be overthrown or
overturned by force, violence or any unlawful means ?21
The court ordered that this question be clarified to indicate "that the
organization's teaching or advocacy of violent overthrow must have
coincided in time with applicant's membership."2 2 In declaring Question
26 overbroad, Judge Friendly stated that
[t]he prospect of having to respond to [such] inquiry . . . might
have a deterring effect on exercise of the constitutionally protected
28 Id. at 125.
10Id.at
"0Id. at
1Id. at
2 Id. at

129.

132.
129.
131.
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right of free association ... [which may be] justified only when...

23
the interest of the state is compelling.

Perhaps the major case paralleling this proposition is Elfbralldt v.
Russell,' in which the Supreme Court, invalidating a similar oath for
Arizona state employees, stated, "[a] law which applies to membership
without the 'specific intent' to further the illegal aims [overthrow of the
government] of the organization infringes unnecessarily on protected
freedoms. It rests on the doctrine of 'guilt by association' which has no
place here." 2
Question 27(a) asked simply, "Do you believe in the principles
underlying the form of government of the United States of America ?,,2G
This question was declared so impermissibly vague and imprecise as to
be unconstitutional.2 ' The court in its conclusion concerning this question
appeared to draw an extremely fine line between it and rule 9406, requiring
belief in the form of government of the United States. The distinction
apparently hinged on two considerations. First, the court accepted the
bar examiners' interpretation of rule 9406 "as directing them 'to test
whether applicants for admission can truly subscribe to the constituitonal
oath of office.' "28 Thus, the phrase "form of government" was judicially
accepted to mean "constitution." Second, invalidation of one item on an
administrative questionnaire is not so abrasive as invalidation of the
statutory rule under which the entire questionnaire is promulgated.
Furthermore, the court was confronted only with the potential for abuse
under the broadly worded rule; no actual abuse was alleged by the
plaintiffs in their action for a declaratory judgment.
One wonders how far a committee of bar examiners could go in
denying admission to the bar on political grounds under a standard of
the applicant's loyalty to form of government. Could one who conscientiously objects to war,29 who is arrested during civil-rights activities,30
23!d.
2 384 U.S. 11 (1966). See also Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589,
606-10 (1967).
2"384 U.S. at 19.
2 8299 F. Supp. at 129.
27 "It seems unnecessary to require such an imprecise declaration from an applicant for admission to the bar." Id. at 130.
" Id. at 126. Judge Friendly "assume[s] a proper implementation of Rule 9406"
to reach his conclusion.
29 For a positive answer, see It re Summers, 325 U.S. 561 (1945), in which
the Supreme Court upheld Illinois' contention that Summers' refusal as a con-
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or who is an outspoken advocate of abolition of the draft and the end of
the Viet Nam War3" be barred? Would any of these actions be evidence
tending to rebut a belief in the form of government of the United States,
or even in the Constitution? The problem is that no one can tell-the
words "form of government" are broad and vague.
Question 31 asked: "Is there any incident in your life not called for
by the foregoing questions which has any favorable or detrimental bearing on your character or fitness? If the answer is 'yes' state the facts." 2
This question was held impermissible because of its serious in terrorem
effect, especially in light of the directions at the head of the bar-application
questionnaire:
This is a statement made under oath. Applicant's failure fully
and accurately to disclose any fact or information called for by any
question may result in the denial of the application for admission, or if
applicant shall have been admitted before the discovery thereof, in the
revocation of his license to practice law.m
The plaintiffs also claimed that required submission to personal interviews was an unwarranted invasion of personal and political privacy.
The court refused to interfere with this practice and said, "We have no
reason to assume that as the scope of the committees' written inquiry
is contracted, there will not be a similar adjustment in the focus of
their spoken questions." 3'4 It should be mentioned that the defendantexaminers, perhaps aware of the potential infringement on first-amendment
rights, made efforts during the course of litigation to remedy several
particularly defective questions. 5
How do bar-examiners' questions about past associations have a
scientious objector to serve in the military made it impossible for him to take the
no violation of the fourteenth amendment
constitutional oath. The Courtseefound
Hallinan v. Committee of Bar Examiners, 65
" For a negative answer,
Cal. 2d 447, 421 P.2d 76, 55 Cal. Rptr. 228 (1966), in which the court held that
convictions and fist fights surrounding civil-rights activities did not warrant
refusal of certification for admission to the bar.
"A majority of the members of the Georgia Legislature felt that Mr. Julian
Bond's statement of opposition to the draft and the Viet Nam War disqualified him
-from taking a constitutional oath of office for service in that body. The Supreme
'Court rejected this contention. Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116, 125 (1966).
"299 F. Supp. at 131.
88
d. at 132.
" Id. This assumption is only one of a number made by Judge Friendly. Quaere,
-should the court assume a narrowing of the oral investigation when it is within the
,court's power to order such a step?
8 Id. at 129.
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chilling effect on applicants' first-amendment rights of free speech and
association.?" A law student generally discovers quite early in his
legal career that he will be held accountable for his associations before the
bar; thus he may be encouraged to avoid anything but the most orthodox
political associations.3 7 Furthermore, the vagueness and breadth of the
questions often contained in questionnaires by bar examiners make it
difficult to decide what to include in the answers.3 8 It has been suggested
" Mr. Justice Black, dissenting in Konigsberg II, described the effect well:
If every person who wants to be a lawyer is to be required to account for his
associations as a prerequisite to admission into the practice of law, the only
safe course for those desiring admission would seem to be scrupulously to
avoid association with any organization that advocates anything at all somebody might possibly be against, including groups whose activities are
constitutionally protected under even the most restricted notion of the First
Amendment.
" A letter, dated March 18, 1970, from Julius L. Chambers, a prominent black
attorney and graduate of the University of North Carolina School of Law, to
J. Michael Brown indicates that
[m]any Negro law students, including myself, were deterred from joining
controversial organizations while in law school because of fear of possible
reprisals in efforts for admission to the North Carolina Bar. One of the
associations ...

was the NAACP.

The North Carolina State Bar Admission Application Questionnaire provides
classic examples of broad inquiries into a prospective lawyers' past associations
and political activities:
39. Are you now or have you ever been a member of any civic, fraternal,
professional, charitable, honorary or other organization? If so, name them.
8

40. Are you now or have you ever been a member of any organization,
association, movement, group or combination of persons engaged in the
activity or business of influencing public opinion or legislation or fostering
or attempting to foster legislation in this or any other State or relating to
any branches of the Federal Government? If so, give full particulars.
41. Are you now or have you ever been a member of any organization,
association, movement, group or combination of persons which advocates
the overthrow of our constitutional form of government, or which has adopted
the policy of advocating or approving the commission of acts of force or
violence to deny other persons their rights under the Constitution of the
United States or which seeks to alter the form of government of the United
States by unconstitutional means? If so, give full particulars.
42. Are you now or have you ever been a member of the Communist
Party? If so, give the date or dates of your membership.
43. Are you now or have you ever been a member of, or associated with
any organization, association, movement, group or combination of persons
affiliated with, dominated by, or sympathetic to the Communist Party, or
having other anti-social aims or objectives, or identified as being so affiliated?
If so, give full particulars.
44. Have you ever engaged in any of the following activities of any
organization of the type described above (Questions' 39 'through 43): contributions to, attendance at or participation in any organizational, social,
educational, or other activities of said organizations or of any projects
sponsored by them; the sale, gift, or distribution of any written, printed, or
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that "hectoring students about membership in left-wing organizations, like
National Lawyers Guild . . ." may force them to perjure themselves by

giving answers best fitted to assure admission.39
If questions by bar examiners concerning past associations have a
chilling effect on a law student's associational freedoms, is it permissible
for the bar to ask them no matter how precisely they are phrased? In
Konigsberg J,40 the Supreme Court refused to reach first-amendment
grounds raised by an applicant for admission to the California bar
although Mr. justice Black, speaking for the majority, indicated that the
claims involving freedom of speech and association were not frivolous.4 1
At his bar-admission hearing, Konigsberg had refused to answer questions
that he considered to be political in nature. On the basis of this refusal,
the admission committee found that he had not sustained his burden
of proof of good moral character. The Supreme Court held that a mere
refusal to answer the questions was not sufficient evidence to support that
finding.4" In a companion case, Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners,4 3
the Court held that facts about Schware's political activities that were
brought out at the administrative hearing44 bore no rational connection to
his fitness to practice law. The bar's refusal to admit him on lack of
good moral character was held to have violated due process. 45
other matter, prepared, reproduced, or published, by them or any of their
agents or instrumentalities? If so, give full particulars.
68. Are there any unfavorable incidents in your life whether at school,
college, law school, business, or otherwise, which may have a bearing upon
your character or your fitness to practice law, not called for by the questions contained in your questionnaire or disclosed in your answers? .

..

if

yes, give full details.
" Brown and Fassett, supra note 3, at 501.

" Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252 (1957).
"Id. at 270.
"Id. at 262. The Court found a violation of due process and equal protection.
A close examination reveals the embryo of the "obstruction theory" (see text
preceding note 47 infra), which flowered in Konigsberg II:
If it were possible for us to say that the Board had barred Konigsberg
solely because of his refusal to respond to its inquiries into his political
association . . . then we would be compelled to decide far-reaching and
complex questions ....

Id. at 261. See also, id. at 259 & n.12. Bar examiners were quick to catch this
distinction. See Kanner Remarks at 160-61.
,3353 U.S. 232 (1957).

"Schware had been a member of the Communist Party between 1932 and 1940,
had used an alias in labor-organizing activities to avoid prejudice against Jews,
and had been arrested several times whd involved in labor disputes but had not
....
been convicted. Id. at 236-38.
,I ld. at 247.
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In 1961, the Supreme Court was directly faced with the first-amendment issues in Konigsberg 114 and developed the "obstruction rule."
Essentially on the same facts as those in Konigsberg I, the Court held that
a refusal to answer questions considered relevant to the investigation by
the bar-admission committee could constitutionally result in a denial of
admission on the ground that the applicant was obstructing the committee. Mr. Justice Harlan, writing for the five-man majority, had no
trouble in deciding that the state's interest outweighed any intrusion into
an area protected by the first amendment. A companion case, In re
Anastaplo,4" reaffirmed the "obstruction rule," notwithstanding overwhelming evidence of the applicant's good moral character. 49 Anastaplo
had persistently refused to answer any questions about his political
associations,50 and the Court again rejected the first-amendment argument.5 '
It has now been nine years since the "obstruction rule" was formulated, and in no case during this period has the Supreme Court considered
the constitutional aspects of political inquiry by bar examiners. There
have been, however, a number of cases that indicate the Court's unwillingness to sanction answers to political questions as a condition to public
employment or office. The attorney's position is analogous to that of a
public employee since he occupies a position of trust and of responsibility
to the public at large. The usual differentiation made between lawyers
and public employees is that the former are not agents of the state nor
salaried by it and therefore need not be as closely scrutinized. Justice
Fortas, concurring in Spevack v. Klein, 2 a case involving the fifth
amendment, illustrated the point:
But a lawyer is not an employee of the State. He does not have
the responsibility of an employee to account to the State for his actions
" Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36 (1961).
"7Id. at 49-53.
,8366 U.s. 82 (1961).
"Id. at 105-06 (dissenting opinion).
"He was questioned about association with the Ku Klux Klan, Silver Shirts,
any organization on the Attorney-General's subversive list, Democratic Party,
Republican Party, Communist Party, and the Diety. Id. at 102 (dissenting opinion).
He did advocate a "right to revolution" and grounded his belief on a paraphrase
of the Declaration of Independence. Id. at 99.
" "[T]he State's interest in enforcing such a rule as applied to refusals to answer
questions about membership in the Commi-nist Party outweighs any deterrent effect
upon freedom of speech and association ... ." Id. at 89.
"385 U.S. 511 (1967).
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because he does not perform them as [an] agent .... The special responsibilities that he assumes as licensee of the State and officer of the
court do not carry with them a diminution, however limited, of his
53
Fifth Amendment rights.
Judge Friendly in Law Students was confronted with the bar examiners'
counterargument that public teachers deserve more protection of their
constitutional rights because of their peculiar, sensitive need for academic
freedom, 4 but he apparently rejected this theory." The close analogy
between attorneys and public officers or employees militates for a review
of the doctrines underlying Konigsberg II and Anastaplo.
The Supreme Court's aversion to the conditioning of public employment or office on a limitaiton of first-amendment freedoms is evident in
0
the line of cases since 1961 that involved loyalty oaths." The earliest of
5
these cases, Cramp v. Board of Public Instruction," held a loyalty oath for
teachers in Orange County, Florida, impermissibly vague. The Court
declared, "[T]he vice of unconstitutional vagueness is further aggravated where, as here, the statute in question operates to inhibit the exer8
cise of freedoms affirmatively protected by the Constitution."" In Baggett
9
v. Bullitt"' the Court held that states may not condition employment upon
oaths 0 that are so vague that they serve to inhibit free speech. 1 And in
Bond v. Floyd6" the Court rejected, on first-amendment grounds, the
notion that the Georgia Legislature could deny Bond his seat in that
body on the basis that his opposition to national foreign policy and the
selective-service system rendered him unable to take with sincerity the
Georgia oath of office.

8

Id. at 520 (concurring opinion).
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960).
299 F. Supp. at 130-31.
is the most recent
'Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967),
affirmation of the Court's aversion to loyalty oaths for those seeking public positions.
1368 U.S. 278 (1961).
8
I at 287.
Id.
'

377 U.S. 360 (1964).

The challenged oath read: "I solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will.., by
precept and example promote respect for the flag and the institutions of the
United States . . .reverence for law and order and undivided allegiance to the
government of the United States." Id. at 361-62.
1
Id.at 372-73. The Court also held that the oath violated due process. Id. at
371.62
385 U.S. 116 (1966).
" Interestingly, Judge Friendly quoted Bornd v. Floyd in Law Students (299
F. Supp. at 126) for the proposition that a legislature need not seat one elected
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As this case note goes to press, Law Students0 4 and its companion
cases0 5 are before the Supreme Court. They will again provide the Court
with the opportunity to balance first-amendment freedoms against the
need of society for political inquires by bar examiners. The Court's
reappraisal will have to be made in light of the aforementioned cases dealing with loyalty oaths.
What is socially desirable about the practice of bar-admission committees excluding or even searching out subversive applicants ?", A recent
article suggests that even the "hard-core revolutionary" does not present
a great danger to the state and that whatever dangers he creates can be
adequately handled through the contempt powers of the courts and disWould it not be better for one who believes in
barment procedures.
to
work within the existing system than without?
radical political reform
If bar committees "chill" leftwing applicants, will not the bar's membership
increase by a proportionately greater number of orthodox, conservative
members-thus further dividing those who seek radical political and social
reform from those within the "power structure?" Such stratification
cannot be said to be in the best interests of a democratic government.0 8
This generation of politically active students should be encouraged to
to membership who swears to an oath pro forma but who disagrees with that oath.

Judge Friendly felt that bar-admission committees may make a reasonable inquiry whether a student can take an oath with sincerity.
"SLaw Students Civil Rights Research Council, Inc. v. Wadmond, 299 F. Supp.
117 (1969), prob. juris. noted, 38 U.S.L.W. 3253 (U.S. Jan. 13, 1970).
" In re Stolar, cert. granted, 396 U.S. 816 (1969) ; Baird v. State Bar, cert.
granted, 394 U.S. 957 (1969). These two cases, having already been orally argued
before the court, have been restored to the calendar for reargument: Baird, 396
U.S. 998 (1970); Stolar, 396 U.S. 999 (1970). They involve the petitioners'
refusal to answer bar committees' political questions and subsequent denials of
admission that were grounded, as in Konigsberg II and Anastaplo, on the "obstruction rule."
" Apparently some state bars do not. See Brown and Fassett, supra note 3, at
497:
It is also relevant, for the sake of perspective, to record that at least
seventeen states apparently make no loyalty investigation and have no loyalty
tests at all, except the traditional oath to uphold the constitution. They are
Arizona, Georgia, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi,
Missouri, Nevada, Nebraska, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. To these may be added
Connecticut, except New Haven County.
7Taylor, Inquiries into the Political Beliefs and Activities of Applicants for
Admission to the Bar, 1 CoLum. SuRVEY OF HUMAN RIGHTS L. 33, 40-45 (196768). " In short, "[tio force the Bar to become a group of thoroughly orthodox,
time-serving, government-fearing individuals is to humiliate and degrade it."
In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82, 115-16 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting).
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enter the field of law rather than discouraged. No one should feel that
leftwing political leanings or associations might result in a denial of
admission to the bar. As Judge Motley pointed out in his opinion in
Law Students, "It is nothing short of a complete irony that lawyers who
fought for and won constituitonal protections for other professions are
the last to receive protection for themselves." 69 It is true that only a
very small percentage of all applicants are rejected by state bars on
grounds of character.Y However, the real problem to be confronted is
not the denial of admission occasioned by political probing of bar
examiners, but the "chilling effect" on freedom of speech and association.
Until required by the courts, all bar examiners should voluntarily share
the view of Robert E. Seifer, Secretary of the Missouri Board of Law
Examiners in 1952:
Speaking solely for myself, I so not think that inquiry into political
beliefs has any place in bar examination work. I think that the study
of law is the best training anyone can have for becoming a good American and I do not think it should be cluttered up with investigations
about political beliefs and whether or not the applicant happens to
agree with what a majority of the people may or may not consider at
71
the moment to be subversive.
J. MICHAEL BRowN

Colleges and Universities-Constitutional Law-Legality of
Broad Rules Governing Student Behavior
It is clear that the federal courts are concerned about the standards

of procedural fairness observed by colleges and universities at disciplinary
hearings.' But the courts have been extremely reluctant to scrutinize
substantive rules that govern student behavior and more reluctant still
to void such rules because of constitutional infirmity.2 Using Esteban v.
0"299 F. Supp. at 146 (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part).
10 Estimates from New York, California, and Illinois bar admission rejections
in 1952 indicates that only one-half of one per cent of all applicants were rejected
on grounds of character. Brown and Fassett, supra note 3, at 497.
"'Id. at 508. Quoting a letter from Robert E. Seifer.
'E.g., Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961);
Zanders v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 281 F. Supp. 747 (W.D. La. 1968);
Jones v. State Bd. of Educ., 279 F. Supp. 190 (M.D. Tenn. 1968); Esteban v.
Central Mo. State College, 277 F. Supp. 649 (W.D. Mo. 1967).
'See e.g., Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957); Steiner v. New
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CentralMissouri State University,' a recent case by the Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit, as a framework for analysis, this note will consider the extent to which the courts can adequately protect students from
arbitrary action by school administrations if judicial review is limited
to procedural matters at the expense of substantive considerations. This
examination will be done, first, by measuring the college regulations in
Esteban against the constitutional standards of vagueness and overbreadth and, second, by considering the Eighth Circuit's application of
the rules to the factual events of the case. Throughout the note, a comparison will be drawn between the court's handling of the students' acts
in Esteban and the judicial treatment generally accorded similar occurrences in a non-college context.
On the evenings of both March 29 and 30, 1969, demonstrations took
place on the campus of Central Missouri State College. During these incidents, six hundred dollars of damage was done to college property, a public
highway was blocked, traffic was halted, and cars were rocked and their
occupants forced out into the street.' On the basis of acts committed
during these incidents, two students, Alfredo Esteban and Steve C. Robards, were suspended from school for two semesters after they were orally
advised of the charges against them and were given an informal conference with the Dean of Men. Alleging a denial of due process, Esteban
and Robards sought an injunction against their dismissal in federal
district court. The district court directed the school to grant the plaintiffs a new hearing at which certain procedural rights were to be
accorded, including the right to notice of charges, the right to rudimentary
discovery, the right to presence of counsel, the right to confront adverse
witnesses, the right to call friendly witnesses, and the right to record the
proceedings.5

At the new hearing granted by the university, Esteban and Robards
York State Educ. Comm'r, 271 F.2d 13 (2d Cir. 1959) ; Greene v. Howard Univ.,
271 F. Supp. 609 (D.D.C. 1967); Connelly v. University of Vt. and State Agricultural College, 244 F. Supp. 156 (D. Vt. 1965); Due v. Florida A.&M. Univ.,
233 F. Supp. 396 (N.D. Fla. 1963).
'415 F.2d 1077 (8th Cir. 1969). The opinion of the court was written by
then Circuit Judge Blackmun, whose future decisions may be of considerably more
moment. On May 12, 1970, Judge Blacknun was unanimously confirmed by the
United States Senate to a seat on the United States Supreme Court. A strong
dissent was registered by Judge Lay both on the merits and on the procedural issue
of whether a federal court should merely review a disciplinary proceeding by a
state college rather than grant a trial de novo.
'Esteban v. Central Mo. State College, 415 F.2d 1077, 1079 (8th Cir. 1969).
'Esteban v. Central Mo. State College, 277 F. Supp. 649 (W.D. Mo. 1967).
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were given a full measure of procedural guarantees and were again suspended for two semesters. These suspensions were upheld by the district
court0 and, subsequently, by the Eighth Circuit.'
THE REGULATIONS

The following regulations of the college were quoted by the Eighth
Circuit as pertinent to the suspension of Robards and Esteban:
All students are expected to conform to ordinary and accepted social
customs and to conduct themselves at all times and in all places in a
manner befitting a student of Central Missouri State College.
When a breach of. regulations involves a mixed group, ALL MEMBERS ARE HELD EQUALLY RESPONSIBLE.
Conduct unbefitting a student which reflects adversely upon himself or the institution will result in disciplinary action.
Mass Gatherings-Participation in mass gatherings which might
be considered as unruly or unlawful will subject a student to possible
immediate dismissal from the College. Only a few students intentionally
get involved in mob misconduct, but many so-called "spectators" get
drawn into a fracas and by their very presence contribute to the
dimensions of the problems. It should be understood that the College
considers no student to be immune from due process of law enforcement when he is in violation as an individual or as a member of a

crowd. 8
The principles of due process contained in the fourteenth amendment
require that before a state may fairly punish an individual, it must give
adequate notice of the conduct that is prohibitedY A statute that does
not properly describe illegal conduct is unconstitutionally vague. 10 If
men of common intelligence must guess at the meaning of a statute or if
they could reasonably differ as to its application, it must fail for vagueness." When preferred freedoms such as speech, press, religion, and
assembly are involved, the standard is more demanding:
'Esteban v. Central Mo. State College, 290 F. Supp. 622 (W.D. Mo. 1968).
7Esteban v. Central Mo. State College, 415 F.2d 1077 (8th Cir. 1969).
8415 F.2d at 1079.
- Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951). See generally Collings, Unconstitutional Uncertainty-An Appraisal, 40 CORNELL L.Q. 195 (1955); Scott,
Constitutional Limitations on Substantive Criminal Law, 29 RoCKY MT. L. REV.
275 (1957); Note, Uncertainty In College Disciplinary Regilations, 29 OHio
ST. L.J. 1023 (1968).
"0Cramp v. Board of Public, Instructid i, .368 U.S.-278 (1961); Dickson v.
Sitterson, 280 F. Supp. 486 (M.D.N.C. 1968).
" Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
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[S]tricter standards of permissible statutory vagueness may be applied
to a statute having a potentially inhibiting effect on speech; a man
may the less be required to act at his peril here, because the free dis12
semination of ideas may be the loser.
Do the regulations in Esteban exhibit sufficient specificity to avoid
the constitutional prohibition against vagueness? The first of the college
rules under which Esteban and Robards were disciplined prohibited any
mass gathering "which might be considered as unruly or unlawful." By
definition, an "illegal gathering" must amount to conduct punishable under
a properly explicit statute or state regulation; otherwise, the standard
pertaining to vagueness is not satisfied. Whether a crowd is "unruly" is
a question on which reasonable men could differ. Are spectators "unruly" if, at a sporting event, they boo the referee? Are the participants in
a raucous fraternity party or an audience that hurls marshmellows at an
unpopular speaker "unruly"? These questions are difficult, and answers
are not likely to be uniform. The phrase "might be considered" in the
regulation would further reduce expected uniformity of opinion because
the inclusion of such language introduces additional elements of sub-

jectivity.
The second regulation in issue in Esteban required students to "conform to ordinary and accepted social customs and to conduct themselves
at all times and in all places in a manner befitting a student of Central
Missouri State College." Are the social customs to which the regulation
refers those accepted by the campus radicals, the "straight" students,
the average Missouri citizen, or the faculty wives' association? Is it
"befitting" a student to vociferously demand constitutional freedoms, or
is it "unbefitting" to refrain from such actions? There is surely a quantum
of vagueness and uncertainty in this regulation.
The court found no merit in the defendant's attack on the vagueness
of the regulations, said that the regulations were not hard to understand,
and expressed confidence that college students could find certainty in
them.' 3 The court further indicated that even if the rules were somewhat
14
broad, they were still valid because "flexibility and reasonable breadth"
in student regulations are not constitutionally fatal. The court joined in
the opinion of those "qualified and experienced" in the field of education
who have felt it preferable for codes of student behavior to be general
1

Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 151 (1959).

13415 F.2d at 1088.

"Id.
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rather than specific, and it cited as authority three articles-all written
by and for college administrators. 5 It is not particularly startling that
such individuals would prefer broad, general rules; for the writing of
new codes would probably be their task, and any code with specific
regulations would sharply curtail their discretion in matters of student
discipline. The court failed to note that others "qualified" in the field
of education 6 -such as the American Association of University Professors, the National Student Association, and the American Associations
of Colleges-and some "experienced" in the field of law-such as Professors Wright,' Linde,' 8 and Van Alstyne 9-- have argued that specificity20 in student rules is preferred, if not required.
Ir rd.
11 Joint Statement on Rights and Freedoms of Students, AM. Ass'N. OF Uxiv.
PROFESSoRs BULL. (Summer 1968). The following organizations have approved
the Joint Statement: U.S. National Student Association, Association of American
Colleges, American Association of University Professors, National Association
of Student Personnel Administrators, National Association of Women Deans and
Counselors, American Association for Higher Education, Jesuit Education Association, American College Personnel Association, Executive Committee, College and
University Department, National Catholic Education Association, Commission on
Student Personnel, American Association of Junior Colleges. It is interesting to
note that one authority on this point cited by the court (415 F.2d at 1088) is taken
from a publication of the American College Personnel Association, one'of the

groups
that has adopted the Joint Statement.
1
"Wright, The Constitution on
18
Linde, Campus

Campus, 22 VAND. L. Rnv. 1027, 1064 (1969).
Law: Berkeley Viewed From Eugene, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 40

(1966).

" Van Alstyne, The Student as University Resident, 45

(1968).

DENVER

L.J. 582, 592

20 Support for the proposition that student disciplinary rules should be specific
rather than general is found in the nature of a second act that the college, sustained
by the court, found sufficiently culpable to punish. This act was the writing of
a letter by Robards to a Missouri state legislator that contained the following
language:
I assure you, I do not stand alone in my disgust with this institution. From

suppression of speech and expression to ridiculous, trivial regulations this
college has done more to discourage democratic belief than any of the world's
tyrants. ... My comrades and I plan on turning this school into a Berkeley
if something isn't done.
415 F.2d at 1081.
In this letter the court could find no expression of a grievance (id. at 1084)
although the language in the second sentence about suppression of speech and
trivial regulations certainly has a grievance-like ring. The court also found a flat
threat contained in the seemingly-ambiguous third sentence (id.). Even assuming
that the court was correct in asserting that correspondence to a state legislator is
punishable if it either contains a veiled threat or does not with sufficient specificity
articulate a grievance, the court by its approach dealt in reality with whether these
acts could be punished at all rather than with whether they could be punished
under the regulations involved in the case. A student would have to be almost
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In addition to cases dealing with "vagueness" in governmental laws
and rules, a second line of precedent involves the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions.21 The courts have made it abundantly clear that the
constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech,22 assembly,23 and press 24
operate with full vigor on college campuses. While a state is not required
to provide subsidized higher education for its citizens, 25 it may not condition the enjoyment of such a privilege on the surrender of preferred
constitutional rights, at least in the absence of a compelling state interest.2 6 What must be settled is whether the constitutional guarantee of
freedom of assembly extends to "unruly or unlawful" mass gatherings.
It is fairly easy to maintain that it does not extend to unlawful gatherings,27 but it is extremely difficult to say that the guarantee does not
clairvoyant to anticipate that writing such a letter could be punished under either
pertinent regulation. Perhaps a student should be expected to realize that politically
sensitive school administrators might consider any complaint lodged with state
legislators to be inherently "conduct unbefitting."
2"Robards was on disciplinary probation at the time of the incident, a fact
on which the court placed great emphasis. (415 F.2d at 1079, 1088). Although
generally a college may not place unconstitutional conditions on the enjoyment
of state-granted educational privileges, can such conditions be imposed pursuant to
college disciplinary action by analogy to the case of a citizen who can be constitutionally deprived of certain fundamental rights while on probation or parole?
Cooper v. United'States, 91 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1937) (probationer is not a free
man but is subject to such restrictions as a court may impose); Adamo v. McCorkle,
26 N.J. Super. 562, 98 A.2d 597 (1953) (right to travel may be restricted). Although there appear to be no cases involving this question, two distinctions between
the situations seem to compel a negative response. First, state and federal courts
are constitutionally established and invested with the full authority of the state or
federal government to completely deprive an individual of his liberty in appropriate circumstances, a power which college disciplinary bodies do not possess.
Second, state and federal courts must strictly observe the full range of procedural
rights accorded by the Constitution and can punish only under laws drawn to
satisfy constitutional specifications, limitations that do not all obtain on campus.
22 Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 404 (1923).
28
Hammond v. South Carolina State College, 272 F. Supp. 947 (D.S.C. 1967).
2
Dickey v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 273 F. Supp. 613 (M.D. Ala. 1967).
See generally Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393
U.S. 503 (1969), for a discussion of first-amendment rights in the educational
context.
" Hamilton v. Regents of Univ. of Calif., 293 U:S. 245 (1934); Dixon v.
Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 156 (5th Cir. 1961).
2 Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1966); Dickson v. Sitterson, 280
F. Supp. 486 (M.D.N.C. 1968).
"'Ina context such as this one, stating that certain conduct is constitutionally
protected means that the interest of the state is not sufficiently compelling to
justify limitation of preferred freedoms, of which assembly is one. The state
has an interest in the preservation of order on the campus, which can in some cases
be of such importance that freedoms may be abridged. But at least one case,
Sellers v. Johnson, 163 F.2d 877 (8th Cir. 1947), cert; denied, 332 U.S. 851
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extend to "unruly" assemblies. In both Edwards v. South Carolinaps
29
the crowds were dancing, clapping and singing
and Cox v. Louisiana,
loudly. Although in both situations the deportment of the crowds could
reasonably be described as unruly, the Supreme Court held that the congregations involved were constitutionally protected by the right to freely
assemble.3 0 So, if indeed there is a constitutional right to participate in
an unruly mass gathering, a statute promulgated in the non-academic
world abridging that freedom would be fatally contrary to the demands
of the Constitution. If the first amendment applies with full vigor on
the campus, as the courts maintain,3 1 a similar rule issued by a state
college or university should also be void.
A final notion, perhaps not yet raised to the level of a constitutional
doctrine, related to the rule-making power of a state university is that
the school may discipline a student only for conduct that interferes with
the institution's primary function-namely, "imparting and expanding
the boundaries of knowledge." 32 This concept represents the furtherest
departure to date from the once-popular idea that the school stands in
loco parentis to the student and has despotic power to regulate every
phase of his life.33 The primary-function theory holds, for example, that
while a school may validly punish a student for plagiarism, an offense not
punishable by general society but clearly a danger to the institution's teaching function, it should leave to the civil authorities such serious, but
educationally unrelated, offenses as reckless driving or shoplifting. This
4
principle has been widely accepted by legal scholars, but it has accrued
(1948), has held that anticipation of violence is not stifficient justification for
preventing assemblies.
28372 U.S. 229 (1963).
='379 U.S. 536 (1965).
See also Sellers v. Johnson, 163 F.2d 877 (8th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332
U.S. 851 (1948).
"' Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503
(1969).
82 Sherry, Governance of the University: Rides, Rights and Responsibilities,
L. REv. 23, 38 (1966).
54 CALIF.
"8North v. Board of Trustees of the Univ. of Ill., 137 Ill. 296, 27 N.E. 54
Gott v. Berea College, 156 Ky. 376, 161 S.W. 204 (1913).
(1891);
8
McKay, The Student as Private Citizen, 45 DENVER L.J. 558, 561-63 (1968);
Sherry, Governance of the University: Rights, Rides, and Responsibilities, 54
CALIF. L. REv. 23, 38 (1966); Van Alstyne, Student Academic Freedom and the
Rule-Making Powers of Public Universities: Some Constitutional Considerations,
3 LAW IN TRANS. Q. 1, 28-33 (1965); Note, Reasonable Rules, Reasonably
Enforced-Gidelines for University Disciplinary Proceedings, 53 MINN. L. Rnv.
301, 336 (1968).
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only a small following among the courtsY 5 It is interesting to note that the

trial court that decided Esteban accepted this idea."0 Despite its lack
of universal acceptance, the primary-function principles serves as both
an analytical tool and, perhaps, a preview of a soon-to-be-established rule
of law. When the two regulations involved in Esteban are measured
by this principle, the rule governing mass gatherings would be easily
acceptable (assuming that it was not too vague) because colleges and
universities have every right to suppress or prevent riots and disturbances
that might interfere with the orderly pursuit of learning. The "conductbefitting" rule, however, can only be tested by resorting to the particular
factual situation so that it can be ascertained whether the school had any
valid interest in the conduct that it sought to punish.
THE CULPABLE ACTS3

7

Robards

On the first night of disturbances, Robards was present as a spectator
at the scene for thirty minutes; on the second, he was present for one
hour, again as an observer. On both occasions he talked with other students in the crowd, and on the second night he discussed with others what
was taking place and expressed his disgust with the college. He also
observed some of the illegal acts of the crowd. 8 As a consequence of these
acts, Robards was cited for "contributing to and participating in an unruly and unlawful mass gathering."' 9
One procedural right on which the courts have uniformly insisted
for students appearing before college disciplinary boards is that they
cannot be punished in the absence of "substantial evidence."4 In light
of this guarantee, how could the Eighth Circuit conclude that there was
substantial evidence of participation by Robards in the crowd's unlawful
acts when it was shown that he did nothing but stand in the crowd and
" Goldberg v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 248 Cal. App. 2d 867, 871, 57 Cal.
Rptr. 463, 472 (1st Dist. Ct. App. 1967).
" 290 F. Supp. 622, 629 (1968).
" Space limitations prohibit a thorough discussion of all acts charged against
Robards and Esteban, but all acts not analyzed in the text will be mentioned in the
notes.
88 415 F.2d at 1080.

Id. at 1082.
' Jones v. State Bd. of Educ., 279 F. Supp. 190, 200 (M.D. Tenn. 1968);
Esteban v. Central Mo. State College, 277 F. Supp. 649 (W.D. Mo. 1967). See
also General Order on Judicial Standards of Procedure and Substance in Review
of Student Discipline in Tax Supported Institutions of Higher Education, 45
F.R.D. 133 (W.D. Mo. 1968).
89
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converse with his schoolmates? Cases cited by the court itself clearly
establish the principle that a citizen may not be criminally punished for
mere presence in a crowd that committed unlawful acts. 41 In Rollins v.
Shannon42 a district court stated unequivocally that "it is clear that mere
presence at an unlawful assembly does not render one liable to arrest
and prosecution .... One must intend to and in fact participate. ' 4' And
in Scoggin v. Lincoln University44 this same principle of "mere presence"
was applied to a case involving a college demonstration. The court
refused to uphold the expulsion of a student by the university because,
while he had been active in organizing the incident and had been present
throughout the violence that resulted, it was not shown that he had
participated in any illegal activity.4 5
Choosing not to rely on decisions directly in point, the Eight Circuit
in Esteban looked to cases from the nonacademic world for a principle
that could be applied to campus activity.4 u The court adopted the
"rational-connection" principle that was first announced in Tot v. United
States47 in 1943 and approved as late as May, 1969, in Leary v. United
States48 to uphold Robards' suspension. This test is stated in United States
v. Romano4" in the following manner: "Such a legislative determination would not be sustained if there was 'no rational connection between
the fact proved and the ultimate fact presumed, if the inference of the
one from proof of the other is arbitrary because of lack of connection...
in common experience.' "50 By adopting this test, the court in Esteban
raised for itself the problem of deciding whether the fact of mere presence
in a crowd is connected in common experience to actual participation in
punishable activity. Does common experience indicate that each individual
in a crowd of several hundred is guilty of every illegal act of the crowd?
The court asserted that Robards "[in] ay not have stopped any automobile,
4' Barr v. Columbia, 378 U.S. 146, 150 (1964) ; Rollins v. Shannon, 292 F. Supp.
580, 590 (E.D. Mo. 1968).
2292 F. Supp. 580 (E.D. Mo. 1968).
-id. at 590.
"291 F. Supp. 161 (W.D. Mo. 1968).
0

2Id.

While refusing to apply such fundamental principles as "void-for-vagueness"
(see discussion pp. 945-48 supra) and "unconstitutional conditions" (see pp. 948-49
spra), the court unquestioningly applied a severely criticized doctrine of secondary
importance.
41 319 U.S. 463 (1943).
48395 U.S. 6 (1969).
'p382 U.S. 136 (1965).
50Id.at 139.
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or rocked it or forced out its occupants or damaged property, but these
incidents took place and were caused by the mob and he was a part of
the mob." 5 1 Since in deciding whether the requisite "rationality" is
present, subjective factors are probably determinative, it is impossible to
say that the court was wrong. But even if its conclusion was correct,
the result would seem to make every casual bystander guilty of any illegal
act of that amorphous and ill-defined entity, the crowd. The court's
rationale would force an individual contemplating attendance at a gathering
to accurately forecast the presence or absence of violence in order to avoid
punishment. 52 Rollins v. Shannon53 and other cases establish the proposition that this result could not obtain outside the college environment, and
Scoggin v. Lincoln University54 indicates that it should not apply to
activities related to the campus.
Esteban
On the first evening of disturbances, Esteban left his dormitory about
the time that the disruptions were subsiding and proceeded to within a
short distance of the intersection that had been the center of the violence.
There he encountered Dr. Meverden, a faculty member who was seeking
to disperse the remaining students. Meverden twice asked Esteban to
return to his dormitory; twice Esteban refused, insisting that he was
breaking no law and that he "had a right to be out there."55 Esteban
argued with Meverden, questioned his authority, and said that there were
no rules limiting the time men could stay outside the dormitories.
Shortly thereafter, at the encouragement of other students present, Esteban
did return to the dormitory. 6 At the college disciplinary proceeding,
Esteban was charged, inter alia, with "contributing to and participation
in an unruly and unlawful mass gathering . .. in that ... [he] ... did
resist the efforts of one Dr. M. L. Meverden in dispersing said mass
gathering.. .. ""
,415

F.2d at 1085. Judge Lay's dissenting opinion stated categorically that

"there is no evidence whatsoever to show that Robards was a 'participant' in any
unlawful disturbance or illegal demonstration." Id. at 1093.
2Id. at 1080. The
dissent in Esteban strongly supported the idea that a student
should not be forced to take this risk. The dissenting judge also seemed to feel
that the chilling effect of this result on the exercise of first-amendment freedoms
was not properly considered by the majority. Id. at 1094-96.
"'292 F. Supp. 580 (E.D. Mo. 1698).
" 291 F. Supp. 161 (W.D. Mo. 1968).
rr 415 F.2d at 1080.
56Id.
17 Id.

at 1081.
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In considering the events that the Eighth Circuit found sufficient to
warrant Esteban's suspension, it is important to note not only that there
was no proof that Esteban took part in any of the illegal acts committed
by members of the crowd but also that the facts established that he did not
leave his dormitory until "about the time the 'disturbance' had subsided." 8 Yet he too was charged with "contributing to and participating
in an unruly and unlawful mass gathering." 59 If it offends due process
to discipline an individual who was merely present in a crowd when
illegal acts were committed, a fortiori punitive action taken against a student who did not arrive at the scene until the disruption was almost over is
similarly offensive.
The charge against Esteban was couched in terms seeming to indicate
that it was the order-keeping function of the university upon which he
encroached. But this position is clearly untenable because Esteban did
eventually comply with Meverden's request that he return to his dormitory, thereby satisfying the university's interest in preventing further
violence. Perhaps Esteban was really punished for his tardiness in returning. But Esteban had been in the dormitory until the disturbance had
almost ended, and he may not have known that any illegal acts were committed. Moreover, it is unclear whether Esteban recognized Meverden as
a member of the faculty or whether Meverden identified himself. It would
seem that if such identity was not established, Esteban could not have
been punished whether he complied promptly, slowly, or not at all with
Meverden's instructions. These two factors would seem to provide
abundant justification for Esteban's less-than-precipitous return to his
dormitory.
A second possible basis for the charge is that Esteban was punished
for failing to comply with a directive of an administrator. The opinion
of the court is full of language supporting the idea that defiance of college
authority is an offense in itself.6 0 Apart from situations on the college campus, the proposition has been established that an individual may not be punished for failure to obey an official of the state unless the official's
directive is supported by a valid statute. 1 In Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham,12 the Supreme Court of the United States said, "Our decision makes
8Id.at

1080.
Id. at 1081.
Id. at 1084, 1088 and 1089. The dissent agreed. Id. at 1092.
"Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 579 (1965) (opinion dissenting in part and
concurring in part).
02382 U.S. 87 (1965).
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it clear that the mere refusal to move on after a police officer's requesting
that a person standing or loitering should do so is not enough to support
the offense."6 Therefore, it would appear that if Esteban's conduct were
not punishable under a valid statute or university regulation, his defiance
of proper authority could not, by itself, be punished.
One final possibility on which Esteban's suspension may have rested
is that mere disrespect for a member of the faculty or representative of
the administration is an offense in itself. At least one court has accepted
this principle.64 Others have not."5 Perhaps the question that should be
asked is what interest a school has in protecting the personal dignity of
an individual faculty member. In a context such as the one in Esteban,
in which the teaching functions of the school were not at stake, the university should have small or no interest, 0 especially since sanctions for
07
disrespect cannot, standing alone, possibly confer respect.
CONCLUSION

This note has shown that the standard of vagueness applied by the
Eighth Circuit in Esteban to test a state college's regulations is not as
strict as that normally applied to the ordinary criminal statute. It has
also been suggested that the court failed to take proper notice of the
doctrine of "unconstitutional conditions" and that the court found
punishable some acts that would not have been punishable if committed
away from the campus. These results occurred despite the fact that a
generous measure of procedural fairness was given both students.
The relaxing of constitutional standards applicable to substantive
regulations of state universities and colleges may seduce an unwary court
into an almost cavalier attitude toward student rules, a trap that may
have ensnared the Eighth Circuit. After asserting that the pertinent rules
were not vague6 " and that vagueness is not a fatal flaw," the court said,
"the college's regulations, per se, do not appear to us to constitute the
"Id. at 91.
,Jones v. State Bd. of Educ., 279 F. Supp. 190, 195 (M.D. Tenn. 1968). The
dissent in Esteban subscribed to this position. 415 F.2d at 1092.
" Breen v. Kahl, 296 F. Supp. 702, 708 (W.D. Wis. 1969) ; Dickey v. Alabama
State Bd. of Educ., 273 F. Supp. 613, 618 (M.D. Ala. 1967).
"See text at note 31 supra.
'7 Esteban was also disciplined for refusing to identify himself to Dr. Meverden
and for threatening and using obscene language toward a resident advisor of his
dormitory. 415 F.2d at 1081-82.

"See text at note 13 supra.
"See text at note 14 supra.
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fulcrum of the plaintiff's discomforture. The charges against Esteban and
Robards did not even refer to the regulations."" It is somewhat disturbing to find that an individual can be deprived of a college education on
the basis of vague rules, but it is much more upsetting to discover that
he may be deprived of it on the basis of some previously undefined common law rule governing the behavior of students. The federal and state
courts have written numerous opinions concerning the procedural rules
to be applied in college disciplinary proceedings; it is clear that they are
concerned that students not be arbitrarily denied the advantages of a public
college education. However, unfairness may not be purged from student
disciplinary action without the strict application of accepted constitutional
standards to the substantive rules. Professor Wright was very close
to the heart of the matter when he said:
If rules of this generality are permissible then students have gained
something, but not very much, from the decisions requiring procedural
safeguards to be observed. It will do a student very little good to be
given every protection of procedural due process ever thought of anywhere if, in the end, he may be expelled because the tribunal is free
to apply a subjective judgment about what is acceptable conduct.
71
This would be neither fair nor reasonable.
J. CLINTON EUDY

Corporations-Recovery of Indemnity by Passively
Negligent Directors
The exact nature of the legal relationship of corporate directors to the
corporation or its stockholders has long been a source of much confusion.
Various legal theories have been developed:
The position of directors has been variously designated and described. Thus, they have been called agents; and they certainly are
for some purposes agents of the corporation. They have also been
called "managing partners ;" but as they are obviously not partners
at all, the phrase is helpful only by analogy. Again, they have been
called "trustees." But a trustee is one who holds the title to property
for the benefit of another, and as directors are not invested with the
title to corporate property, the inaccuracy of the appellation is apparent. The truth is that the status of director and corporation is a
10415 F.2d at 1088.

Wright, The Constitution on Campis, 22

VAND.

L.

REV.

1027, 1065 (1969).
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distinct legal relationship. It resembles in some respects those of
agent and principal, of managing and dormant partners, of trustee
and cestui que trust; but it is different from each.'
In DePinto v. Landoe2 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
applied alternate legal theories to the issue of whether a passively negligent
corporate director could recover indemnity from a director who is guilty
of malfeasance.
In Landoe, the plaintiff and two of the defendants were directors of
United Security Life Insurance Co. (United).' When United was in the
twilight of its productive life, the defendants formed American Security
Investment Co. and transferred 314,794.19 dollars of United's assets
(consisting of cash, promissory notes, and mortgages) 4 to American in
exchange for worthless American stock.' At the same meeting in which
the defendants voted to authorize transfer of United's assets, DePinto
was present only to offer his resignation from the board of United prior
to the vote.6 In a derivative suit 7 brought by United's stockholders, the
claim against DePinto was severed s from the claims against the other
directors. Judgment for the value of the transferred assets was entered
against him. In DePinto v. Provident Security Life Insurance Co.,"
the Ninth Circuit found sufficient evidence to support a finding of negligence and breach of fiduciary duty by DePinto and affirmed the judgment against him. DePinto's cross-complaint against his fellow directors
for the amount of the judgment was dismissed by the district court, 10 and
the appeal in Landoe followed.

'2 A.

MACHEN, A TREATISE ON THE MODERN LAW OF CORPORATIONS

§ 1399

(1908).

2411 F.2d 297 (9th Cir. 1969).

' Of the three defendants, Sabo and Pegram were directors of United, and
Landoe was a director of American Security Development Co. The claim against
Sabo and Pegram arose out of their alleged breach of fiduciary duty. The claim
against Landoe was grounded in conspiracy to commit fraud; it is peripheral to
this note and will not be considered further.
'DePinto v. Provident Security Life Ins. Co., 374 F.2d 37, 47 n.7 (9th Cir.
1967).
61d. at 43.
6

Id. at 42.

' DePinto v. Provident Security Life Ins. Co., 374 F.2d 37 (9th Cir. 1967).
8The claim against DePinto was severed because it was uncomplicated by
allegations of fraudulent transfer. The claim against him was based solely on his
alleged failure to exercise the required standard of fiduciary care.
' 374 F.2d 37 (9th Cir. 1967). For the fifteen months prior to the final meeting of the board, DePinto attended none of the board meetings but perfunctorily
signed the minutes of those meetings. Twice during the period, he signed minutes stating falsely that he was present. Id. at 41.
10 DePinto v. Landoe, 411 F.2d 297, 299 (9th Cir. 1969).
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The Ninth Circuit in Landoe based the first of its alternative theories
on analogy to the law of trusts to reach the conclusion that DePinto could
recover indemnity from his fellow directors. Concluding that Arizona law,
which accepted the analogy, controlled, 1 the court held that DePinto's
right to obtain indemnity arose out of his "consensual relationship"' 2
with the corporation. He therefore became subrogated to the claims of
United against his co-directors.
Although in a number of cases courts have designated corporate
13
directors as "trustees" either for the corporation or for its stockholders,
analogy to the law of trusts is not without conceptual difficulties. A
trustee holds title to the trust property ;14 a corporate director does not
hold title to the assets of the corporation. Beneficiaries of a trust are
liable to third persons for costs incurred in administration of the trust ;15
stockholders of a corporation are not personally liable for operating expenses of the corporation. It must be concluded, therefore, that directors
of corporations should be treated as constructive trustees' 0 or as trustees
for limited purposes' 7 only when some policy of the law justifies such
treatment. In deciding Lcndoe, however, the court failed to evaluate the
policies that would justify indemnifying the director who was passively
negligent.'"
The court in Landoe could have based its decision solely on the
analogy that it found to the law of trusts. However, analyzing the
case in terms of agency, the court found an alternative theory for allowing
recovery of indemnity.' 9 Under the second theory used by the court,
"I Id.at 300, citing Kenton v. Wood, 56 Ariz. 325, 107 P.2d 380 (1940) ; Steinfield v. Neilson, 15 Ariz. 424, 139 P. 879 (1913); Hatch v. Emery, 1 Ariz. App.
142, 400 P.2d 349 (1965).
12411 F.2d at 300.
18 Cf. Lebold v. Inland Steel Co., 125 F.2d 369 (7th Cir. 1941); Saracco Tank
& Welding Co. v. Platz, 65 Cal. App. 2d 306, 150 P.2d 918 (1944); Tuttle v.
Junior Bldg. Corp., 228 N.C. 507, 46 S.E.2d 313 (1948). Contra, RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 16A (1959).
14
18 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 2 (1959).
Id. § 274.
16 Bainbridge v. Stoner, 16 Cal. 2d 423, 429, 106 P.2d 423, 427 (1940).
17 "[Corporate directors are] trustees in the sense that every agent is a trustee
for his principal, and bound to exercise diligence and good faith." Wallace v. Lincoln Say. Bank, 89 Tenn. 630, 649, 15 S.W. 448, 453 (1891). "One who is a director for a corporation acts in a fiduciary capacity, and the law does not allow
him to secure any personal advantage as against the corporation or its stockBainbridge v. Stoner, 16 Cal. 2d 423, 427, 106 P.2d 423, 426 (1940).
holders."
18 See p. 960 infra.
" However, if we are mistaken in this analysis [analogy to the law of trusts],
and DePinto should, under Arizona law, be regarded as a tort-feasor with
respect to the breach of his fiduciary duty, we are nevertheless of the
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DePinto was treated as an agent of the corporation, and his breach of
fiduciary duty brought about his liability in tort.20 The court allowed
him to recover indemnity because it held that the breach of his duty had
been passive in nature while the defendants had been guilty of malfeasance.
The use of the theory of agency in the case is as plagued by conceptual difficulties as is the analogy to the law of trusts.21 A true agent,
unlike a corporate director, acts on behalf of and subject to the control
of his principal at all times.22 Furthermore, either party can terminate
the agency relationship at any time. 3 Analyzing the case in terms of
agency also raises two other difficult problems. A principal as the
plaintiff in a tort action against an agent must prove an actual monetary
loss to recover damages, 4 and he must prove that the loss was the
proximate result of the defendant's breach of a fiduciary duty. 25
Although DePinto had violated his fiduciary duty to United,20 the
court in Landoe found that his actions had been "inactive in nature,
different in character, and prior in time" 27 to those of the defendants
and that he could, therefore, properly cross-complain for indemnity. Cited
as controlling on the issue of indemnity was Busy Bee Buffet, I1c. v.
view that, under the particular circumstances of the case, his status as a
tort-feasor does not bar him from obtaining indemnity.
411 F.2d at 300.
" Accord, Baltimore & O.R.R. v. Foar, 84 F.2d 67 (7th Cir. 1936) ; Etheredge
v. Barrow, 102 So. 2d 660 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1958).
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 14C (1958): "Neither the board of
21 RESTATEMENT
directors nor an individual director of a business is, as such, an agent of the corporation or of its members."
22Id.
§ 1. A board of directors is not subject to stockholders' control except
with regard to the appointment and removal of its members. The stockholders
cannot otherwise interfere, and the board of directors is entitled to use its own
business judgment in managing the affairs of the corporation. Id. § 14C, comment
a; Note, Position of Corporate Director as Sui Generis, 35 MINN. L. REV. 564,
565-66 (1951).
2
OF AGENCY § 119 (1958). Except under certain
" RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
extreme circumstances, members of a corporate board of directors can be dis-

placed only by the stockholders' refusal to re-elect them. Id. § 14C, comment a;
Note, Position of Corporate Director as Sui Generis, snpra note 22, at 565-66.
Contra, Western
2" Eccles v. Sylvester, 131 Colo. 296, 281 P.2d 1006 (1955).
States Life Ins. Co. v. Lockwood, 166 Cal. 185, 135 P. 496 (1913) (president of a
corporation must account for secret profits that he obtained).
2" N. LATTIN, THE LAW OF COOROaTIONS 245 (1959); Note, CorporationsLiability of Corporate Directorsfor Failureto Exercise Reasonable Diligence and
Due Care, 71 Dxcx. L. REv. 668, 673-74 (1967). See Barnes v. Andrews, 298
F. 614, 616-17 (S.D.N.Y. 1924) for an example of an insuperable burden of proof.
26 DePinto v. Provident Security Life Ins. Co., 374 F.2d 37 (9th Cir. 1967).
" DePinto v. Landoe, 411 F.2d 297, 301 (9th Cir. 1969).
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Ferrell,"' in which an invitee sued Busy Bee for injuries sustained when
he fell through a trap door on the premises of the corporation. Busy Bee
filed a cross-complaint for indemnity against its co-tenant, who had negligently left the trap door in a dangerous position. The court held that
since the corporation's negligence had been passive, indemnity would be
allowed; no injury would have occurred but for the active negligence
of the co-tenant.2 9
The court's reliance on Busy Bee was misplaced. That case should
have no effect on Landoe because the standard of care imposed in Busy
Bee is not logically applicable to the situation involving negligence by a
corporate director in carrying out his duties. Busy Bee recovered because
the active negligence of the co-tenant caused the breach by the corporation of its duty to maintain a safe passage for invitees. The duty of
DePinto, a corporate director, was to manage the assets of the corporation;
he breached his fiduciary duty by failing to attempt to prevent the transfer
of United's assets to American." The standard of care required of Busy
Bee was that it use ordinary care to prevent dangerous conditions on its
premises. Directors of corporations, on the other hand, are fiduciaries
required to exert the utmost care and good faith to protect the assets
of the corporation."' Since only ordinary care was required of Busy Bee,
it could recover indemnity because its negligence was passive when
compared to the active negligence of its co-tenant. According to this
logic, if the standard of care for a corporate director is higher than
ordinary care, then not only would he be liable to the injured party for
either active or passive negligence, as was Busy Bee, but he would also
" 82 Ariz. 192, 310 P.2d 817 (1957).
P.2d at 820-21.
20Id. atF.2d
197,at310
300.
30 411
"1Norway-Pleasant Tel. Co. v. Tuntland, 68 S.D. 441, 3 N.W.2d 882 (1942).
In Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), the
court applied different standards of care to various defendants based on the relationship of each particular one to the corporation. For example, the court applied a stricter standard of care to an attorney-director who helped prepare the
corporation's registration statement than to a director who had no part in preparing the statement. Folk, Civil Liabilities Under the Federal Securities Acts:
The BarChris Case, 55 VA. L. Rnv. 1, 42 (1969). Since BarChris arose out of
violations of the Securities Act of 1933, the Act should govern the standard of
care to be applied. The standard imposed by the Act is that "required of a prudent
man in the management of his own property." 15 U.S.C. § 77(k) (c) (1964). This
standard is equivalent to the high degree of care required by common law for
fiduciaries. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 174 (1959) ; Folk, supra at 117.
Thus, although the court in BarChris applied variable standards, it is clear that
the Act requires a minimum standard of care that is equivalent to the high standard required of fiduciaries.
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be unable to recover indemnity. Thus, active and passive negligence,
which might be unequal under the standard of Busy Bee, should be found
to be equal under the fiduciary standard with the result that the passive
wrongdoer would not recover indemnity.
The decision in Landoe, if sound at all, could better have been based
on equitable considerations that the court failed to enumerate. Whether
to allow the equitable remedy of subrogation3 2 should have been dependent
upon the court's policy toward allowing indemnity for a corporate director
who is passively negligent. In favor of allowing indemnity are: (1) the
unfairness of permitting liability to fall on the director charged with
passive negligence rather than the ones who are guilty of malfeasance
and (2) the possible discouragement of some persons from assuming the
responsibilities of corporate directors unless liability is limited to cases
of malfeasance.3" Militating against indemnity is the policy of protecting
corporate stockholders. If the court had disallowed indemnity for the
director who had been passively negligent, the effect would have been to
encourage a higher standard of care of corporate directors and thus
possibly to provide more protection for stockholders.
In deciding whether the court that decided Landoe reached the right
result, it is necessary to consider how the above policies apply to the
various relationships between co-directors. A paradigm used by Professor
Scott in analyzing trusts is valuable in this analysis:
Where there are two trustees and a breach of trust is committed
by one of them, the other is liable if he is himself guilty of a violation
of duty to the beneficiaries. This is the case (1) where he participates
in the breach of trust ... (3) where by his failure to exercise reasonable care he has enabled his co-trustee to commit the breach of trust;
(4) where he approves or acquiesces in or conceals the breach of
trust.

....

34

Under Professor Scott's first category, a corporate director who
participates in the breach of trust should be equally liable with the other
participating directors. In Knox Glass Bottle Co. v. Underwood,3 5 the
32 Subrogation is "founded on principles of justice and equity, and . . . [i]t
rests on the principle that substantial justice should be attained regardless of
form." Castleman Constr. Co. v. Pennington, - Tenn. -, -, 432 S.W.2d 669,
674 (1968); accord, South Shore Natl Bank v. Donner, 104 N.J. Super. 169,
249 A.2d 25 (1969).

" Note, Position of Corporate Directors as Sui Generis, supra note 22.
"43 A. ScowT, TRUSTS §224 (1967).
" 228 Miss. 699, 89 So. 2d 799 (1956).
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defendant-directors and their friends leased equipment to Knox at
exorbitant rates. The directors were found jointly and severally liable
for each other's gains and for the gains of their friends 6 Joint participation represents the strongest case for joint and several liability among
corporate directors, and, conversely, the weakest case for indemnity.
A trustee or director may be liable if, as in Professor Scott's fourth
illustration pertaining to trustees, he approves, acquiesces in, or conceals
the breach of trust even though he receives no benefit from the transaction.
It is arguable that the facts of Landoe fall within this classification. Since
DePinto's resignation from the board of United was tendered at the same
meeting in which the resolution in question was passed, it is clear not only
that he had actual knowledge of the intended transaction, but also that
he was in a position to resist if he had not resigned. 7 His resignation,
therefore, might be termed acquiescence or approval of the transaction.
This situation represents a somewhat stronger case for indemnity due to
a difference in the degree of fault between the director who was passively
negligent and those who were guilty of malfeasance.
By analogy to Professor Scott's category number three, a director is
liable if his failure to exercise reasonable care enables a co-director to
commit a breach of trust. In Allied Freightways, Inc. v. Cholfin,-8 the
wife of the corporation's president, who was a completely innocent and
passive director, was unable to avoid liability for the wrongful conduct
of the other corporate directors. In Globus v. Law Research Service,
Inc.,3 9 a cross-complaint for indemnity by a passively negligent underwriter against "'active' wrongdoers" was denied. 40 Although Landoe
was based on state law and Globus was based on federal securities regulations, the Ninth Circuit in deciding Landoe should have examined the
policy considerations that were stated in Globus:
This court believes that it would be against the public policy embodied
in the federal securities legislation to permit [cross-complainant]
which has been found guilty of misconduct in violation of the public
interest involving actual knowledge of false and misleading statements
or omissions and wanton indifference to . . . the rights of others, to
" Id. at 769-70, 89 So. 2d at 824. See Beard v. Achenbach Mem. Hosp. Ass'n,
170 F.2d 859 (10th Cir. 1948); McGinnis v. Corporation Funding & Fin. Co.,
8 F.2d 532 (M.D. Pa. 1925).
37

374 F.2d at 37.

325 Mass. 630, 91 N.E.2d 765 (1950).
287 F. Supp. 188 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), rev'd on other grounds, 418 F.2d 1276
1969).
(2d'Old.
Cir. at
198-99.
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enforce its indemnification agreement. The purpose of the federal
securities acts is to insure that the public investor ... will obtain the
benefit of a thorough investigation of the facts . . . not only by the

issuer but also by the underwriter so that prospective investors will
41
have access to the truth.
Globus, far from being established law, is a landmark case indicating
a trend toward protection of stockholders.42 The court that decided
Globus limited its holding to "circumstances where [the cross-complainant
for indemnity] has been found guilty of misconduct evincing actual
knowledge or reckless disregard of the falsity of the offering circular."43
Since the cross-claimant in Landoe had knowledge of the intended transactions, 44 the case appears to be analogous to the limited factual pattern
of Globus. Globus might be distinguished because the issue in that
case involved indemnity for underwriters. However, the court in Globus
found no significance in the distinction between underwriters and corporate
directors 5 The policies that affect directors were found to be equally
applicable to underwriters: "If an underwriter were to be permitted to
escape liability for its own misconduct by obtaining indemnity from
the issuers, it would have less of an incentive to conduct a thorough investigation and to be truthful ... .
In Landoe, the court, relying on the distinction between active and
passive wrongdoers and on an analogy to the law of trusts, allowed the
passive wrongdoer to recover indemnity. But the court entirely failed
to consider the policy of protecting stockholders of corporations. That
policy, which led to denial of indemnity for underwriters in Globus, is
no less operative in the case of corporate directors. A stricter standard of
care for corporate directors to promote greater protection of shareholders
is necessary because of the enormous growth in number and size of
In huge, diversified corporations, most shareholders are
corporations.
completely unable to exert any control; and vigilance on the part of the
directors in protecting the interests of all owners of stock becomes crucial.
"Id. at 199.

,2 Knox, Some Reflections on Indemnification Provisions and S.E.C. Liability
Insurance in Light of BarChris and Globtus, 24 Bus. LAWYER 681, 692 (1969).
"287 F. Supp. at 199.
"See p. 961 supra.
"Knox, supra note 42, at 690.
"287 F. Supp. at 199.
"Snow, Liability of Directors and Officers of Corporations, 17 DEFENSE LAW
J. 521 (1968).
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Denial of indemnity should tend to motivate each director to police the
actions of the other directors out of self-interest. In an age of supercorporations, the policy favoring a knowing, passive director over a
knowing, active one weighs lightly in comparison to the policy of protecting shareholders. For this reason, the court in Landoe reached a
questionable result by allowing recovery of indemnification by the passive
corporate director.
RICHARD L. GRIER

Federal Jurisdiction-Suits by a State as Parens Patriae
Although the right of a state to bring suit in a federal court was
expressly provided for in the Constitution,' a state, in order to have
standing, must have a sufficient interest in the outcome of the litigation.2
Basically, the types of cases in which a state has capacity to sue have been
classified as proprietary suits' and parens patriae suits.4 Suing in each
capacity, the State of Hawaii recently filed an antitrust action, Hawaii v.
Standard Oil Co.,5 in a United States district court against three oil
companies and an asphalt company. Realizing the importance of its de'U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, extends the judicial power of the United States to
cases "between a State and Citizens of another State," and provides that in
cases "in which a State shall be a Party, the supreme Court shall have original
Jurisdiction." Suits by one state against another are within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. § 1251 (a) (1) (1964). Suits
by a state against the citizens of another state are in the original, but not the
exclusive, jurisdiction" of the Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (3) (1964).
Concepts of justiciability presumably apply equally to suits brought originally
in the Supreme Court and in a lower federal court; however, it may well be that
the Supreme Court, conscious of its caseload (e.g., Oklahoma ez rel. Johnson v.
Cook, 304 U.S. 387, 396 (1938)), would apply different standards of justiciability
when jurisdiction by a lower court is available. But see Georgia v. Pennsylvania
R.R., 324 U.S. 439, 451-52 (1945).
2 E.g., Florida v. Anderson, 91 U.S. 667, 675-76 (1875). It is difficult to determine from the cases to what extent standing is grounded in constitutional mandate and to what extent in judicial policy. Clear-cut rules in the area are difficult
to find because "[t]his complicated speciality of federal jurisdiction . . .is in any

event more or less determined by the specific circumstances of individual situations . . . ." United States ex rel. Chapman v. Federal Power Comm'n, 345 U.S.
153, 156 (1953).
'E.g., Virginia v. West Virginia, 246 U.S. 565 (1918) (suit on a debt).
'E.g., Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208 (1901) (suit to enjoin the discharge
of sewage into interstate river).
301 F. Supp. 982 (D. Hawaii 1969). Hawaii sued under sections 1 and 2 of
the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1964) and section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964).
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cision to deny the defendants' motion to dismiss," the trial court certified the
case to the court of appeals.'
In order to sue in a proprietary capacity, a state must be in the same
position as a private litigant. It is established that a state is a "person"
within the meaning of the antitrust laws,' and states have been allowed
to sue in many cases to protect their proprietary rights.9 Hawaii clearly
had proprietary standing in the instant case because it was a purchaser of
the allegedly over-priced petroleum products."°
Much more difficult, however, is Hawaii's claimed right to sue on
behalf of its citizens as parens patriae. The right of a state to bring
suit as parens patriae was first articulated in 1901 by the Supreme Court's
decision in Missouri v. Illinois." Missouri, solicitous of the well-being of
its citizens, sought to enjoin Illinois from dumping sewage into the
Mississippi River. Granting Missouri the requested relief, the Court
noted that although previous state-initiated actions had involved disputes over boundaries or proprietary interests, "[s]uch cases manifestly
do not cover the entire field in which such controversies may arise, and
For when
for which the Constitution has provided a remedy .. ".."I'
"[siuits brought by individuals.., would be wholly inadequate and disproportionate

. .

.

,,,1the

state is the proper party to protect the "[h] ealth

and comfort of its inhabitants."'1 4 Thus the state, as parens patriae,is able
to fill the vacuum created by the inability of private citizens to redress
adequately their possible injuries. 6
Following the decision in Missouri v. Illinois, Georgia was permitted
' 301 F. Supp. at 988.
Standard Oil Co., 301 F. Supp. 980, 981 (D. Hawaii 1969).
IHawaii v.
v. Evans, 316 U.S. 159 (1942).

'Georgia
1E.g., South Dakota v. North Carolina, 192 U.S. 286 (1904) (suit on bonds
of one state that were owned by another state).
I0For discussion of standing requirements in private antitrust actions, see
Note, Standing to Sue for Treble Damages Under Section 4 of the Clayton Act,
64 COLUm. L. REv. 570 (1964); Note, Antitrust-Clayton Act § 4-StandingAntitrist Violator May Be Liable for Damages Resulting from Over-Charges
in Sales by Non-Compiring Competitors, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1374 (1969).
'180 U.S. 208 (1901).
12
Id.at 241.
1Id.

1

"Id.See also In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 584 (1895) : "The obligations which
[the federal government] is under to promote the interest of all, and to prevent
the wrongdoing of one resulting in injury to the general welfare, is often of itself
sufficient to give it a standing in court."
" But cf. Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923), in which it appears
no one had standing to raise the constitutionality of a federal appropriation.
Quaere to what extent Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968), changes this.
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to go to court to protect the forests, vegetable life, and health of a fivecounty area from sulphurous fumes emitted by a private industry in
17
Tennessee. 6 Describing the suit as based on the state's "quasi-sovereign"'
rights over the ultimate disposition of its natural resources, Justice Holmes
said that "the State has an interest independent of and behind the titles
of its citizens, in all the earth and air within its domain."'" By these oftquoted words, he shifted the emphasis from the inadequacy of private
remedies to the inherent power of the state as sovereign and intimated
that the state has interests beyond-and perhaps in spite of'--the aggregate interests of its citizens.
In 1923, Pennsylvania and Ohio were allowed to sue "as representatives of the consuming public" 2 to strike down a West Virginia
statute requiring a locally preferential distribution of privately-owned
natural gas. There was concern that residents of Pennsylvania and Ohio
would be denied fuel. It was noted that "private consumers in each
State not only include most of the inhabitants of many urban communities
but constitute a substantial portion of the state's population. Their health,
comfort and welfare are seriously jeopardized by the threatened withdrawal of the gas from the interstate stream."'" The Court then added,
"This is a matter of grave public concern in which the state, as the
representative of the public, has an interest apart from that of the
individuals affected. It is not merely a remote or ethical interest but one
which is immediate and recognized by law.""
In its suit in Standard Oil, Hawaii relied heavily on Georgia v.
Pennsylvania Railroad," in which Georgia was allowed to bring suit as

" Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907).

1

7Id. at 237.

18Id.
" Id. at 239: "Whether Georgia by insisting upon this claim is doing more
harm than good to her own citizens is for her to determine." See also Note,
The Original Jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court, 11 STAN. L. REV.
665, 678-80 (1959) for a discussion of the right of individuals and minority
groups in the state bringing suit to intervene because their interests differ from
those of the state.
"Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 591 (1923).
2Id. at 592.

22 Id.
'8 324 U.S. 439 (1945).
The complaint by Georgia alleged that the rates were

fixed so as
(a) to deny to many of Georgia's products equal access with those of other
States to the national market;
(b) to limit in a general way the Georgia economy to staple agricultural
products, to restrict and curtail opportunity in manufacturing, shipping and
commerce, and to prevent the full and complete utilization of the natural
wealth of the State;
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parens patriae against twenty out-of-state railroad companies for rate
discrimination allegedly violative of antitrust acts. The Supreme Court
in that case found that discriminatory rates "stifle, impede, or cripple old
industries and prevent the establishment of new ones. They may arrest
the development of a State or put it at a decided disadvantage in competitive markets."2 4 To deny Georgia the right to sue "would whittle
the concept of justiciability down to the stature of minor or conventional
25
controversies."
It has been suggested that Pennsylvania Railroad departed from
previous parens patriae cases because it dealt with the protection of a
state's economic resources rather than its natural resources.2 0 Such an
analysis, however, does not seem to be accurate. To begin with, previous
parens patriae cases did not deal exclusively with the protection of natural
resources.2 7 Moreover, the proper concern in parens patriae cases is not
only with the particular subject matter of the controversy, but also with
whether an adequate remedy exists for the people whom the state represents. 28 Pennsylvania Railroad has timely importance because in it the
Court acknowledged the role of a state in protecting its citizens from
higher prices. In a highly organized and interdependent society, the
consumer ultimately bears the burden of higher prices, but usually is
unable to remedy his plight. He often must rely on the state to take
the proper measures that will ensure his economic security.
Pennsylvania Railroad is equally significant because the state as the
plaintiff in that case was permitted to take advantage of a federallycreated right in the capacity of parens patriae. It would not have been
exceptional for the Court to find that Congress did not intend in federal
statutes to give the states causes of action as parens patriae, as it would
(c) to frustrate and counteract the measures taken by the State to promote
a well-rounded agricultural program, encourage manufacture and shipping,
provide full employment, and promote the general progress and welfare of
its people; and
(d) to hold the Georgia economy in a state of arrested development.
Id. at 444.
2
1Id.at 450.
Id. at 451.
27

93 U. PA. L. Rav. 442, 444 (1945) ; 32 VA. L. REv. 157, 159 (1945).

In Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923), natural gas was
not dealt with as a natural resource, but as an article of interstate commerce
vital to the citizens of two states.

"The Court in Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208 (1901), was concerned not
only with the status of the states' rivers, but also with protecting citizens who
could not adequately protect themselves from diseases caused by the dumping of
sewage.
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'have been if the Court had held that a state could not protect its proprietary interests in the same manner as a private citizen. Implicit in
the Court's opinion is the requirement of express Congressional intent
in order to deny a parens patriae suit to states even if a proprietary suit
is appropriate. 29 While arguably limited to the antitrust laws, the holding
:may have ramifications in other federally regulated areas. For example,
it has been suggested that a state might sue as parens patriae to enjoin
the construction of a nuclear power plant sanctioned by the Atomic Energy
.CommissionY0
Because Pennsylvania Railroad and Standard Oil are substantially
related, 3 ' Hawaii should have little difficulty in being upheld in its attempt
to bring suit as parens patriae. However, there are boundaries to the
concept. The trial court in Standard Oil set forth two primary requirements for a parens patriae suit: that a substantial portion of the inhabitants of the state be adversely affected, and that the state have a direct
interest of its own concerning the matter in controversy.32
33
The first test is conceptually difficult because the extent of harm
that must be shown and the number of people34 who must be affected are
matters of degree.35 The court, however, had little trouble with the first
requirement because of the great importance to, and pervasive use of,
petroleum products by citizens of Hawaii.3 0
" "[W]e find no indication that, when Congress fashioned those civil
remedies, it restricted the States to suits to protect their proprietary interests....
There is no apparent reason why [parens patriae] suits should be excluded from
the antitrust acts." 324 U.S. 439, 447.
SoTelephone interview with Mr. Jean A. Benoy, Deputy Attorney General
of North Carolina, March 17, 1970. Another suggested example would be a suit

to enjoin termination by the Interstate Commerce Commission of train service to
parts of a state.
" In both cases suit was brought under antitrust acts. See note 5 supra.

" 301 F. Supp. at 986-87.
" See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923).
"See, e.g., Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125 (1902).
"Note, The Original Jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court, 11
STAr. L. REv. 665, 675 (1959).
"0301 F. Supp. at 987: "[T]here is probably not a single industry nor more
than an insignificant number of persons in Hawaii whose operations, life and
livelihood are not connected in some way with, or affected by, the use of gasoline
fuel and the other petroleum products . .. ."
Plaintiff's fourth amended complaint alleged injury to the state because:
(a) revenues of its citizens have been wrongfully extracted from the State of
Hawaii;
(b) taxes affecting the citizens and commercial entities have been increased
to affect such losses of revenues and income;
(c) opportunity in manufacturing, shipping and commerce have been restricted and curtailed;
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The requirement that the state have a direct interest of its own is made
difficult by the corollary that a suit by a state must not be a guise to
enforce the rights of individuals 1 or small groups of citizens. 8 In
Oklahoma v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway,"0 a case factually
similar to PennsylvaniaRailroad and Standard Oil,40 the Supreme Court
refused to allow Oklahoma to bring suit to protect its citizens and economy
from alleged excessive railroad rates. The Court reasoned that in reality
the state was enforcing the rights of individual shippers rather than the
rights of its citizens in general.
When the Court decided Pennsylvania Railroad thirty-four years
later, it expressly affirmed the rule in Atchison and distinguished the
factual similarity in a conclusory manner. 4 Similarly, the court in
Standard Oil made only slight mention of Atchison.12 This result is
perhaps explained by the conceptual change that has occurred concerning
the role of standing in the antitrust field." Standing is a concept tied
closely to the substantive right claimed. As a policy matter, a major
function of a private antitrust suit, whether brought by a state or a
(d) the full and complete utilization of the natural wealth of the State has
been prevented;
(e) the high cost of manufacture in Hawaii has precluded goods made
there from equal competitive access with those of other States to the national market;
(f) measures taken by the State to promote the general progress and welfare
of its people have been frustrated;
(g) the Hawaii economy has been held in a state of arrested development.
Id. at 983-84. Compare this complaint with the one in Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R,.
324 U.S. 439 (1945), reprinted in part in note 23 supra.
" New Hampshire v. Louisiana, 108 U.S. 76 (1883) (citizen assigned bond
to state and state sued upon it).
North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365, 374-76 (1923) (farmers).
"220 U.S. 277 (1911).
Note Oklahoma's allegations and compare them with those in Pennylvania
Railroad, note 23 supra, and Standard Oil, note 36 infra. The state alleged that
it had
about two million inhabitants, is developing and building towns, villages and
individual farmhouses, and that lime, cement, plaster, brick and stone are
very essential to its growth; that at this time in the State of Oklahoma there
are very large and extensive petroleum oil wells, and the manufacture or refining of the same is an industry continually growing in said State; that
the transportation rates on crude and refined oil, lime, cement, plaster,
brick and stone are very important and essential to the development of said
State; and, that the violation by said respondent of the said conditions of
said grant is a menace to the future of said State.
220 U.S. at 283-84.
"324 U.S. at 451-52.
"301 F. Supp. at 986.
"See p. 966 supra.

1970]

SUITS BY STATE AS PARENS PATRIAE

citizen, is that it "supplements government enforcement of the antitrust
laws."" Recent decisions on the issue of standing have been consistent
with this policy. 5 Although under an expansive doctrine of standing the
possibility of a treble-damage windfall may attract suits with little merit,
such a risk may be justified by improving the enforcement of antitrust
laws. Moreover, the fear of sham suits would be less applicable when
states are involved, for, despite the potential for harassment because of
concentration of power and resources, state officials hopefully are invested with better judgment and are checked by political processes.
Any ultimate reconciliation of Atchison and Pennsylvania Railroad"'
must answer an important question lurking beneath the concept of parens
patriae: Whether a state has standing to seek redress when private parties,
more directly concerned, can also bring suit. In both of these cases private
parties could have sued to enjoin the alleged discriminations in rate that
the states, as parens patriae, attempted to enjoin.4 7 Atchison intimated
that if an acceptable private remedy exists, a state may not sue. Pennsylvania Railroad,however, indicated that a state may sue as parens patriae
if it has a legitimate interest in the controversy, notwithstanding the availability of a private remedy.
Because Hawaii's complaint in Standard Oil was for monetary
damages as well as injunctive relief, the issue is more clearly delineated
than in Pennsylvania Railroad or Atchison, in which only injunctive
relief was sought. In reaching the same result as reached in Pennsylvania Railroad, the court in Standard Oil distinguished the possible
claims of individual citizens, for which the state cannot recover, from
the claims of the state.4 Such a solution is logical but begs the difficult
question of just what are the damages to the state, or, rather, what
"United States v. Borden Co., 347 U.S. 514, 518 (1954).
"E.g., Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957).
" One possible explanation of the practical inconsistency of the two cases is
that the Supreme Court in Pennsylvania Railroad perceived a distinction that the
Court may have overlooked when it decided Atchison-the distinction between one
state suing another state and a state suing a citizen of another state. When one
state sues another state, the policy underlying the eleventh amendment buttresses
the case for finding lack of standing since it is more likely that in actuality an

individual is suing under the guise of the state. The main case relied upon in
Atchison was Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U.S. 1 (1900), a suit between two states.
See generally Note, The OriginalJurisdictionof the United States Supreme Court,
11 STAN. L. Rv.665, 677 (1959).
""Georgia alleged that the rate-fixing practices "give manufacturers, sellers
and other shippers in the North an advantage over manufacturers, shippers and
others in Georgia." Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439, 444 (1945).
" 301 F. Supp. at 986.
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are the state's interests "independent of and behind the titles of its
citizens." 49 The court's failure to answer this question exposes an
anomalous situation: The court as a matter of law has concluded, for
purposes of standing, that independent interests of the state are present;
however, the court lends no aid as to the identity of these interests for
purposes of damages. Apparently the State of Hawaii also found this
problem troublesome, for after twice fully briefing and arguing the parens
patriae issue, she had not alleged the precise extent of her monetary
damages. 50
A recent suit brought by North Carolina may help bring about a
solution. 5 Relying largely on Standard Oil, North Carolina has filed suit
against five drug companies for excessively priced drugs. Two types of
monetary relief are being sought: 200,000 dollars for loss of tax revenue
from the sale of taxed commodities that would have been purchased but
for the over-priced and untaxed drugs; and twenty million dollars for
general economic injury caused by the diversion of money by the drug
companies from the state's economy.
Despite the problem of damages, the concept of parens patriaehas great
potential in the area of consumer protection. California, for instance,
recently filed an antitrust action against automobile manufacturers for
conspiracy to suppress the development of anti-pollution devices on automobiles.5 2 Cases such as those brought by California, North Carolina,
and Hawaii should not be dismissed for lack of standing. The parens
patriae concept, while not denying private substantive rights, gives the
public a voice in matters of utmost importance to society.
WILLIAM MAcNIDER TROTT

Income Tax-Charitable Contributions under the

Tax Reform Act of 1969
In a message to Congress on April 22, 1969, President Nixon emphasized the need for tax reform in order to "lighten the burden on those
who pay too much, and increase the taxes on those who pay too little."'
" Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907).
'o301 F. Supp.
at 984.
1Telephone interview with Mr. Jean A. Benoy, Deputy Attorney General of
North Carolina, March 17, 1970.
" Telephone interview with Mr. Benoy, note 51 supra.
'Hearings on H.R. 13270 Before the House Committee on Ways and Means,
91st Cong., 1st Sess. 5047 (1969) [hereinafter cited as 1969 Hearings].
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After eight months, Congress finally passed the Tax Reform Act of 1969,
which was signed by the President on December 30, 1969, and became
Public Law 91-172.2 One of the most important changes proposed by
both the President3 and the Treasury4 pertained to charitable deductions.
Many of their recommendations 5 regarding reform in this area were
adopted and appear in the final version of the Act. This note will point
out the major changes in the law of charitable deductions and analyze
specifically the tax consequences of the Act for the individual taxpayer
who makes a charitable contribution of appreciated property.
The most apparent change in the area of charitable deductions is the
provision by which the maximum limitation for deductions from an individual's income for gifts to public charities is increased from thirty
per cent to fifty per cent of adjusted gross income. Section 170(b) (1) of
the Internal Revenue Code, as amended, states that "[i]n the case of an
individual . . . any charitable contribution to [public charities] shall be

allowed [as a deduction against ordinary income] to the extent that the
aggregate of such contributions does not exceed fifty per cent of the taxpayer's contribution base for the taxable year." 6 The term "contribution
base" is defined as "adjusted gross income (computed without regard
to any net operating loss carryback to the taxable year under section
172) ."1 Under the old law, charitable contributions had to be made to
certain specific organizations in order to qualify for the thirty-per-cent
maximum limitation. These same organizations are now included in the
definition of "public charities" under the new provisions ;' in addition,
three new types of foundations 9 have been included.
- 83 Stat. 487 (1969).

'1969 Hearings at 5048.

"Id. at 5510.
Id. Generally the reforms proposed in this area by the Treasury were an in-

crease in the maximum limitation on deductions to increase the incentive for

charitable contributions and an elimination of double deductions, especially as a
result of gifts of appreciated property.
o INT. REV. CODE of 1954, as amended by Pub. L. No. 91-172 § 201, 83 Stat.
487 (1969), § 170(b) (1) [hereinafter INT. REV. CODE of 1954 (as amended
For a definition of "charitable contribution" see id. § 170(c).
1969)].
7
Id. § 170(b) (1) (F).
8
Id. § 170(b) (1) (A).
'Id. at (vii) states that "a private foundation described in subparagraph
(E)" is included in the definition of "public charities." Subparagraph (E) defines these foundations as (1) private operating foundations, (2) private nonoperating foundations that distribute the contributions that they receive to public
charities or make other qualifying distributions within two-and-one-half months

after their taxable year's end, and (3) community foundations that pool all contributions into a common fund and allow the contributor to designate the charity
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As under the old law, deductions for contributions to qualifying organizations not included in the definition of "public charities" are restricted to a maximum of twenty per cent of the contribution base.1
Furthermore, deductions for such gifts can be taken into account only after
deductions for gifts to "public charities" which qualify for the maximum fifty-per-cent limitation.:" Thus, the effect of these provisions is
that deductions for gifts made to non-public charities cannot exceed twenty
per cent of the contribution base or the difference between the total
amount of contributions made to public charities and fifty per cent of the
contribution base, whichever amount is less.' 2 For example, if the contribution base were 100,000 dollars, gifts to public charities were 40,000
dollars, and gifts to non-public charities were 20,000 dollars, only 10,000
dollars of this latter amount would be deductible.
Under the new law, a taxpayer is still allowed to carry over to the
next five succeeding years any "excess"'" contribution made to public
charities; but he may do so only to the extent that the maximum allow14
able deduction is not used in the year to which the carryover is made.
For example, if a taxpayer had a contribution base of 100,000 dollars in
each of five successive years and if, in the first year, he gave 100,000
dollars to a public charity, he could deduct 50,000 dollars in that year.
If, in the second year, he gave 30,000 dollars to a public charity, he could
deduct this additional gift plus 20,000 dollars of the excess 50,000 dollars from the previous year. If, in the third year, he gave 20,000 dollars
that is the recipient. (The income from the common pool must be distributed
within two-and-one-half months after the taxable year in which it was realized,
and the corpus attributable to any donor's contribution must be distributed to a
charity not later than one year after the donor's death or after his surviving
spouse's death if she has the right to designate the recipients of the corpus.)
"0(B) OTHER CONTRIBUTI01.-Any charitable contribution other than a
charitable contribution to which subparagraph (A) applies shall be allowed
to the extent that the aggregate of such contributions does not exceed the
lesser of(i) 20 percent of the taxpayer's contribution base for the taxable
year, or
(ii) the excess of 50 percent of the taxpayer's contribution base for
the taxable year over the amount of charitable contributions allowable
under, subparagraph (A) (determined without regard to subparagraph
(D)).

Id. § 170(b) (1) (B).
'2"Id.
See CCH 1970

STAND. FED. TAx REP. 911271 (4th Extra Ed. No. 3).
The term "excess" contributions refers to the amount of contributions made
by a taxpayer in one taxable year that exceeds the maximum allowable deduction
for that year.
"'INT. REV. CoDE of 1954 (as amended 1969), § 170(d) (1).
'8
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to a public charity, he could deduct this gift plus the remaining excess of
30,000 dollars from the first year. Thus, in three years he would be able
to obtain a full deduction for the gift of 100,000 dollars made in the first
year. In the case of excess contributions, when the recipients are nonpublic charities that are subject to the twenty-per-cent limitation, the
rule under the old law continues to apply: no carryover of excess contributions is allowed. 5
Although it did not apply to many taxpayers, there was a special provision in the old law,' 6 often referred to as the "Philadelphia-nun" provision, whereby a taxpayer's charitable contributions could qualify for
an unlimited deduction if certain requirements were met. New provisions 17 will result in the elimination of this unlimited deduction by 1975.
At that time the maximum allowable deduction for gifts to charities will
be fifty per cent of the taxpayer's contribution base even though the old
"Philadelphia-nun" requirements are met. The phasing out of the unlimited deduction will take place gradually over a five-year period, with
an eighty-per-cent maximum deduction allowed in 1970. There will be
an annual decrease of six per cent thereafter until 1975.8

In contrast to the Act's liberalizing effect on the percentage limitations,
the new provisions of section 170(f)' 9 reduce the allowable deduction
for gifts of income and remainder interests in trusts ;20 and no deduction
is allowed for gifts made for less than the entire interest in the property
given.21 Thus a deduction is no longer allowed for the rent-free use of
property by a charity.2 2 An exception to this provision is made for gifts

of a remainder interest in a personal residence or farm.23 While such
24
gifts are still deductible, they are subject to special valuation provisions.
The provisions of the Act that probably will have the greatest limiting
effect and also cause the most confusion are those dealing with contribu5

Id.
16 INT.

REV. CODE of 1954, § 170(b) (1) (C). This section was completely
changed by the 1969 Act.
INT. REV. CODE of 1954 (as amended 1969), § 170(b) (1) (C).
16
Id. § 170(f) (6).
10
Id.§ 170(f).
oId. at (f) (2).
21Id. at (f) (3). This section applies to all charitable gifts made after July 31,
1969.
"Id. The Act does not, however, require the taxpayer to include the rental
of the property in his income.
value
2
1281 (4th
-1d. § 170(f) (3) (B) (i). See CCH 1970 STAND. FED. TAx REP.
Extra Ed. No. 3); P-H 1970 FED. TAXES 114 (Rep. Bull. 1, 1970).
2" INT. REV. CODE of 1954 (as amended 1969), § 170(f) (4).
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tions of appreciated property. 25 Under the old rules, the deduction for
such gifts was generally measured by the fair market value of the property given.2" This method for determining the amount of the deduction
often made it possible for the taxpayer to realize a greater tax advantage
from a gift of appreciated property than he could have obtained from a
cash contribution because it allowed a deduction for income or gain that
had not been recognized for tax purposes. For example, if a taxpayer
donated to a public charity stock that had cost him 5,000 dollars but that
had a fair market value of 10,000 dollars, he would be allowed a charitable
deduction of 10,000 dollars without having to treat the gain of 5,000
dollars as income or capital gain for tax purposes. If he sold the stock
and donated the proceeds, he would still have received a deduction of
10,000 dollars; but he would have had to recognize a capital gain of
5,000 dollars for tax purposes. The 1969 Act is aimed at equalizing the
consequences of cash gifts and gifts of appreciated property by eliminating
the double tax benefit of the latter, but it is doubtful that the new law
will have such an effect.
As discussed above, the Act generally provides that contributions to
public charities may be deducted to the extent that the aggregate of
such gifts does not exceed fifty per cent of the taxpayer's contribution
base for the taxable year. Deductions for contributions of "capital gain
property" and "ordinary income property," however, are now subject to
special limitations.2 For purposes of the section of the Act dealing with
charitable deductions, "capital gain property" is defined as any capital
asset on which a long-term capital gain would have been realized if the
taxpayer had sold the asset for its fair market value on the date of the
contribution.2" As a consequence of these new special-limitation rules,
if a taxpayer donates "capital gain property" to a public charity, he is
still able to claim a deduction for the full fair market value; and he is not
subject to any capital gains tax on his paper profit.20 The aggregate of
such deductions, however, is limited to a maximum of thirty per cent of
his contribution base rather than to the fifty-per-cent maximum that
applies to gifts of cash or non-appreciated property. Furthermore, the
" Id. §§ 170 (b) (1) (D), 170 (e) (1).
-'Treas. Reg. § 1.170-1(c) (1958).
-'INT. REv. CODE of 1954 (as amended 1969), §§ 170(b) (1)(D), 170(e),(1).
8
2 Id. § 170(b) (1) (D) (iv). For a definition of "ordinary income property" see

p. 977 infra.

2' "Paper profit" refers to the inherent gain that would be recognized for tax
purposes and would represent long-term capital gain had the property been sold
instead of having been given to charity.
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deductions for gifts of "capital gain property" are computed after all
other contributions are taken into consideration.3" For example, a taxpayer may have a contribution base of 10,000 dollars and give 4,000 dollars in cash and 2,000 dollars in appreciated stocks to a public charity.
Since his maximum deduction is 5,000 dollars (50 per cent of 10,000
dollars) and since the cash gift must be considered first, the deduction
for the gift of stock is limited to 1,000 dollars in the current taxable
year. Gifts of "capital gain property," however, may be carried over for
up to five years, but they retain their original status and are deductible
in any one taxable year only to a maximum of thirty per cent of the
donor's contribution base.3
There are two situations in which the thirty-per-cent limitation does
not apply to contributions of "capital gain property." If such property is
given to a "non-public" charity 2 or if tangible personal property is given
to a public charity for purposes other than for use in its principal charitable function,33 a special provision takes effect.34 Under this provision,
the allowable deduction is the fair market value of the gift reduced by
one half of the amount of the gain that would have been recognized if
the property had been sold by the taxpayer at its fair market value on
the date of the contribution. The deductions under this special provision
are also subject to the appropriate maximum limitations-fifty per cent
of the contribution base for gifts of tangible personal property to a
"public charity"3 5 and twenty per cent when the donee is a "non-public"
charity.3"
Furthermore, the Conference Committee Report states that when a
taxpayer "makes a contribution to a public charity of [capital gain] property ... the taxpayer may deduct such contributions of property under
' 0 INT. REV. CODE of 1954 (as amended 1969), § 170(b) (1) (D) (i) provides:
In the case of charitable contributions of capital gain property to which
subsection (e) (1) (B) does not apply, the total amount of contributions of
such property which may be taken into account under subsection (a) for
any taxable year shall not exceed 30 percent of the taxpayer's contribution
base for such year. For purposes of this subsection, contributions of capital
gain property to which this paragraph applies shall be taken into account
after all other charitable contributions.
'Id. § 170(b) (1) (D) (ii). See text preceding note 14 supra.
'2. Id. §170 (e) (1) (B) (ii).
"Id. § 170(e) (1) (B) (i). Intangible personal property is not included under
this provision as is erroneously stated in CCH 1970 STAND. FED. TAX REP. 1277
(4th Extra Ed. No. 3). This error was corrected id. [Green 1854-56] at 21,997.
INT. REV. CODE Of 1954 (as amended 1969), § 170(e) (1).
"%Id. § 170(b) (1) (A).
"See note 10 supra.
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the 50 per cent limitation if he elects to take the unrealized appreciation
into account for tax purposes.'8' 7 This does not mean, however, that the
gain must be recognized and capital gains tax paid on it. Presumably,
to "take . . . into account for tax purposes" means that the deduction is
limited according to the provisions of subsection 17 0(e) (1).88 While the
precise manner and time of making the election must await delineation
by the Treasury, it is clear that the function of subsection 170(b) (1)
(D) (iii) 39 is to provide such an election. If the taxpayer does elect under
subsection (b) (1) (D) (iii) to "take the unrealized appreciation into
account for tax purposes" in accordance with subsection (e) (1), a deduction qualifying for the fifty-per-cent limitation is allowed in the
amount of the fair market value of the property reduced by one half of
the gain that would have been realized if the property had been sold for
its fair market value on the date of the contribution.4 ° Thus, under this
provision, if a gift of stock (which had been held for six months or
more) with a basis of 100 dollars and a fair market value of 200 dollars
was given to a "public charity," the allowable deduction would be 150
dollars; and this total amount would qualify for the maximum limitation
of fifty per cent of the taxpayer's contribution base." And election to
"take the unrealized appreciation into account" is probably to the taxpayer's advantage if the appreciation is nominal or if a large immediate
deduction is needed.'
H.R. REP. No. 91-782, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 292 (1969) (emphasis added).
's

See note 39 infra.

(iii) At the election of the taxpayer (made at such time and in such manner as the Secretary or his delegate prescribes by regulations), subsection
(e) (1) shall apply to all contributions of capital gain property (to which
subsection (e) (1) (B) does not otherwise apply) made by the taxpayer during the taxable year. If such an election is made, clauses (i) [which limits
deductions of capital gain property to 30 percent] and (ii) [which permits
a carryover of such gifts] shall not apply to contributions of capital gain
'

property made during the taxable year ....
INT. REv. CODE of 1954 (as amended 1969), § 170(b) (1) (D)
4' (1)
GENERAL RutE.The amount of any charitable

(iii).
contribution of
property otherwise taken into account under this section [in this case by the
election under (b) (1) (D) (iii)] shall be reduced by .

.

. 50 percent ...

of

the amount of gain which would have been long-term capital gain if the property contributed had been sold by the taxpayer at its fair market price
(determined at the time of such contribution).
Id. §1170(e) (1).
" In applying the fifty-per-cent carryover for any year in which this selection
is made, the taxpayer must remember that contributions of "capital gain property" in any prior year for which an election was not made must be reduced as
if they were subject to the reduced-contribution rule when they were made. See
INT. Rav. CODE of 1954 (as amended 1969), § 170(b) (1)(D) (iii).
"233 & 34 Am. JuR. Federal Taxation 63 (Special Supp. 1970).
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In the case of contributions of "ordinary income property," the new
Act imposes the most stringent restrictions of all. While the maximum
fifty-per-cent limitation applies, the provision applicable to such gifts
states that "the amount of any charitable contribution of property . . .
shall be reduced by ... the amount of gain which would not have been
long-term capital gain if the property contributed had been sold by the
taxpayer at its fair market value."4 This provision thus permits a deduction for gifts of "ordinary income property" only to the extent of the
taxpayer's basis in the property. "Ordinary income property" is not
specifically defined in the Act; but it is clear that the term applies to any
property that, if sold by the taxpayer on the date of the contribution at
its fair market value, would have resulted in ordinary income to him.
The Senate and House Committee Reports 44 indicate that "ordinary income property" includes inventory; "section 306 stock;" '45 works of art,
books, letters, and memorandums that are given by the person who created them; and stock held for less than six months.
Since "inventory" is included in this definition and since contributions
of inventory are deductible only to the extent of basis, the question arises
whether Revenue Rulings 55-13846 and 55-53 1,47 as embodied in subsection 1.170-1(c) of the Treasury Regulations,48 still apply. These
rulings hold, in effect, that when inventory is given, the cost of the
property, or its inventory value, must be eliminated from the taxpayer's
beginning inventory account. There does not seem to be any inconsistency between the new Act and these two rulings, and there appears to be
no reason why they should not still apply. Thus, a taxpayer will be
limited, under the Act, to the amount of his basis when he claims a deduction for a gift of inventory; and, under the Treasury's rulings, he will
still have to remove the value of the property given to charity from his
beginning inventory account. If the law was otherwise, he would receive
a double tax benefit because he would be allowed a charitable deduction
49
for an item that, in effect, would have cost him nothing.
'3 INT. REV. CoDE of 1954 (as amended 1969),
"S. REP. No. 91-552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 81

§ 170(e)(1)(A).
(1969); H.R. REP. No. 91-413

(Part 1), 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 55 (1969).
,1 For a definition of "Section 306 stock," see INT. REV. CODE of 1954 (as
amended 1969), § 306(c); see generally B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS § 8.03 (2d ed. 1966).
,' Rev. Rul. 55-138, 1955-1 CuM. BULL. 223.
"Rev. Rul. 55-531, 1955-2 CuM. BULL. 520.
"Treas. Reg. § 1.170-1(c) (1958).
"If the regulation did not require that the value of the donated inventory item
be removed from the beginning inventory account, the result would be an inflated
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It should be noted that the definition of "ordinary income property"
includes that portion of a gift of depreciable real or tangible personal
property used in a taxpayer's trade or business that would have been
subject to the depreciation recapture rules 0 if the property had been sold
at its fair market value at the date of contribution. Any gain above this
amount is treated as "capital gain property" and is subject to the provisions of the Act applicable to such property.5'
In addition to the provisions discussed above regarding gifts to
charitable organizations, the 1969 Act also provides specifically for the
adjustment of basis in bargain sales to charitable organizations. 2 Under
the old law, if a taxpayer sold property with a basis of 12,000 dollars and
a fair market value of 20,000 dollars to a charity for the amount of his
basis, he recognized no gain and was allowed a charitable deduction of
8,000 dollars. If he had sold the property to the charity for 14,000 dollars, he would have had a 2,000 dollars gain, which would have been
recognized for tax purposes, and a charitable deduction of 6,000 dollars.
In other words, all of his basis was offset against the proceeds of the
sale to determine his gain, and the amount of the fair market value of the
property in excess of the proceeds from the sale was treated as a charitable
contribution. Under the new law, the basis must be allocated between
the portion "sold" and the portion "given" to the charity."3 In the first of
the two examples immediately above, the taxpayer would, under the Act,
be required to allocate sixty per cent of his basis (7,200 dollars) to the
portion "sold" and forty per cent (4,800 dollars) to the portion "given"
to the charity. Thus, the taxpayer would be required to include 4,800
dollars (12,000 dollars [total basis] - 7,200 dollars [basis allocated
to portion "sold"] = 4,800 dollars) as a gain from the sale of a capital
asset in his tax return; and, as under prior law, he would be allowed a
cost-of-goods-sold figure that would reduce the net profit on which income tax is
computed.
r°See INT. REv. CODE of 1954 (as amended 1969), §§ 617(d) (1) (mining
property), 1245(a), 1250(a), 1251(c), 1252(a).
11Id. § 170(e) (1). See 2 CCH 1970 STAND. FED. TAX REP [Green 1854-56]
at 21,998; P-H 1970 FED. TAXES 113 (Rep. Bull. 1, 1970).
1 (b) BARGAIN SALE TO A CHARITABLE ORGANIZATION.-If a deduction
is allowable under section 170 (relating to charitable contributions) by
reason of a sale, then the adjusted basis for determining the gain from such
sale shall be that portion of the adjusted basis which bears the same ratio to
the adjusted basis as the amount realized bears to the fair market value of
the property.

INT. REv. CODE of 1954 (as amended 1969), § 1011(b). This section applies to all
19, 1969.
such sales made after December
"sSee H.R. REP. No. 91-413 (Part 1), 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 55-56 (1969).
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deduction of 8,000 dollars.5 Furthermore, since this contribution is one
of appreciated property, it would appear that all of the rules applicable
to such contributions must be considered."
An overall view of the provisions of the 1969 Act relating to charitable deductions seems to indicate that the new law will have little economic effect on the individual taxpayer. It is doubtful that the increase
in the maximum limitation will be a greater incentive for charitable contributions since very few individuals contribute the maximum deductible
amount to charity each year. Furthermore, because of the five-year carryover provisions, which also applied under the old law, most taxpayers
could deduct the entire amount of their charitable contributions anyway.
While the new provisions eliminate most of the tax advantages previously available for taxpayers making charitable contributions of "ordinary
income property," many of the double tax savings, still remain for gifts
of "capital gain property." Thus, even though many of the rules governing charitable deductions have been tightened, the individual taxpayer, by carefully following the new rules discussed in this note, can still
enjoy significant tax benefits through the use of charitable contributions.
TURNER VANN ADAMS

Income Tax-Problems of a Corporate Executor in the Administration
of Successive Estates
The gain or loss from the sale or exchange of property is determined,
for tax purposes, by the relation of the "amount realized" to the adjusted
basis of the property.' The method used to compute the basis for the
capital gains of property acquired from a decedent is defined by section
1014 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to be ."the fair market value
of the property at the date of the decedent's death ... ."2 In Manufacturers
Hanover Trust Co. v. United States' the United States Court of Claims
applied section 1014 in a case involving successive deaths.
The plaintiff, a corporate executor, brought an action for refund of
federal income taxes paid by the estate. The plaintiff was the executor of
54

Id.

P.H. 1970

115 (Rep. Bull. 1, 1970).
1954, § 1001.

FED. TAxEs

'INT. REv. CODE of

'Id.§1014(a).
-410 F.2d 767 (Ct. Cl. 1969).
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the estate of a woman who had died testate in 1957 and who had left
her husband as her sole residuary legatee. Her estate included securities
having at her death a fair market value of approximately 65,000 dollars.
The executor had not distributed the estate prior to the husband's death
in 1964, and at his death the fair market value of these securities was
almost 160,000 dollars. The plaintiff was also appointed executor of the
husband's estate. Shortly after the death of the husband, the executor
sold the securities for 160,700 dollars and with that money purchased
United States Treasury notes. In July, 1965, the executor sold the notes
and distributed the proceeds to the beneficiaries of the husband's estate.
As executor of the wife's estate, the plaintiff filed a fiduciary tax return
for the year 1964 reporting that the wife's estate had realized a longterm capital gain from the sale of the securities. This gain was based on
the difference between the sale price in 1964 and the fair market value
of the securities at the wife's death in 1957, which resulted in a taxable
capital gain of almost 95,000 dollars. In December, 1964, the plaintiff
filed an amended tax return for the wife's estate claiming that, instead
of the long-term capital gain, the estate had realized only a short-term
capital gain representing the difference between the sale price in 1964
and the fair market value of the securities at the husband's death in 1964:
a gain of approximately one thousand dollars. The plaintiff's claim for
refund was disallowed and his suit followed.
The Court of Claims granted the government's motion for summary
judgment." The majority reasoned as follows: the plaintiff was acting solely in the capacity as executor of the wife's estate when he sold the securities
in 1964 even though his action was taken after the husband's death. Each
estate was a separate entity for tax purposes, and no merger of the two
estates was accomplished although the plaintiff was acting at the time
as executor of both estates. Since the plaintiff failed to show anything
in New York law requiring a different result, the wife's estate had realized
a long-term taxable capital gain on the difference between the sale price
and the fair market value at the wife's death.'
The dissent relied on Brewster v. Gage,6 a decision by the Supreme
Court in 1930. The plaintiff in Brewster was one of the residuary legatees
of the estate of his father, who had died in 1918. The father's stocks, the
personal property in question, had been distributed in 1920, and the plain"Id. at 770.
Id. at 768-70.

6280 U.S. 327 (1930).
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tiff had sold some of them in 1920, 1921, and 1922. The Commissioner
of Internal Revenue contended that the values of the stocks at the testator's
death, rather than at the date of distribution, should have been used to
determine capital gains and assessed a deficiency. 7 The district court
agreed with the plaintiff's contention that the proper time for determining
basis for gains was the date of distribution,' but the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit reversed' and held that the date of death was determinative. The Supreme Court affirmed this judgment. 10
The Supreme Court in Brewster relied on basic principles of property
law in reaching its decision. Under one of these principles, title to devised
real property, both legal and equitable, passes immediately to the devisee;
but the legal title to bequeathed personal property passes to the executor.
The Court stated that "immediately upon the death of the owner there
vests in each of [the legatees] the right to his distributive share of so
much as shall remain after proper administration"" and that "there vests
in the . . . executors, as of the date of the death, title to all personal

property belonging to the estate; it is taken, not for themselves, but in
the right of others ...."1

The Court emphasized the significance of the

date of death of the testator and relegated the date of distribution to
secondary importance: "[T]he decree of distribution confers no new
right; it merely identifies the property remaining, evidences right of
possession in the heirs or legatees and requires the administrators or
executors to deliver it to them. The legal title so given relates back to the
date of death."'" The Court concluded that at the testator's death the
legatee received an economic interest in the property even though the
executor held the legal title and that from the date of death the legatee
would be enriched or suffer loss with every increase or decline in the
value of the property.' 4
The dissenting judge applied these principles to the facts before the
court in Manufacturers Hanover Trust and reached a result favorable
to the taxpayer. His position was based on the rationale that the basis
used in the determination of capital gains should relate to the beneficial
at 333.
v. Gage, 25 F.2d 915 (W.D.N.Y. 1927).
Brewster
'7Id.
SBrewster v. Gage, 30 F.2d 604 (2d Cir. 1929).
U.S. at 337.
"Id.at 334.
1Id.
1d.
"Id.
'10
1 280

12
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interest in the property. Since at the wife's death the husband acquired a
beneficial interest in the property, his basis should have been the fair market
value at that date. At the husband's death his legatees (the children)
received a stepped-up basis: the fair market value of the property at his
death rather than its lesser value at the time that he acquired it. The
sale by the executor could only be made for the legatees, the beneficial
owners. By focusing on the beneficial interest, the dissenting judge concluded that the only gain realized was the difference between the sale
price and the fair market value of the securities on the date of the husband's death. 5
Section 1014(b) (1) of the Code, which provides that a decedent's
estate shall be considered to have acquired property from the decedent for
the purpose of applying the general rule'6 for determining basis, does not
require a result different from the position taken by the dissent. The
estate is a taxable entity, and specific provisions in the Code provide for
the taxation of capital gains realized by it.17 Section 1014(b) (1) allows
the estate a stepped-up basis at the death of the decedent. This provision
does not preclude the courts from looking at the beneficial interest to
compute the basis for capital gains; Brewster, in fact, held that they must.
Moreover, courts have focused on the holder of the equitable title in
other areas of tax law. An example can be found in the determination
of what constitutes a depreciable interest. The basis used to determine
depreciation is the same as the basis used in computing capital gains.' 8
A case in which the depreciable-interest concept is illustrated is Helvering
v. F. & R. Lazarus & Co.' In that case a bank held the legal title to
three buildings used by the taxpayer in his business. The Commissioner
disallowed a depreciation deduction on the ground that the deduction
followed the legal title. The Supreme Court ruled against the Commissioner. It concluded that since the instrument conveying legal title to
the bank was merely a security agreement, the taxpayer, being the equitable
owner, should be allowed the depreciation deduction. The Court in
Lazarus emphasized the "equitable nature of [tax] proceedings" and the
concern of tax courts with "substance and realties" rather than formal
410 F.2d at 770-73 (dissenting opinion).
' INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 1014(a).
1 Id. §§ 641(b), 1202. The majority relied on the separate-entity theory in
Hanover Trust. 410 F.2d at 770.
Manufacturers
13Id. § 167(g).
10308 U.S. 252 (1939).
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documents. 20 In defining depreciable interest, the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit has said:
It is not the physical property itself, nor the title thereto, which
alone entitles the owner to claim depreciation. The statutory allowance
is available to him whose interest in the wasting asset is such that he
would suffer an economic loss resulting from the deterioration and
physical exhaustion .... 21
Clearly equitable ownership was critical in the court's determination of
the depreciable interest.
The rationale of the dissent would be equally applicable in determining
capital losses and would produce a result different from that which would
be reached by using the rationale of the majority. If the securities in
ManufacturersHanover Trust had decreased in value between the wife's
and the husband's death and then had further declined after the death of
the husband, the basis used in determining the loss would, under the view
of the dissent, still be the fair market value on the date of the husband's
death. In a declining market, the difference between the two computations
would be significant if the property was, as in Manufacturers Hanover
Trust, held over a long period and then sold immediately after the second
death.
The validity of the dissent's rationale can be illustrated by posing a
situation in which there are multiple legatees. If, in the principal case,
the husband had shared the securities with his two children, his portion
that was sold by the executor after his death would have received the
stepped-up basis while the basis of the children's shares would have remained the fair market value at the time of their mother's death. This
difference would have occurred even if the securities had at all times been
treated as an entity by the executor, had been acquired from the same
decedent, and had been sold simultaneously.
The most serious objection to the view of the majority is that its focus
is primarily on the date of distribution and on the status of the plaintiff as
executor of the wife's estate on the date of sale. If the securities had been
distributed to the husband and had not been sold or exchanged prior
to his death, his estate and his legatees would have received a stepped-up
basis at his death. If the securities had been distributed to his estate
after his death but before sale, an identical result would have followed.
20
Id. ;t 255.
" Commissioner v. Moore, 207 F.2d 265, 268 (9th Cir. '1953).
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The only difference between the latter situations and the actual facts
of the case is that the date of distribution occurred both after the husband's death and the executor's sale. Brewster held that the decree of
distribution gives no new rights and should not be considered in determining basis. By concentrating on the status of the plaintiff as executor of
the wife's estate at the time of sale and on the date of distribution, the
majority in Manufacturers Hanover Trust put form before substance. 2
The result reached in ManufacturersHanover Trust represents a trap
for the unwary. A long period of administration is not unusual, and the
conclusion reached by the majority would, mutatis mutandis, be equally
applicable to a shorter period of administration. The use of a single corporate executor for sucessive estates is not an unusual practice. The likelihood
of a corporate executor's serving successive estates has in fact, been greatly
increased in North Carolina due to the significant and continuing expansion of the state's larger banks, which now offer trust services that
were not available in the past. Executors should be aware when administering successive estates that utmost care should be taken in the choice
of dates for the distribution and sale of estate property.
LANNY

B.

BRIDGERS

Insurance-Liability of Insurers under the Omnibus Clause to
Protect Emergency Drivers-The North Carolina Situation
The general effect of an omnibus clause in an automobile liability
insurance policy is that one using the automobile with the permission of
the named insured becomes an additional insured under the policy.' Not
only does coverage under the omnibus clause provide the driver with a
right against the insurer for indemnification for liability arising out of
his use of the vehicle, 2 but such coverage also guarantees at least minimal
recovery to an innocent third party who suffers personal injury or prop" The inequitable result reached by the majority is even more apparent upon
consideration of the estate-tax consequences. The fair market value of the securities
at the date of the husband's death was used to compute the estate tax on his estate.

§ 4354 (1962) [hereinafter
cited as APPLEMAN]; 7 D. BLASHFIELD, AUTOMOBILE LAW AND PRACTICE §§ &15.5,
ed. 1966) [hereinafter cited as BLASHEIELD].The liability of the insurer is
.8 (3d
27 APPLEMAN § 4354; 7 BLASIFIELD § 315.5.
27 J.

APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE

still controlled by the limits of coverage of the policy. 7

APPEMAN

§ 4371.
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erty damage due to the driver's fault.3 The importance of protection for
the injured third party is clearly evident when it is realized that the
driver may be judgment-proof.
In Whelchel v. Sommer,4 the owner's wife took his car without his
knowledge. While she was driving, the vehicle went into a skid.
The wife, suffering from a heart condition, became hysterical and
allegedly passed out. Unable to drive, she was transferred to another
car to be taken home. At no time did she give anyone permission to
drive the car. However, one of her passengers decided to return the car
to the owner's home because it was feared that the vehicle would be stolen
or vandalized if left unattended in the immediate vicinity. An accident
ensued in which the driver was killed and the appellant in the case was
injured. The appellant, after obtaining a judgment against the decedent's
estate that was unsatisfied, brought an action against the owner's insurance company for garnishment under the omnibus clause. Judgment
was rendered for the insurer by the federal trial court on the basis that
the decedent did not have permission to drive the car, and this judgment
was affirmed on appeal.
Traditionally, permission of the named insured has been the key in
bringing the omnibus clause into effect, and litigation involving whether
there is coverage under such a provision is generally "permissionoriented."" A typical policy may read:
Persons Insured:
(1) the named insured ...
(2) any other person using such automobile with the permission
of the named insured ....6
There is general agreement today that permission may be expressed or
implied ;7 that is, when express permission cannot be found, the court
I "[S]uit may . . .be brought against the insured by a third person, injured

by the conduct of the automobile, by garnishment or otherwise." 7 APPLEMAN
§4371.
'413 F.2d 521 (8th Cir. 1969).
'For a discussion of the major issues which "dominate the history of litiga-

tion ...with reference to the omnibus provision," see Note, The Omnibus Clause
and Extension of Coverage by the Court, 45 N.D.L. REv. 505 (1969).
'McLendon, Coverage Disputes: Basis of Defenses in NORTH CAROLINA BAR
ASSOCIATION FOUNDATION, INSTITUTE ON LIABILITY INSURANCE LITIGATION inI-1,

111-12 (1968) [hereinafter cited as McLendon] (emphasis added).
77 APIPLEMAN § 4365; 7

BLASHFIELD § 315.10. North Carolina makes
STAT. § 20-279.21(b) (2) (Supp. 1969).

provision by statute. N.C. GEN.

this
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may look to see if the insured had impliedly consented to the driver's
use of the vehicle. In making this determination, the facts and circumstances of each case are considered." However, judicial decisions have
developed certain rules regarding the particular facts and circumstances
that will justify a finding of implied permission. Three factors are generally required to coexist: (1) a history of frequent past use by the
permittee, (2) knowledge by the named insured of such use, and (3)
acquiescence on the part of the named insured.' If no permission is found,
the court will generally stop its inquiry and hold that the driver is not
an additional insured. On such a finding, the injured party may be
without a satisfactory remedy since the insurer is absolved from liability.
In Whelchel, as permission in the traditional sense could not be
established, the appellant argued that the court should extend "implied
permission" to cover the decedent on the basis of emergency-i.e., that
the court should find a constructive consent in that operation of the
vehicle was under such circumstances that the named insured under the
policy would have granted his permission had he been in a position to do
do. As to "[t] he question of whether an 'emergency' can create implied
permission of the named insured to drive his insured automobile,"' the
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit recognized that the issue was
one of first impression under Missouri law" and that very few other courts
had previously considered it.12 Under the dictate of Erie,3 the court

found that the closest analogy to the question before it was the approach
taken by the Missouri courts in cases presenting the traditional issue of
implied permission. Finding that Missouri had adopted a strict position
87 BLASHFIELD § 315.10.
1Note, The Omnibus Clause and Extension of Coverage by the Court, supra
note 5, at 519. Implied permission may also arise from the relationship of the parties
or from certain conduct on the part of the named insured, but such permission is
not germane to this note. Id. at 518-21.
"oWhelchel v. Sommer, 413 F.2d 521, 526 (8th Cir. 1969).
" The case was in the federal courts on removal from a Missouri court on the
basis of diversity of citizenship. The parties agreed that Missouri law was
controlling. Id. at 524.
"2Perhaps the most analogous case in which liability for the insurer has been
found is Coons v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 12 App. Div. 2d 701, 207
N.Y.S.2d 819 (1960), aff'd, 9 N.Y.2d 994, 176 N.E.2d 515, 218 N.Y.S.2d 66
(1961). In this case the insured stopped his automobile in the middle of a busy
street and walked away. A passenger attempted to move the vehicle and had an
accident. Though the court mentioned the foreseeable "emergency," the decision
appears to be based on permission implied from the conduct of the insured. See
note 9 supra.
"Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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in that regard, the court felt compelled to hold that state law would not
have recognized implied permission based on emergency. However, the
court added:
. . . [W]e cannot escape the conclusion that a beneficial purpose
would have been served if the Missouri Supreme Court could have
rendered a definitive decision on a question that deeply involves
matters of local law and policy. 14
This question of "local law and policy" suggests that Whelchel, though
far removed from the local forum, calls for a searching inquiry as to
what should constitute permission in North Carolina. For the sake of
discussion, let us imagine a clear situation of emergency arising in this
state.' 5 Insured, driving alone, stops to pick up a hitchhiker. While stopped,
insured slumps over the wheel unconscious. As no help is immediately
available, the hitchhiker takes the wheel to drive to the hospital. Is the
hitchhiker an additional insured? Under North Carolina case law, the
answer is no. Clearly there has been no express permission.
Where express permission is relied upon it must be of an affirmative
character, directly and distinctly stated, clear and outspoken, and not
merely implied or left to inference.-6
It also appears that there is no implied permission on these facts.
Though not spelling out the elements mentioned earlier,' 7 North Carolina
has followed the traditional approach.
S..
[I]mplied permission involves an inference arising from a course
of conduct or relationship between the parties, in which there is
mutual acquiescence or lack of objection under circumstances sig-

nifying consent.'
14413

8

F.2d at 527.

" As the court in Whelchel refused to accept appellant's argument regarding
emergency, it was unnecessary for it to determine if the facts of the case actually
constituted such an emergency that the omnibus clause would be brought into effect.
A significant difficulty in expanding implied permission to cover the "emergency
operator" is the determination of what circumstances in fact constitute an emergency. Inquiring of the trier of fact whether a reasonable man would have granted
his permission if he had known of the circumstances and had been in a position to
consent may provide a solution.
Hawley v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of North America, 257 N.C. 381, 384, 126
S.E.2d 161, 164 (1962).
' See text preceding note 9 supra.
18 Hawley v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of North America, 257 N.C. 381, 384, 126
S.E.2d 161, 164-65 (1962).
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Should an accident occur under circumstances similar to those in our
hypothetical fact-situation, the result might be to leave injured third
persons without redress. Is such an outcome warranted on the sole
grounds that the insured was unable to expressly consent and that, since
the parties were strangers, no "course of conduct" can be established?
The expressed public policy of the state would decry such a result.
The primary purpose of the law requiring compulsory insurance is
to furnish at least partial compensation to innocent victims who have
suffered injury and damage as a result of the negligent operation of a
motor vehicle upon the public highway.19

Yet, for "claims or causes of action" arising before July 6, 1967,20 it is
apparent that there would be no liability for the insurer.
In 1967, North Carolina General Statutes, section 20-279.21 was
amended to read:
(b) Such owner's policy of liability insurance:
(2) Shall insure the person named therein and any other person,
as insured, using any such motor vehicle or motor vehicles with the express or implied permission of such
named insured, or any other persons in lawful possesSion....

21

The addition of the italicized language would appear to provide coverage
to the hitchhiker in our hypothetical situation as the use of the conjunction "or" seems to indicate that "lawful possession" is something different
from "using . . . with . . . express or implied permission." However,
this interpretation ultimately depends upon a similar construction of the
words "lawful possession" by the North Carolina courts, and to this date
no litigation involving the issue has been before the supreme court or
the court of appeals. 2
19

Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hale, 270 N.C. 195, 200, 154 S.E.2d 79, 84 (1967).
Ch. 1162, §4, [1967] N.C. Sess. L. 1795 provides: "[N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20279.21(b) (2) (amendment ratified July 6, 1967)] shall be in full force and effect
from and after its ratification, but shall not affect any claims or causes of action
arising
before ratification."
"1N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21(b) (2) (Supp. 1969) (emphasis added). Since
coverage under the omnibus clause of "persons in lawful possession" of the named
insured's vehicle is based upon the public policy of providing minimum protection
for third persons, the courts might well limit the insurer's liability under the clause
to the statutory minimums in the absence of an express provision to the contrary
in the insurance policy.
2 Though this language was included in an earlier statute (Ch. 1006, § 4(2) (b),
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The preamble to the session law through which this statutory addition
was enacted" also appears to support the conclusion that it was intended
to expand the scope of the omnibus clause beyond the traditional coverage
of drivers with the "permission" of the named insured.
WHEREAS, many innocent and blameless citizens who are victims of serious personal injuries and property loss are unable to receive any compensation whatsoever because of difficulty of proof under
the terms of liability insurance policies, and it is difficult and often
impossible for injured parties and operators to prove that one lawfully in possession of a vehicle had the express or implied permission
of the owner to drive on the very trip and occasion of the collision;
and
WHEREAS, liability coverage under the laws of North Carolina
is provided for an operator of a vehicle who has the "express or implied
permission" of the titled owner but does not extend to persons otherwise lawfully in possession of vehicles .... 24
Section two of the same session law reads: "It shall be a defense to
any action that the operator of a motor vehicle was not in lawful possession on the occasion complained of."'25 Mr. L. P. McLendon, Jr., a
member of the Senate Insurance Committee when the law was considered and passed, has pointed out that the effect of the second section
is to shift the burden of proof to the insurer to show that the operator
was not in lawful possession.26 Quaere whether the insurer can meet
this burden by simply showing that the operator had neither the express
nor the implied permission of the insured. If so, it would appear that
the sole effect of the statutory addition is to ease the plaintiff's "difficulty
of proof" by shifting the burden on the issue of permission and that, in
fact, coverage under the omnibus clause is not extended beyond the
operator's having permission.
Since such a construction is possible, it is necessary for us to
consider where the "emergency operator" and the person that he injures
stand if they must fall back upon actual permission, express or implied.
[1947] N.C. Sess. L. 1414 (repealed 1953)), the cases indicate that there has been
no judicial determination of the meaning of "lawful possession."
Ch. 1162, [1967] N.C. Sess. L. 1794.
"Id. at 1795 (emphasis added).
2 cId.
"8McLendon at 111-13.
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A consideration of the circumstances that gave rise to the 1967 amendment may be helpful to the litigant. Mr. McLendon has attributed the
legislation to confusion existing from court decisions dealing with the
omnibus clause.2 7 This confusion arose in an attempt by the supreme
court to settle on one of three approaches taken by other jurisdictions
in interpreting such clauses. Relying on Hawley v. Indemnity Insurance
Co. of North America,28 Mr. McLendon has summarized the three
approaches as follows:
(1) Strict Rule- . . . [A]ny deviation from the time, place or purpose specified by the person granting permission is sufficient to take
the permittee outside the coverage of the omnibus clause.
(2) Moderate Rule-... [A] material deviation from the permission
granted constitutes a use without permission, but a slight deviation is
not sufficient to exclude the permittee from coverage.
(3) Liberal Rule- . . [I]f the permittee has permission to use the
auto in the first instance, any subsequent use while it remains in his
possession, though not within the contemplation of the parties at the
time of the bailment, is a permissive use within the terms of the clause. 20
In Hawley, the supreme court derived a legislative intention to confine construction of omnibus clauses at least to the moderate rule.30 The
rationale was that since the Motor Vehicle Safety and Responsibility Act
of 194731 had extended coverage to one "using or responsible for the use
of the motor vehicle with the permission, expressed or implied, of the
named insured, or any other person in lawful possession,' ' 2 the deletion
in 1953 of the italicized phrases indicated a legislative desire to narrow
the statute. Mr. McLendon has criticized this interpretation and has
pointed out that the legislature modeled the language of the 1953 enactment3 4 deleting the phrase in question on a provision in the Uniform
Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act of 1952,", which has been held
27

Id.

N.C. 381, 126 S.E.2d 161 (1962), ioted in Note, Automobile InsurancePermissive User Under the Omnibus Clause, 41 N.C.L. REV. 232 (1963). Mr.
McLendon also relied upon this case note.
29 McLendon at 111-14.
10257 N.C. at 387, 126 S.E.2d at 167.
Ch. 1006, §§ 1-59, [1947] N.C. Sess. L. 1412-32 (repealed 1953).
Id. § 4(2) (b) at 1414 (emphasis added).
88 Ch. 1300, § 21(b) (2), [1953] N.C. Sess. L. 1271.
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21(b) (2) (1965), as amended, N.C. GEN. STAT.
§20-279.21(b) (2) (Supp. 1969).
" The pertinent provision in uniform legislation today can be found in NATIONAL
28257
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to encompass the liberal rule in other jurisdictions 6 "Importantly," he
has stated, "the Court noted that the omnibus clause as contained in the
[1947 act] was broad enough to embrace the liberal rule. ' 'aT Though
Mr. McLendon did not say that the purpose of reinsertion of the phrase
"in lawful possession" by the 1967 General Assembly was to enact the
liberal rule, the quotation above would indicate his opinion that there was
intent by the legislature to allow the courts to adopt it.
Significant in this legislative history is that the rules in question as
well as the supreme court's opinion in Hawley are not concerned with
what constitutes initial permission. Rather the focus is on the scope of
such permission and the consequences for deviation from it3s Therefore,
any attempt to determine specific legislative intent to either expand or
restrict what constitutes initial permission would be futile, for it is
implicit that this question was not considered by the legislature. However, continuing to be aware that "[a] compulsory motor vehicle insurance act is a remedial statute and will be liberally construed so that
the beneficial purpose intended by its enactment . . . may be accomplished,""0 the courts should realize that the specific attempt to liberalize
the applicability of the statute in those cases involving a permissive user
is some indication of the feeling of the legislature about application of
the statute generally. As the 1967 amendment clearly provides the
opportunity for adoption of the liberal rule in North Carolina as to the
scope of permission once granted, it appears permissible for the courts
to similarly liberalize the view of what constitutes initial permission so
that the emergency operator will be covered by insurance and persons or
property injured by his driving will be afforded some protection.40 Even
under the traditional interpretation of implied permission, the supreme
court has recognized that "the purpose of the use . . . [has] bearing on
COMMITTEE ON UNIFORM TRAFFIC LAWS AND ORDINANCES, UNIFORM VEHICLE
CODE & MODEL TRAFFIC ORDINANCE § 7-324(b) (2) (rev. ed. 1968).

" McLendon at 111-13.
87 Id.
8 For a discussion of

problems regarding the scope of permission in North
Carolina see Note, Autonmbile Insumrance-Permissive User Under the Omnibus
Clause, 41 N.C.L. REv. 232 (1963).
"' Moore v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. Group, 270 N.C. 532, 535, 155 S.E.2d 128,
130-31 (1967).
"0It is difficult for this writer to comprehend why the emergency operator
(who is perhaps performing a service for the insured and who may possibly have
the insured in the automobile at the time of the accident) should not be provided
coverage if coverage is provided to one who has initial permission regardless of
the extent of his later deviation. Liberal Ride in text at note 29 supra.
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the critical question of the owner's implied permission for the actual
4
use." 1
Whether the courts interpret "lawful possession" to cover the emer-

gency operator or whether he is found to have "permission" because of
the existing emergency, it is evident that coverage must be provided under
the statute if more than lip service is paid to the public policy underlying
compulsory liability insurance in North Carolina. Arguably, the more
desirable approach is to give "lawful possession" a meaning independent
of permission, for the former appears to describe the emergency situation
more accurately. Indeed, "lawful possession" can even be extended
beyond the emergency situation so that anyone other than a thief becomes
an insured. Such a far-reaching interpretation would still fall short of the
ultimate remedial goal of providing partial redress to every innocent
42
victim of a negligent driver.

JAMES LEE DAVIS

Labor Law-Duty to Bargain in Good Faith-Boulwarism
Within the Totality-of-Circumstances Rule
In 1947, following a series of setbacks in negotiations with the three
major unions representing its employees,' General Electric introduced a
new approach into its technique of collective bargaining. This approach,
labelled "Boulwarism" after its supposed progenitor,2 was designed to
instill in the employees of GE the idea that the company, without prodding
by the representatives of the employees, would do what was "right" and
would give each employee the benefits to which he was entitled, but no
more.3 The implementation of Boulwarism was two-pronged. First, by
means of extensive investigation into the various economic factors in,1 Bailey v. General Ins. Co. of America, 265 N.C. 675, 678, 144 S.E.2d 898,

900 (1965).
4'

See text preceding notes 19 & 24 supra.

' Note, Labor Law: General Electric's "Overall Approach" to Bargaining
Held a Violation of Good Faith, 1965 DuKE L.J. 661 n.1. See Cooper, Boulwarisin and the Duty to Bargain in Good Faith, 20 RUTGERS L. Ruv. 653, 662-63
& n.35 (1966).
'Lemuel R. Boulware, then vice-president of GE, designed the new technique
in the late 1940's. R. SMITH, L. MERRIFIELD, & T. ST. ANTOINE, LABOR RELATIONS
LAw 718 (4th ed. 1968). The most detailed history of Boulwarism is contained
in H. NORTHRUP, BOULWARISM (1964).
'Note, Labor Law--Collective Bargaining-GeneralElectric'sFir~n Offer Approach Held Bad Faith, 40 N.Y.U.L. REv. 798 (1965). GE developed an almost
paternalistic attitude toward its employees. See Cooper, supra note 1, at 660.
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volved, the company would arrive at what it felt to be a fair offer. This
offer would be presented to the union representatives at the time for renegotiation of the employment contracts. The company would not consider changing its offer unless bargainers for the union could prove to the
company that the proposal was based on a misapprehension of the relevant
facts. Thus was the "firm, fair offer" conceived.' Second, an extensive
communications campaign would be waged to convince the employees and
the public that GE had made its best offer first, that the offer was fair
for all concerned, and that the offer was not subject to change. 5
Boulwarism was so successful initially that the first year in which GE
employed it, "The [union] was so dumbfounded ... that its representatives asked for an adjournment and accepted the company's offer the next

day."'

Abandoning altogether the "auction" method of bargaining, GE

continued to use the Boulware technique unimpededly until the contract
negotiations of the summer and fall of 1960.7 At that time, prototypic
Boulwarism alone proved to be ineffective to force capitulation by the
union representatives; GE was forced to engage in activities-including
unilateral offers to employees' and direct negotiations with locas-that
were outside the theory of Boulwarism.1 °
'Comment, Restrictions on the Employer's Right of Free Speech During
Organizing Campaigns and Collective Bargaining, 63 Nw. U.L. REV. 40, 66
(1968). Perhaps the most important facet of the "firm, fair offer" relating to its
legality is that it is not completely unalterable. See Dierks Forests, Inc., 148
N.L.R.B. 923 (1964) ("hard bargaining" by an employer is not in itself unlawful).
' 38 TEmP. L.Q. 353 (1965). GE was attempting to apply its successful productmarketing techniques to its relations with its employees. See Cooper, supra note 1,
at 660.
' Cooper, supra note 1, at 661 n.29, citing HENDERSON, CREATIVE COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING 52-53 (Healy ed. 1965).
"Comment, "Boidwareism": Legality and Effect, 76 H.RV. L. REV. 807, 809
(1963). In the 1966 negotiations, the major union with which GE was bargaining
tried another method of combating Boulwarism instead of striking-co-ordinated
bargaining. Under this approach, other unions with which GE dealt were
brought in for joint negotiations so that a united front might be presented. GE
refused to join in joint negotiations. See R. SMITHa, L. MERRIFIELD, & T. ST.
ANTOINE, supra note 2, at 718-19; Note, Labor Law-The Legality of Coordinated Bargaining, 47 N.C.L. REV. 946 (1969).
' General Elec. Co., 150 N.L.R.B. 192, 214-15 (1964). GE unilaterally offered
an accident and life insurance policy to all its employees. This action was held by
the Labor Board to be a violation of GE's duty to bargain in good faith. Id. at 193.
See NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962).
0 150 N.L.R.B. at 193. The Board held GE's action in dealing with locals
when the parent international union was the recognized bargaining agent to be a
violation of the company's duty to bargain in good faith. Id. See Medo Photo
Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 678 (1944); NLRB v. Herman Sausage Co.,
275 F.2d 229 (5th Cir. 1960).
" The Board found one other specific violation of the duty to bargain in good
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I Under

the contract that was operative prior to 1960, the earliest date
that either party could compel the beginning of formal negotiations was
August 16, 1960, forty-five days before the end of the contract." In the
latter part of 1959, the company began its publicity campaign by advising employees of the need for GE to remain competitive through low
operating costs. 2 Then, after negotiations had started, the employees
were bombarded with over one hundred written communications 3
bruiting the virtues of their company's "firm, fair offer" and disparaging the representatives of the IUE (International Union of Electrical,
Radio, and Machine Workers).
'During the period of informal negotiations, the company informed
the union that it was going to institute contributory group-life and accident-insurance plans for all employees, but that, if the union objected,
the plan would be instituted only for unrepresented employees. Despite
protests by the union that such a plan should be negotiated before being
impjernented, the company instituted it for the unrepresented employees
in July, 1960.11 Once the formal bargaining began, the company consistently refused to furnish the, union the information, including wage
costs, used in computing its offer. When pressed for such information,
GE's representatives would only state enigmatically that they bargained in terms of the "level of benefits" rather than costs.1
As the bai'gaining progressed, GE continually refused to make meanfaith-,GE's refi4sal to supply information to the union regarding the cost-basis
for its "firm, fair offer." 150 N.L.R.B. at 193. The reason that such a refusal
is unlawful is that it forces the representatives of the union to rebut proposals
by the company without having any information on which to base their rebuttal.
See NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149 (1956); NLRB v. Fitzgerald Mills
Corp., 313 F.2d 260 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 834 (,1963).,
" NLRB v. General Elec. Co.,, 418 F.2d 736, 741 (2d Cir. 1969).
12
. d. at 741-42.
. Id. at 759 n.14. See Comment, Restrictions on the Employer's Right of Free
Speech During Organizing Campaigns and Collective Bargaining, 63 Nw. U.L.
REv. 40,. 67-71 (1968) (pointing out the massive size of GE's campaign and examining effects of the campaign on GE's eventual bargaining position).
" 418 F.2d at 742. This action was held by the court to constitute in itself a
violation of section 8(a) (5) of the National Labor Relations Act. (This section is
described in note 25 infra.) Id. at 746-49. See Equitable Life Ins. Co., 133 N,L.R.B.
167k (1961). See also cases cited note 8 supra.
418 F.2d at *742-43. An employer's failure to disclose "relevant" informatitiojn support of his claimed inability to meet union demands is a violation of section 8(a)(5). 2NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149 (1956). Furthermore,
tb~er-e is,
a presumption that information relating to wages is relevant. NLRB v.
375 U.S. 834 (1963).
Cir.),
denied,
F.2d circuit
260 (2dheld
Fitzgerald
Corp.,
In
GeneralMills
Electric,
the313
second
thatcert.
GE's
failure to furnish relevant
information was a violation of section, 8(a) (5). 418 F.2d at 749-53.
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ingful concessions to the union."6 It was not until August 29, 1960, that
GE completely revealed its own proposals.' 7 Despite the IUE's admonitions that GE should not publicize its "firm, fair offer" until the IUE
representatives had an opportunity to examine it, GE refused to delay releasing its prepared publicity beyond the time of the formal presentation
of its offer on the next day.' With only three scheduled meetings Jeft
before the end of the existing contract, it was evident that GE would not
make any significant changes in its offer; for when asked about the possible institution of a local-option plan to divert proposed wage increases
to supplement unemployment compensation, the company's negotiator
replied that "[a]fter all our month [sic] of bargaining and after telling
the employees before they went to vote that this is it, we would look
ridiculous to change it at this late date; and secondly the answer is no."' 9
On September 29, 1960, with a strike imminent, GE refused the
union's request to maintain the status quo under the old contract until a
new one could be signed. 0 On the same day, GE authorized its employee-relations manager for the Schenectady plant to offer almost all of
the terms of the "firm, fair offer" to the local IUE unit for local approval. The manager did so. Throughout the ensuing strike, the company continued to deal with local officials directly. 2 ' The strike was unsuccessful; on October 22, the IUE was forced to capitulate. Without
having seen the complete contract, the union signed a short-form memorandum of agreement.2
In 1964, the NLRB reviewed GE's conduct in the 1960 negotiations.2 3
Among other violations of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA),24
10 418 F.2d at 742-43.
17Id. at 742.
18Id.at 742-43.
19Id. at 745.
20
Id.
1
Id.GE's dealings with locals were found by the court to constitute a specific
violation of section 8(a) (5) of the National Labor Relations Act. Id. at 753-56.
See cases cited note 9 supra. See also J. I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332
(1944).
22418 F.2d at 745-46.
2 General Elec. Co., 150 N.L.R.B. 192 (1964).
"'In addition to the three specific violations of the duty to bargain in good
faith (see notes 8-10 supra), the Board also found GE guilty of violations of sections 8(a)(1) [61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §158(a)(1) (1964) (unlawful
to interfere with or restrain employees' exercise of the right to5 bargain collectively)] and 8(a)(3) [61 Stat. 141-42 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §1 8(a)(3) (1964)
(unlawful to discriminate in employment opportunities against employees exercising collective-bargaining rights)] of the National Labor Relations Act [formerly,
Labor Management Relations Act, 61 Stat. 136-62 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-87
(1964)]. See 150 N.L.R.B. at 193, 284.
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the Board found GE guilty under section 8(a) (5) of an over-all failure
to bargain in good faith2 5 with the IUE. In NLRB v. General Electric
Co.,26 a 1969 decision, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the
Board's decision. Judge Kaufman, writing for a two-judge majority, 27
reaffirmed the Board's use of the "totality-of-circumstances" 28 approach
to determining good faith: "[G]ood faith-or lack of it-must in the absence of a per se violation depend upon a factual determination based
on the overall conduct of the party charged."2 9 He made clear that the determination of subjective good faith could not be made to fit a uniform
rubric, but would have to be resolved through a case-by-case examination
of the facts.
In an opinion concurring and dissenting, Judge Friendly disagreed
with the majority's analysis of GE's conduct. 80 He suggested that since
the parties had "sat down together"'" and had not engaged in any "proscribed tactics"'32 in bargaining, the majority's finding of an over-all
failure to bargain in good faith contravened the language and policy of
section 8(d) of the NLRA. 33 He insisted that when the Board relies on
25 150 N.L.R.B. at 196. Section 8(a) (5) [61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a) (5) (1964)] provides that it is an unfair labor practice for an employer
to refuse to "bargain collectively" with his employees' representatives. Section
8(d) [61 Stat. 142 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1964)] defines "bargain collectively" as follows:
For the purposes of this section [8 of the NLRA], to bargain collectively
is the performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good
faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written contract incorporating any agreement
reached if requested by either party, but such obligation does not compel
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession ....

28418 F.2d 736 (2d Cir. 1969).
" Id. judge Kaufman was joined in his opinion by judge Waterman. judge
Friendly dissented from the portion of the majority opinion finding GE guilty
of an over-all refusal to bargain in good faith.
28
Id. at 756. See General Elec. Co., 150 N.L.R.B. 192, 196 (1964). See also
NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477 (1960); NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395 (1952); Cox, The Duty to Bargain in Good
Faith, 71 HARV. L. REv. 1401 (1958).
29 418 F.2d at 756.
oId. at 764-74 (concurring and dissenting opinion).
"1 Id. at 767. This reference by Judge Friendly apparently was to GE's compliance with the procedures required by section 8(d) (see note 25 supra). See
Comment, "Boniwareism": Legality and Effect, 76 HARV. L. REv. 807, 810-11
(1963).
" 418 F.2d at 767. judge Friendly alluded to the fact that GE had not committed a per se violation of the NLRA. But see id. at 762; NLRB v. Katz, 369
U.S. 736 (1962).
" 418 F.2d at 765. See generally Cox, supra note 28, at 1403-12, tracing the
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the "totality of circumstances" in finding a violation of section 8(a) (5),
a more stringent test than the subjective absence of good faith should be
required: ". . . I have no difficulty with the Board's making a finding of
bad faith based on an entire course of conduct so long as the standard of
bad faith is, in Judge Magruder's well-known phrase, a 'desire not to
reach an agreement with the Union.' "4 Judge Friendly came to the
conclusion that GE had sought to reach some agreement with the union
and was, therefore, not guilty of bad-faith bargaining. 5
The flaw in Judge Friendly's approach, the majority pointed out,3 6 is
that it is easily susceptible of reduction to the absurdity wherein a company could escape the prohibitions of section 8(a) (5) merely by demonstrating a desire to sign a contract with the terms to be supplied by the
company itself. Such a result would permit bad-faith bargainers to avoid
the sanctions of the NLRA merely by meeting a prescribed form of bargaining. Since "good faith," absent facts warranting a finding of per se
bad faith,3 7 necessarily involves a determination of the state of mind of
the particular bargainers,3" the majority was correct in concluding that a
court best proceeds on a case-by-case examination of the facts surrounding
the negotiations and should leave to the Board's discretion the application
of the "totality-of-circumstances" doctrine.3 9
Since the majority relied on the totality of GE's conduct in reaching
history and policies relating to section 8(d); Feinsinger, The National Labor Relations Act and Collective Bargaining,57 MIcH. L. Rav. 807 (1959).
" 418 F.2d at 767, citing NLRB v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 205 F.2d 131, 134
(1st Cir. 1953). But see 418 F.2d at 761, in which Judge Kaufman pointed out
that judge Magruder's language was not intended to be converted into a simplistic
test of good faith; United Steelworkers v..
NLRB, 390 F.2d 846 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
5418 F.2d at 774.
"Id. at 761.
"Certain

actions of employers have been held to be inherently indicative of

bad-faith opposition to collective bargaining. See, e.g., NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S.
736 (1962) (unilateral wage increases while bargaining was in process held to be

a violation of section 8(a) (5)). Thus, in cases involving per se bad faith, the
actual state of mind of the employer is irrelevant because his unlawful act renders
a good-faith intent objectively impossible. See generally Cox, supra note 28, at

1422-28; Bowman, An Employer's UnilateralAction-An Unfair Labor Practice?,
9 VAND. L. REV. 487 (1956).

" See Comment, "Boulwareimi": Legality and Effect, 76 HARV. L. REV. 807,

810-14 (1963).
"1418 F.2d at 756. Since the only way that the state of mind of an employer can

be determined is through an evaluation of the objective manifestations of his
intent through the totality of his actions, it is useless to try to segment a defendant's conduct and make rules for each separate act. Indeed, it is clear that often,
when a defendant's state of mind is in issue, the sum of his acts may be illegal

although each individual act is not. See, e.g., Daniel Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 341
F.2d 805, 811 (4th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 831 (1965). See also Cooper,
supra note 1, at 672-73.
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a decision, it is ,still unclear whether "pure" Boulwarism constitutes badfaith bargaining.4p However, in at least two respects, Judge Kaufman
went farther than did the majority of the NLRB toward declaring prototypic Boulwarism a violation of section 8(a) (5) : he indicated that GE's
failure to make meaningful concessions changed the context in which the
company's other conduct would be viewed, 4' and he held that using evidence of GE's publicity campaign did not contravene section 8(c)42 of
3
4

the NLRA.

The Board in its decision of the case did not directly address the issue
of GE's refusal to make concessions and the effect of that refusal on the
legality of GE's "firm, fair offer." However, a majority of the Board indicated a preference for an "auction" type of bargaining: "This 'bargaining' approach [Boulwarism] undoubtedly eliminates the 'ask-and-bid'
or 'auction' form of bargaining, but in the process, devitalizes negotiations and collective bargaining and robs them of their commonly accepted meaning."44 Judge Kaufman did not opt for this subtler approach
to the issue of lack of concessions and the validity of various forms of
bargaining.45 Rather, he stated that "while the absence of concessions
would not prove bad faith, their presence would, as GE claims, raise a
'0 See address by Frank W. McCullock, Chairman of the NLRB, 43d Annual
Conference of Tex. Indus., Oct. 28, 1965, in 60 L.R.R.M. 44 (1065):
, * * [T]he Board held in all the circumstances of that case [General
Electric] that the company failed to meet the law's requirements of good
faith bargaining.

The Board simply applied accepted principles to a unique bargaining
situation, which I do not know to have been duplicated in any other company....
Id. at 47. But see Note, Labor Law: General Electric's "Overall Approach" to
Bargainiin9Held a Violation of Good Faith, 1965 DUKE L.J. 661; Note, Labor
Law-Collective Bargaining-GeneralElectric's Firm Offer Approach Held Bad
Faith,40 N.Y.UL. REv. 798 (1965); 38 TEMP. L.Q. 353 (1965) (concluding that
the Board had found that Boulwarism alone was an unlawful method of bargaining).
"1418 F.2d at 758-59.
42 61 Stat. 142 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1964):
The expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or the dissemination thereof, whether in written, printed, graphic, or visual form, shall not
constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice under any of the provisions of this Act, if such expression contains no threat of reprisal or force
or promise of benefit.
42418 F.2d at 760. See discussion p. 1000 infra.
""General Elec. Co., 150 N.L.R.B. 192, 195 (1964) (footnote omitted).
"2 But see remarks by Phillip D. Moore, Manager of Employee Relations Service of GE, 58 L.R.R.M. 33 (1965) (concluding that the Board in its decision
specifically held that the absence of concessions is evidence of a lack of good
faith).
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strong inference of good faith."4 If concessions raise an inference of
good faith, then, logically, concession-making forms of bargaining will,
under a given set of facts, fare better in court than bargaining in which
the best offer is made first. Thus, the context in which a tribunal may
view the facts surrounding employment-contract negotiations is sub•stantially altered by Judge Kaufman's determination. Two questions
thus emerge. First, has the court disregarded section 8(d) ?7 Second,
does the encouragement of concessions do any more than make the parties
go through a period of haggling before they tender their "real" offer?
In defining the obligation to bargain collectively, section 8(d) states
that "such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal
or require the making of a concession .. *,48 In interpreting this language, the Supreme Court has held that the Board may not compel concessions either directly or indirectly.4" Clearly Judge Kaufman's opinion
at least indirectly would compel GE to make concessions in bargaining,
and this fact was one basis for Judge Friendly's dissent."0 Judge
Friendly's view was that, instead of telling the parties how to bargain,5 '
the Board must limit its functions to escorting the parties to the bargaining table, to making sure that they meet at reasonable times 'and
make memoranda of any agreements reached,52 and to assuring that there
are no per se violations of the duty to bargain."8 Such an approach ignores the intentions of the parties and precludes the Board from ever
examining the negotiators' state of mind. But this restrictive interpretation was repudiated in the very case that Judge Friendly cited" as his
authority-NLRB v. Insurance Agents' International Union."5 Since a
" 418 F.2d at 758. See NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 133 F.2d 676
(9th Cir. 1943); Marcus, The Employer's Duty to Bargain: Comnterproposal v.
Concession, 17 LAB. L.J. 541 (1966); Comment, Collective Bargaining, Boutlwareism, and the Fluctuating Duty to Concede, 61 Nw. U.L. REv. 427 (1966).
ForStat.
the language
of section
8(d)§ 158(d)
see note(1964).
25 snpra.
4061
142 (1947),
29 U.S.C.
40 NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 404 (1952).
"See 418 F.2d at 765-66 (concurring and dissenting opinion).
"See id. at 769.
Cf. California Girl, Inc., 129 N.L.R.B. 209, 219 (1960) (there must be a
potentiality of the parties' yielding).
"0See material cited note 37 supra. But see Duvin, The Duty to Bargain:Law
in Search of Policy, 64 COLUM. L. REv. 248, 290-91 (1964) (concluding that
Boulwarism inevitably results in the employer's total unilaterMd control over "dis-

tributive power").
51 418 F.2d at 765.
361 U.S. 477 (1960), aff'g 260 F.2d 736 (D.C. Cir. 1958). The Supreme
Court emphasized that its holding in the case was not intended to remove the
Board's power to examine the good faith of the parties through their over-all con-

duct. Id. at 498 (dictum).
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factual determination of the parties' state of mind is extremely difficult
to make and since concessions are indeed relevant to a state of openmindedness in bargaining, the provision of section 8(d) relating to concessions should be limited to its precise language: no concessions shall
be required. To deny evidence concerning concessions or the lack of them
would only inhibit the Board in performing its duty to seek industrial
peace through enforcing collective bargaining."0
If evidence of concessions raises an inference of good-faith bargaining, what is to prevent GE from entering negotiations, haggling with the
IUE for a few meetings, making a few planned concessions, and then
resorting to its normal bargaining techniques? The prevention of this
possibility was, arguably, the very purpose behind the passage of section
8(d); the Supreme Court has recognized that "it is now apparent from
the statute [8(d)] that the Act does not encourage a party to engage in
fruitless marathon discussions at the expense of frank statement and support of his position.

'5 7

There appears to be an adequate check against

such a superficial use of concession-making by virtue of the fact that the
Board may declare mere surface bargaining to be indicative of a lack of
good faith." Although the Board might be unable always to ferret out
those parties who lack good faith this risk is worth the "vitalizing" effect
that encouragement of concessions should have on the negotiations of the
parties.59
The Board's use of evidence of GE's publicity campaign in finding
bad-faith bargaining provided the issue that split the court three ways.
The court was forced to make a determination of the scope of an employer's free speech under section 8(c) of the NLRA.0 0 Unlike the majority of the Board, Judge Kaufman addressed himself directly to whether
section 8(c)"' precluded use of the evidence. He concluded that Congress, in passing the statute, had intended to exclude only "irrelevant"
"'See 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1964).
"NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 404 (1952).

Carey Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 331 F.2d 720 (6th Cir. 1964).

Cf. Philip

"See, e.g., H. K. Porter Co., 153 N.L.R.B. 1370 (1965), enforced, 363 F.2d

272 (D.C. Cir. 1966), rev'd on other grounds, 38 U.S.L.W. 4177 (U.S. Mar. 2,
1970).
" It does not seem unreasonable to suggest that parties will be more willing
to listen to each other when each knows that there is some possibility for a
change in the other's position. See California Girl, Inc., 129 N.L.R.B. 209, 219

(1960).

" Judge Waterman's concurring opinion, explicitly adopting Judge Kaufman's
opinion, took up only the issue of GE's communications to its employees. 418
F.2d at 763-64.
"1See note 42 supra for the text of section 8(c).
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speech from the Board's consideration: "The evil at which the section
was aimed was the alleged practice of the Board in inferring the existence
of an unfair labor practice from a totally unrelated speech or opinion delivered by an employer." 6 2 He insisted that Congress could not have intended to bar the Board's examination of all communications that do not
contain a threat or a promise of benefit; otherwise section 8(c) would
destroy the Board's purview over sections of the NLRA predicated on
63
evaluation of motive and intent.
Although Judge Kaufman's reasoning seems to contradict the express
language of section 8(c), his viewpoints, arguably, have a rational basis.
Congress probably passed the section to achieve a more equitable balance
between the free-speech rights of employers and the rights of employees
to organize and bargain than had existed under the doctrine of NLRB
v. Virginia Electric and Power Co.6 4 To permit this balance to be
struck formalistically so that the rights of employees are subverted would
be an unintended paradox.
Judge Waterman went the step beyond the determination that section
8(c) was intended only to balance the interests of the parties: he actually
balanced the interests involved in the case.6 He found that GE's publicity
campaign had had two deleterious effects on its employees' rights: it
cemented the company to its original position so that there was no effective
bargaining possible,6 6 and it fixed the idea in the minds of the employees
that the company, rather than the union, was their proper representative.6 7 As to the employer's rights to exercise freedom of speech, Judge
" Id.at 760; Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers of America, 383 U.S. 53,
62 (1966) (concurring opinion).
03418 F.2d at 761-62. In addition to section 8(a)(5), section 8(a)(1) also
requires examination of an employer's intent in cases in which there appears to be
a conflict with section 8(c). See Southwire Co. v. NLRB, 383 F.2d 235 (5th Cir.
1967); Comment, "Bouiwareism": Legality and Effect, 76 HARV. L. REv. 807,
814-15 (1963). See generally Pokempner, Employer Free Speech Under the Nationat Labor Relations Act, 25 MD. L. REv. 111 (1965).
0'314 U.S. 469 (1941). The Board in this case was given broad discretion to
examine an employer's speech as an incident of his total course of conduct. The
Board's use of this broad discretion to examine employers' speech that was unrelated to bargaining was criticized by the Senate committee that drafted section
8(c). S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 23-24 (1947). See, Comment, Restrictions on the Employer's Right of Free Speech During Organizing Campaigns
and Collective Bargaining, 63 Nw. U.L. REV. 40, 44-47 (1968).
65418 F.2d at 764 (concurring opinion).
6
"Id. This result may, in fact, be the single feature of GE's communications
program that made it illegitimate. See Procter and Gamble Mfg. Co., 160 N.L.R.B.
334 (1966).
6 418 F.2d at -764. This argument (that GE was attempting to replace the
-union as the representative of the employees) can be extended even farther than
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Waterman saw no value in the company's publicizing that its offer was
virtually unalterable.6" Thus, he concluded that evidence of GE's communications program was properly admitted in the action before the
Board.
Judge Friendly felt that "GE's communications [fitted] snugly under
the phrase 'views, argument, or opinion' in § 8(c). '" 9 He argued that
Judge Kaufman had misinterpreted the reasons why Congress passed the
statute, that Congress had struck a constitutionally-permissible balance
in favor of protecting employers' speech, and that the court was bound
by that determination.70 He concluded that since GE's "views" contained neither a threat of reprisal or force nor a promise of benefit, evidence of GE's publicity campaign could not be considered. 7
The three judges' debate on the proper interpretation and application
of section 8(c) points to the problem that is the heart of the issue of the
legality of Boulwarism: the Board and the courts are forced to reconcile
two sections of the NLRA-8(a) (5) and 8(c) -that are, under the
facts of many cases, contradictory. Section 8(a) (5) must depend for its
enforcement upon the ability of the Board to determine the employer's
state of mind. Such a determination is not difficult when the employer
completely disregards the procedures prescribed by section 8(d) ,72 when
he commits an act that can be said to be inherently indicative of bad
faith,73 or when he adamantly refuses to bargain with a union.7 4 But
when an employer meets the formal procedures that are required in collective bargaining and disguises his performance in the negotiations
through hard bargaining so that the Board is unable clearly to perceive
his bad faith, then determination of his state of mind is very difficult.
When the employer carefully follows a "legal" form of bargaining, he
Judge Waterman did to provide a basis for finding that GE violated section

8(a) (5) : GE refused to recognize the IUE as the representative of its employees;
therefore, since it is logically impossible for GE to bargain with a union that it
fails to recognize, GE could not have been bargaining in good faith "with the
representatives of [its] employees." 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (5)
(1964). See Cooper, suipra note 1, at 675.
"8418 F.2d at 764. Judge Waterman seemed to feel that disparagement of
union officials and massive communication of the benefits of the company's offer
were not evidence of bad faith. Rather, it was the communication of "firmness for
firmness' sake" that threw the balance against the speech. Id.
61
70 Id. at 770.
1d. at 771-73.
71 See id. at 771.
"See, e.g., H. J. Heinz Co. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 514 (1941).
" 3See, e.g., NLRB v. Herman Sausage Co., 275 F.2d 229 (5th Cir. 1960).
7
See, e.g., NLRB v. Fitzgerald Mills Corp., 313 F.2d 260, 268 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 375 U.S. 834 (1963).
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may be able to avoid the sanctions of section 8,(a) (5) and still communicate his bad-faith intentions to his employees if section 8(c) precludes any evidence of such communications. Thus, if he is able to per-

suade the courts to adhere strictly to the language of section 8 (c), he has
safely avoided the duty imposed by the NLRA to bargain in good faith.
If he cannot persuade a court to preclude use of this evidence at the hearing of an 8(a) (5) charge, he will have to rely solely on his "hard bargaining" at the negotiations; and this alternative is less likely to bring
about capitulation of the union and more likely to effectuate the policies
of the NLRA. Judges Kaufman and Waterman, by consciously balancing
the interests of the parties, have adopted the only feasible method for
protecting the policies embodied by the Act.
KENNETH B. Hipp

Medical Problems in the Law-Automobiles-Reporting Patients for
Review of Drivers' Licenses
A person licensed to drive a motor vehicle by the State of North Carolina may lose this privilege' if he is adjudged incompetent, is admitted
as an inpatient to an institution for the treatment of the mentally ill, or
enters an institution for the treatment of alcoholism or drug addiction.2
' "A license to operate a motor vehicle is a privilege in the nature of a right
of which the licensee may not be deprived save in the manner and upon the
conditions prescribed by statute." Underwood v. Howland, 274 N.C. 473, 476,
164 S.E.2d 2, 5 (1968), qutotiig from lit re Wright, 228 N.C. 584, 589, 46 S.E.2d
696, 699-700 (1948).
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-17.1 (Supp. 1969) in pertinent 'part provides:
(a) The Commissioner, upon receipt of notice that any person has been
legally adjudged incompetent or has been admitted as an inpatient to an institution for the treatment of the mentally ill or has entered an institution
for the treatment of alcoholism or drug addiction shall forthwith make inquiry into the facts for the purpose of determining whether such person is
competent to operate a motor vehicle. Unless the Commissioner is satisfied
that such person is competent to operate a motor vehicle with safety to persons and property, he shall revoke such person's driving privilege. No driving privilege revoked hereunder shall be restored unless and until the
Commissioner is satisfied that the person is competent to operate a motor
vehicle with safety to persons and property.
(c) The person in charge of every institution of. any nature for the
care and treatment of the mentally ill, the care and treatment of alcoholics
or habitual users of narcotic drugs shall forthwith report to the Commissioner
in sufficient detail for accurate identification the admission of every person.
(e) Notwithstanding the provisions of G.S. 8-53, G.S. 8-53.2, G.S. 122-8.1
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Those in charge of institutions treating these conditions are required to
report admissions to the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles.8 The original
4
legislation in this area of reporting and revocation was enacted in 1947,
and was substantially amended and put in its present form in North
Carolina General Statutes, section 20-17.1, in 1969. There was little compliance with the provisions of the former statute concerning reporting, and
no significant increase in reporting has been noted under the current
enactment. 5 The latest amendment has accomplished desirable changes in
the law; some additional improvements should be considered. These include amendments to effect a more equal application of the statute and to
establish a discretionary system of reporting in certain situations.
The original legislation required that the Commissioner "forthwith
revoke [the] license" upon receipt of notice of admission to an appropriate institution or of adjudication of incompetency unless the individual had
since been adjudged competent or discharged with a certificate of competency." The present law, however, requires the Commissioner, upon
receiving notice, to inquire into the facts for the purpose of determining
driving competency. Unless he is satisfied that a person is competent to
drive with safety, the Commissioner is required to revoke the license.'
Thus, the Commissioner is now vested with some discretion; before the
amendment in 1969, he had none. This element of discretion is important
for purposes of judicial review since the right of appeal to the courts
is not available if the revocation or cancellation of the license is mandatory.8
and G.S. 122-8.2, the person or persons in charge of any institution as set
out in subparagraph (c) hereinabove shall furnish such information as may
be required for the effective enforcement of this section. Information
furnished to the Department of Motor Vehicles as provided herein shall be
confidential and the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles shall be subject to the
same penalties and is granted the same protection as is the Department,
institution or individual furnishing such information. No criminal or
civil action may be brought against any person or agency who shall provide or submit to the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles or his authorized
agents the information as required herein.
(f) Revocations under this section may be reviewed as provided in
G.S.
20-9(g) (4).
8 Id. § 20-17.1(c).
Ch. 1006, § 9,[1947] N.C. Sess. L. 1417.
'Interview with Edward H. Wade, Director, Driver License Div., N.C. Dep't
of Motor Vehicles, in Raleigh, N.C., Mar. 4, 1970. Mr. Wade estimated that no
more than ten per cent of reportable admissions are actually reported.
'Ch. 1006, § 9(a), [1947] N.C. Sess. L. 1417.

"N.C.
'N.C.

GEN. STAT. § 20-17.1 (a) (Supp. 1969).
GEN. STAT. §20-25 (1965) provides

in part: "Any person denied a
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The new statute, unlike the former, also provides for an elaborate
administrative review of revocations' before a board consisting primarily
of medical specialists.1 0 Another improvement of the current enactment
is that it grants immunity to all those persons reporting the required
information;" the former statute did not. Indeed, the argument might
have been made before the latest amendment, that physicians were not
allowed to disclose admissions to institutions because such action would
have involved divulgence of information "acquired in attending a
12
patient."'
It is elementary that regulation of the operation of motor vehicles
is a valid exercise of a state's police power in the furtherance of the safety
and welfare of its citizens.' 3 Still, there are constitutional questions to
consider. Since the present statute does not require summary revocation
by the Commissioner and any loss of license is reviewable both administratively and judicially, this legislation should satisfy the requirements of
due process of the fourteenth amendment.' 4 Whether the demands of the
equal protection clause are likewise met is not as clear.
license or whose license has been cancelled, suspended or revoked by the Department, except where such cancellation is mandatory under the provisions of this
article, shall have a right to file a petition ... for a hearing ... in the superior
court.. . ." (emphasis added). See Carmichael v. Scheidt, 249 N.C. 472, 476, 106
S.E.2d 685, 688 (1959) ; Fox v. Scheidt, 241 N.C. 31, 34, 84 S.E.2d 259, 261 (1954).
*N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 20-17.1(f) (Supp. 1969).
"0 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-9(g) (4) (Supp. 1969).
" Id. § 20-17.1 (e).
12 N.C. GEN. STAT.

§ 8-53 (1969) provides:

No person, duly authorized to practice physic or surgery, shall be required to disclose any information which he may have acquired in attending a patient in a professional character, and which information was necessary to enable him to prescribe for such patient as a physician, or to do
any act for him as a surgeon: Provided, that the court, either at the trial
or prior thereto, may compel such disclosure, if in his opinion the same
is necessary to a proper administration of justice.
Query whether this prohibition applied to the reporting of patients admitted for
treatment. In any case, reporting is now required "[n]otvithstanding the provisions of G.S. 8-53." N.C. GEN. STAT. §20-17.1(e) (Supp. 1969).
"See South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177
(1938).
" In addition, the procedures adopted by the Department of Motor Vehicles
for the initial review of the records of reported drivers generally reflect a presumption of competency to drive unless a reasonable ground exists for concluding otherwise. For example, if a person reported as an alcoholic patient
has no history of having driven after consuming alcoholic beverages, no medical
evaluation is required upon his release. On the other hand, if the patient's driving
record shows evidence of his having driven after consumption of alcoholic beverages,
a medical evaluation is required upon his release, and the Commissioner is furnished
with a copy of the patient's medical summary. Interview with Edward H. Wade,
supra note 5.

1006

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 48

The classification made by the statute must be reasonable to satisfy
the constitutional mandate of equal protection. 5 Thus, the legislation
should equally affect "all persons who are similarly situated with respect
to the purpose of the law."' 6 The obvious purpose of section 20-17.1 is
to promote highway safety by removing drivers who are unsafe. Therefore, the statute's scheme of classification should be expected reasonably
to contribute to these objectives, and there should be no unreasonable
exclusions from its application.
It cannot be denied that a considerably high percentage of fatal automobile accidents and traffic violations involve drinking drivers 17 and the
mentally ill.' It is also fairly well established that the alcoholic, and not
the social drinker, is the major problem.'" The drug addict, too, is a
hazardous user of the highways."0
"' "[T]he classification must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon
some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object
of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated
alike." F. S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920).
" Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV.
341, 346 (1949).
17J. WALLER, GUIDE FOR THE IDENTIFICATION, EVALUATION AND REGULATION
OF PERSONS WITH MEDICAL HANDICAPS TO DRIVING 3, 23 (1967) [hereinafter cited
as WALLER] (indicating that alcohol is involved in fifty to seventy-five per cent of
all severe and fatal traffic accidents); Univ. of N.C. News Bureau, News Release
No. 1515, Nov. 10, 1969 ("Seventy-eight percent of the automobile drivers killed in
single-car vehicle crashes in North Carolina during September and October were
under the influence of alcohol according to figures released.., by the State Medical Examiner."); AMA Committee on Medical Aspects of Automobile Injuries

and Deaths, Medical Guide for Physicians in Determining Fitness to Drive a
Motor Vehicle, 169 J.A.M.A. 1195 (1959); Borkenstein, Alcohol and Traffic
Safety, in LAW, MEDICINE, SCIENCE-AND JUSTICE 382, 398-99 (L. Bear ed. 1964) ;
Waller, King, Nielson & Turkel, Alcohol and other Factors in California Highway Fatalities, 14 J. FOR. Sci. 429, 442 (1969).
" WALLER 3, 25-28; Brandaleone, Blaney, Irwin, Kuhn, Miller, Penalver,

Seth, Sim & Friedman, Recommendations for Medical Standards for Motor Vehicle Drivers, 26 IND. MED. & SURG. 25, 30 (1957) (The authors list the following as probable non-acceptable conditions for one who drives: psychosis; moderate severe chronic psychoneurosis; severe transient psychoneurosis (situational);
marked character, behavioral or personality disorder that prevents good adjustment, such as antisocial tendencies, overt homosexuality, chronic alcoholism, or
drug addiction; marked mental deficiency; and perversion.); Crancer & Quiring,

The1 Mentally Ill as Motor Vehicle Operators,126 AM. J. Psy. 807, 807-09 (1969).

°E.g., WALLER 23.
Conclusive research on this point is lacking. One survey showed that per-

20

sons convicted for illegal possession or use of drugs were not involved in more
accidents than non-drug users of the same age; however, the drug users had
nearly twice as many traffic violations. WALLER 28-29. It is important to differentiate between "users" and "addicts." Those truly addicted are thought by
medical personnel to be greater than average accident risks. Id. See Brandaleone,
supra note 18.
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But neither can it be doubted that many persons whose mental and
physical condition does not warrant revocation of their licenses are required
by the statute to be reported. Thus, if the Commissioner was under the
obligation to revoke the license of everyone reported, the statute would
be open to attack for overbreadth. The 1969 amendment should avoid
the weakness of overinclusiveness because it vests the Commissioner with
discretion not to revoke as well as providing for an opportunity of administrative and judicial review if the Commissioner decides upon revocation.
At the same time, many drivers whose records should be reviewed will
avoid scrutinization simply because they have not been adjudged incompetent or have not been admitted to institutions for treatment of
alcoholism or drug addiction.
Does the omission of this latter group render the statute unconstitutional as a denial of equal protection? In Buck v. Bell2 1 the United States
Supreme Court upheld a Virginia statute requiring sterilization by salpingectomy of certain mental inmates found afflicted with an hereditary
form of insanity or imbecility. To the argument that the statute applied
only to the small number of persons within institutions and not to the
multitudes outside, the Court replied: "But the answer is that the law
does all that is needed when it does all that it can, indicates a policy,
applies it to all within the lines, and seeks to bring within the lines all
similarly situated so far and so fast as its means allow."2 2
The North Carolina reporting statute could not feasibly be made to
apply to persons who have not sought treatment. However, section 20-17.1
does not apply to many persons who do seek treatment because it does
not require physicians to report those persons who undergo treatment
for alcoholism, drug addiction, or mental problems privately in the
doctors' own offices. In all likelihood, those individuals who would escape
detection through operation of the statute by seeking such treatment are
not among the lower income classes. If this probability can be demonstrated, an argument can be made that there is discrimination in favor of
the wealthy.2 3 This discrimination is not of much significance, however,
2-274 U.S. 200 (1927).
-Id.at 208. In Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 542
(1942), the Court approved Buck but struck down the Oklahoma Habitual Criminal Sterilization Act because that law unreasonably excepted prisoners convicted
of embezzlement while applying to those convicted of larceny.
3 Cf. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) ; Douglas v.
California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
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if it can be authoritatively said that institutionalized patients are in much
greater need of treatment that those treated outside institutions.
Excluding the possibility of an attack on the statute on the theory of
discrimination based upon individual wealth, an argument under the equal
protection clause that persons being treated privately by physicians are
excluded from the reporting provisions is almost certain to fail. In addition to the strong barrier that Buck poses to such an argument is the
familiar rule in equal-protection cases that a state need not attempt to
solve all of the problems of the same kind within reach of its police powers
while eradicating some of them.24 Nevertheless, since the risk to highway
safety presented by non-institutionalized patients may be comparable to
the risk presented by those confined for treatment, the statute should be
amended to require reporting by doctors of all persons being treated for
the conditions set out in the present law. A possible constitutional attack
on the present reporting provisions is colorable at best,2 and the statute
could readily be expanded to apply to an even greater number of persons.
Some members of the medical profession have raised objections to
the statute's provisions for reporting.20 The required disclosures interfere
with the physician-patient relationship and force the doctor to become,
in effect, an agent of the state. However, the only rational objection is
that the therapeutic relationship may be impaired, not that breach-ofconfidence actions by patients will be asserted against physicians who obey
the law. Immunity is specifically granted by the statute,27 and the legal
requirement of disclosure is a traditional defense to such suits. 8
Mandatory reporting by physicians of information acquired in the
course of treatment is hardly a novel concept. Many states require doctors
and other persons to report the discovery of various conditions and

" See Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949).

"The patient's right to privacy in his relationship with his physician probably is not a "relationship lying within the zone of privacy created by several
fundamental constitutional guarantees." Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
485 (1965). Confidential communications between a physician and patient were
not privileged at common law. State v. Martin, 182 N.C. 846, 849-50, 109 S.E.
74, 76 (1921); C. DEWITT, PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN PHYSICIAN
AND PATIENT 10 (1958). Only about two-thirds of the states have conferred the
privilege by statute. R. SLOVENKO, PSYCHOTHERAPY, CONFIDENTIALITY, AND
PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION 15-16 (1966).
"N.C. Neuropsychiatric Ass'n, Newsletter, Nov. 1969.
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-17.1(e) (Supp. 1969).
"8Note, Medical Practice and the Right to Privacy, 43 MINN. L. REV. 943,
954 (1959).
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diseases. 20 North Carolina requires reporting of venereal disease,3 ° inflammation of the eyes of newborn infants, 31 and certain other diseases
designated by the State Board of Health to be reportable. 2 Thus, there
is ample precedent for mandatory reporting under the statute. There is
no conflict with medical ethics:
A physician may not reveal the confidences entrusted to him in
the course of medical attendance, or the deficiencies he may observe
in the character of patients, unless he is required to do so by law or
unless it becomes necessary in order to protect the welfare of the individual or of the community. 33
To the extent that the requirement of disclosure interferes with treatment and thus is detrimental to the patient, a valid objection is raised.
Due to the unique intimacy between doctor and patient attained in
psychiatric treatment, the confidential relationship is an especially essential
element of the practice of psychiatry. 34 The success of therapy in psychiatric and related treatment may be jeopardized by mandatory disclosures
of the sort required by the North Carolina statute; this danger must be
weighed heavily against the social value of reporting. However, patients
treated outside institutions are not reportable under the present law; so
many psychiatric patients are not affected. If amendment of the law to
make the reporting requirements applicable to the non-institutionalized
patient is envisioned, perhaps consideration should also be given to
softening the requirements concerning all those being treated by psychiatrists. For example, equally satisfactory traffic-safety results might be
obtained by requiring psychiatrists to report only those patients that
they determine under broad statutory guidelines to be hazardous drivers.
Another valid objection to the statute is that some unsafe drivers,
2'E.g., D.C.

CODE ANN.

§ 6-202 (1967) (eye inflammation in newborn chil-

dren); MINN. STATS. § 144.68 (Supp. 1969) (malignant disease); R.I. GEN.
LAWS ANN. § 23-5-4 (hearing defects in children), § 23-5-5 (occupational
diseases), §23-11-6 (venereal diseases) (1968); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN.
§ 26-10-10 (1967) (child abuse). For a more complete list of applicable statutes,
see Note, Medical Practice and the Right to Privacy, 43 MINN. L. REv. 943,
953-54 (1959).
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130-95 (1964).

31 Id. § 130-107.
"Id. § 130-81.
"AMA, OPINIONS

AND REPORTS OF THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL § 9, at 55 (1969)
(Principles of Medical Ethics).
"J . ROBITSCHER, PURSUIT o- AGREEMENT, PSYCHIATRY & THE LAW 230
(1966); R. SLOVENKO, PSYCHOTHERAPY, CONFIDENTIALITY, AND PRIVILEGED COMfMUNICATION

40-44 (1966).
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fearing loss of driving privileges, may possibly be discouraged from seeking necessary treatment. It is conceivable that the driver posing the highest
risk to society, who faces almost certain loss of his license if reported,
riight forego treatment, continue to drive as his condition worsens, and
eventually kill himself and others. If he had sought treatment, he might
have improved or been cured. This assumption may be purely speculative
and is founded on the presumption that the patient avoiding treatment
because of the law is aware of its existence. In fact, the general public
probably is not aware of the law. Nevertheless, the risk that some, and
perhaps many, drivers with reportable problems will be discouraged from
seeking needed medical help must be weighed in any evaluation of section
20-17.1.
In conclusion, the statute appears to be a valid exercise of the power
of the state to protect the motoring public, pedestrians, and the affected
individuals. However, to avoid possible constitutional defects and to
achieve fully the policy behind the legislation, the present law may need to
be broadened to require reporting of all patients possessing the enumerated
characteristics whether they are institutionalized or not. Moreover, it
would be desirable for some concessions to be made in the area of psychiatric treatment. Finally, in view of the present reporting rate, the
appropriate penalty provisions85 should be utilized to bring about full
compliance.
JAMES E. CLINE
Poverty Law-Is a Search Warrant Required for Home Visitation
by Welfare Officials?
The fact that public assistance is a statutory right means, therefore,
that it is subject to conditions imposed by the Legislature. .

.

. It

means that the Legislature may require that the applicant waive his
right to privacy to permit a thorough investigation of his eligibility
for public assistance. It means that the applicant must open his home
to admit representatives of the Welfare Department to enter and to
observe. .

. [I]f he refuses to submit and refuses to permit such

infringement upon his right to privacy, then he may not exercise his
right to receive public assistance.'
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-35 (1965) provides that it is a misdemeanor to violate
any of the article's provisions, which is punishable by a fine up to five-hundred
dollars or by imprisonment for not more than six months.
1
Ruebhausen & Brim, Privacy and Behavioral Research, 65 CoLum. L. Rnv.
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The foregoing remarks were made by a high-ranking official in the
New York City Department of Social Services and represent the widelyheld theory that public assistance is a "gratuity" furnished by the state
and thus may be made subject to whatever conditions the state sees fit
to impose. This idea has recently been successfully challenged in James
v. Goldberg-a case adding to the slowly rising reservoir of case law
defining the rights of welfare recipients.
Mrs. James, a resident of the city of New York and a recipient of
payments under Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC),'
received a letter from her caseworker requesting an appointment to visit
her at her home. She replied that under no circumstances could the
caseworker make a home visit. The caseworker explained that the law
required home visits4 and that refusal by Mrs. James to permit them
would result in the termination of her AFDC benefits. At a subsequent
hearing, the Department of Social Services' review officer upheld the caseworker's decision to terminate benefits. Mrs. James then commenced a
suit in which she sought to prevent the termination of the benefits on the
grounds that such action constituted a violation of her fourth-amendment
right to be secure from unreasonable searches of her home and of her
fourth- and ninth-amendment rights to privacy.
In opposition to the plaintiff's application for relief, the Department
urged that home visits by caseworkers were not searches since the purposes for them were to verify eligibility for public assistance and to offer
the recipient professional counseling.5 The department pointed out that
caseworkers were instructed not to enter homes without permission or
under false pretenses and not to look into closets or drawers.6 In rejecting these arguments, the three-judge district court relied on recent Supreme Court decisions establishing that an individual's right to privacy
is within the scope of the protection of the fourth amendment. 7 Un1184, 1203 (1965) (quoting the then Deputy Commissioner of the New York City
Department of Social Services).
'303 F. Supp. 935 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), prob. juris. noted sub norn., Wyman v.
James 38 U.S.L.W. 3319 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1970).
a42 U.S.C. § 601-10 (Supp. III, 1965-67). The Aid to Families with Dependent Children program provides aid to needy children who have been "deprived
of parental support or care by reason of the death, continued absence from the
home, or physical or mental incapacity of a parent" and who live with any of certain enumerated relatives. 42 U.S.C. § 606(a) (1) (Supp. III 1965-67).
'See N.Y. Soc. WELFARE LAW § 134 (McKinney Supp. 1970).
'303 F. Supp. at 939.
0Id. at 940.
"Id. at 940-42. See, e.g., Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
See generally Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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doubtedly an influential factor was the New York law providing that if
a caseworker visited a home and found any evidence of fraud, he would
be obligated to report what he observed' even though the visit was not
for that purpose. The court was compelled to recognize the paradoxical
nature of a caseworker's job-that his duties are dichotomous. He is
trained to give professional counseling; yet he must also serve as an informer. The court therefore concluded that all home visits "may appropriately be considered searches for evidence of welfare fraud or other
criminal activity."9
The constitutionality of home visits by caseworkers to provide counseling has never before been questioned. Traditionally caseworkers have
had ready access to recipients' homes. In a recent study of the attitudes
of recipients of AFDC in Wisconsin toward unannounced visits by caseworkers, those receiving payments were asked the following question:
"Should a welfare client have the right to refuse access to his home to a
caseworker who calls unannounced?" Less than twenty-eight per cent
of those questioned answered this question affirmatively. 10 However, the
study did not cover the situation that was perhaps the most significant
fact in James-the caseworker's being refused admittance after having
made an appointment with the welfare client.
On the other hand, welfare searches (as distinguished from counseling
visits) have long been under attack by civil libertarians although only
one case was found in which the question has been litigated. In Parrish
v. Civil Service Commission," early-morning mass raids, primarily
for the purpose 2 of securing proof of welfare ineligibility in order
to reduce the number of persons on public assistance, had been made
on the homes of recipients of AFDC. No search warrants had been
obtained, but each home had been searched thoroughly. On appeal from
denial of a petition for reinstatement brought by a caseworker who had
refused to participate and had been dismissed, the Supreme Court of
California held that the raids were unconstitutional." Despite the court's
condemnation of the mass raids, there was no suggestion that all searches
by welfare officials are illegal. The court's repudiation was, in fact,
8 See

note 33 infra and accompanying text.
'10 303
F. Supp.
at 944.
Handier
& Hollingsworth,
Stigma, Privacy, and Other Attitudes of Welfare
Recipients, 22 STAN. L. IEv. 1, 11 (table 6) (1969).
166 Cal. 2d 260, 425 P.2d 223, 57 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1967).
1
Evidently another purpose was to counter local criticism of the AFDC program by exhibiting the infrequency of fraud.
66 Cal. 2d 623, 425 P.2d at 225, 57 Cal. Rptr. at 625.
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limited to mass raids conducted at a time "inconvenient" for the recipient.14 If the decision in Parrishis strictly interpreted, it is not authority against a warrantless search of a welfare recipient's home made
at a reasonable hour.
Although Parrish is the only reported decision prior to James in
which a court has dealt directly with the merits of searches of the homes
of those receiving welfare payments, there have occasionally been other
instances of formal complaints filed in court concerning the issue. For
example, in a case from the District of Columbia,15 a welfare recipient
sought a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief against allegedly
unlawful and harassing searches and surveillance by investigators of the
District Department of Public Welfare. The recipient averred that the
Department had threatened to terminate her assistance payments unless
she allowed the searches. Denial of relief by the district court was affirmed on the ground that administrative remedies had not been exhausted. 0 Undoubtedly, the infrequency of similar challenges 7 is evidence of the understandable reluctance of welfare recipients to dispute
the authority of those upon whom they are totally dependent for support.
An analogous situation arising from the actions of other administrative
agencies led to the first serious constitutional challenge of civil searches
8
in the federal courts. In Frank v. Maryland,"
the Supreme Court upheld
the conviction in state court of a homeowner who had refused to permit
a municipal health inspector to enter his premises without a search warrant. The Court's rationale was that "[n] o evidence for criminal prosecution is sought to be seized."' 9 This decision was overruled in Camarav.
Municipal Court.2 0 A lessee had refused to allow a warrantless inspection
" Perhaps the court in Parrish would have been willing to hold all searches
by welfare officials illegal had they not been compelled to distinguish the facts of
Parrish from those of Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959), in which the
Supreme Court had upheld a warrantless health inspection. The court in Parrish

stated that "[t]he great gulf which separates an 'orderly' afternoon visit from the

searches conducted shortly after dawn in the present case would itself suffice to
deprive defendant of any support from the Frank opinion." Id. at 267, 425 P.2d
at 228, 57 Cal. Rptr. at 628. Frank has since been overruled in Camara v. United
States, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
" Smith v. Board of Comm'rs, 380 F.2d 632 (D.C. Cir. 1967), noted in 9
WELFARE L. BULL. 4 (1967).

380 F.2d at 633.

Bradley v. Gingsberg, Civ. No. 3047 (S.D.N.Y., filed August 10, 1967),
WELFARE L. BULL. 8 (1967), is another example of a suit complaining of searches brought by a welfare recipient.
"359 U.S. 360 (1959).
°Id. at 366.
.o387 U.S. 523 (1967).

noted in 10
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of his apartment by housing inspectors. Although the inspection could
not have resulted in criminal prosecution, the Court struck down the
civil-criminal distinction that it had articlulated in Frank and held that a
citizen has the right to keep his private premises free from being entered
for administrative safety and health inspections without the authority of
a warrant.
Although in Camara the Court was concerned with inspections by a
city's building investigators and limited its decision to "administrative
searches of the kind at issue here,"'" the rationale of the holding 2 should
extend to administrative visits to the homes of welfare recipients. The
majority in James relied in part on Camara in reaching its decision.2 8
Before Camara,if the immediate purpose of the search was to determine
eligibility for welfare rather than to initiate criminal prosecution, the
proposition that the search required no warrant was at least colorably
supportable. An argument for this proposition after the decision in
Camara is indeed difficult to accept. There is a less demanding public
interest in searches of welfare recipients' homes than in health and safety
inspections because of the unavailability of equally effective substitutes
for the latter. To inspect a home for building-code violations requires
access into the home; to ascertain eligibility for welfare or to provide
counseling does not.2 4
Nevertheless, Judge McLean, dissenting in James, voiced his fear
that extending the fourth amendment to require warrants for counseling
visits would hobble caseworkers in their attempts to carry out the aims
of the AFDC program:
We are concerned here with a program of public assistance to dependent children who are to be cared for in their homes ....

It is essen-

tial that the welfare workers who administer this program enter the
Id.at 534.
[W]e hold that administrative searches of the kind at issue here are significant intrusions upon the interests protected by the Fourth Amendment,
that such searches when authorized and conducted without a warrant procedure lack the traditional safeguards which the Fourth Amendment guarantees to the individual ....
Id. 23 303 F. Supp. at 941.
' One AFDC supervisor stated that although refusals to allow entrance into
the home for counseling were rare, the department's policy was to honor the refusal. Implicit in this policy is the recognition that home visits are not imperative
in the AFDC program. Interview with Ann De Main, Supervisor of AFDC program, Durham County, North Carolina, in Durham, Feb. 9, 1970.
'2
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children's home to ascertain the conditions under which they live.
The purpose of the visit is to assist the children, not to catch the chil25
dren's mother in a violation of the law.
But this language indicates that Judge McLean overlooked the fact that
a visit by a caseworker may be for any one of three often-overlapping
purposes. First, the purpose of the visit may be the one to which Judge
McLean addresses himself-to provide social services. Second, the visit
may be to determine welfare eligibility. Finally, it may be for the sole
purpose of searchng for evidence of welfare fraud.
In James, all of these categories were lumped together as "searches"
for which a warrant must be obtained if consent is not given. The court
stated that "for [a] search of private property in a particular case, application may be made to an appropriate judicial officer who, utilizing the
standard of 'probable cause,' will test the particular decision to search
against the constitutional mandate of reasonableness." 2 6 The court intimated that Camara,which provides a relaxed standard of probable cause
for administrative searches, should provide guidelines for the issuance
of a warrant to welfare officials. The Supreme Court in Camara emphasized that "'a health official need [not] show the same kind of proof
to a magistrate to obtain a warrant as one must who would search for the
fruits or instrumentalities of a crime.' ",27
The approach to probable cause in Camara leaves much to be desired,
especially when the standard of that decision is applied to visits to
recipients by welfare officials. The criteria suggested by the Supreme
Court that might constitute probable cause for health and safety inspections (such as the length of the interval between inspections or the
general condition of the area) 28 would not be helpful in legitimizing
official visits to welfare recipients. And unless judicial approval is to
be a "rubber stamp," an allegation that the visit is merely to provide
professional guidance for the recipient should not demonstrate sufficient
" 303 F. Supp. at 946 (dissenting opinion).
2'6
303 F. Supp. at 943-44.
" 387 U.S. at 538, quoting from Justice Douglas' dissenting opinion in Frank
v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 383 (1959).
" The court in Camara stated that
[s]uch standards [of probable cause] which will vary with the municipal
program being enforced, may be based upon the passage of time, the nature
of the building (e.g., a multi-family apartment house), or the conditions
of the entire area, but they will not necessarily depend upon specific knowledge of the conditions of the particular building.
387 U.S. at 538.
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cause for a warrant under even a relaxed standard." Rightly understood,
the practical thrust of James is that if the recipient does not wish to have
counseling done within his home, it cannot be forced upon him even though
the visit purports to be for the sole purpose of benefitting his children.
If the court's decision in James does mean that social services may no

longer be forced upon a recipient in his home, what will its effect be?
Under New York's policy, home visits to recipients of AFDC are to be
made once every three months.80 Although heavy case loads perhaps
dictate this small number of visits, the amount of benefit derived from

four visits a year is likely minimal. The recent study in Wisconsin mentioned earlier revealed that visits of caseworkers to recipients of AFDC
amounted to a thirty-minute chat every three months."' The authors of
the report reached the following conclusion:
Our overall finding was that very little social service activity goes
on. This follows from the pattern of caseworker visits. Since the caseworkers visit the clients so infrequently and for such short periods of
time, there is of necessity very little supportive service work or regu32
lation of client's lives.

Thus the decision in James may not have so drastic an effect on the
AFDC program as the dissenting judge anticipated.
The question remains whether the standard of probable cause enunciated in Camara is applicable to visits of caseworkers for the purposes of

either determining eligibility or searching for evidence of welfare fraud.
As a practical matter, the two purposes may be indistinguishable: in

either instance the informatoin sought can be used not only to terminate
welfare assistance but also to initiate criminal prosecution based on
fraudulent misrepresentation. 3 These relatively severe consequences
" Judge McLean attacked the majority opinion in James on this point: "If...
the welfare worker can obtain a warrant merely by pointing out the need to inspect the home in order to carry out her duties, then the warrant is a mere formality." 303 F. Supp. at 946 (dissenting opinion).
'Id. at 938.
"Handler & Hollingsworth, supra note 10, at 8.
12 Id. at 10 (emphasis added).
"N.Y. Soc. WELFARE LAW § 145 (McKinney 1966) provides in part:
Any person who by means of a false statement or representation, or by
a deliberate concealment of any material fact, or by impersonation or other
fraudulent device, obtains or attempts to obtain, or aids or abets any person
to obtain public assistance or care to which he is not entitled, or does any
wilful act designed to interfere with the proper administration of public
assistance and care, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, unless such act constitutes a violation of a provision of the penal law of the state of New York,
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weigh heavily against relaxing the standard of probable cause for obtaining a warrant for these purposes; the same degree of justification should
be shown to the issuing magistrate as the police officer must show before
he initiates his search for evidence of a crime."4 This conclusion does
not mean that welfare eligibility cannot be checked: "[L] ess drastic means
may be suggested for achieving the same basic purposes for which the
35
City and State urge home visits are designed."
The consent of the recipient eliminates the requirement of a warrant
for welfare officials to enter his home. 6 Does a citizen who accepts
public assistance impliedly consent to a search of his home in order for
the caseworker to review his continuing eligibility? After James, this
question must be answered in the negative.3 7 But if the recipient expressly agrees to the visit, will the courts show the same reluctance to
find legally effective consent as they have in scrutinizing police searches?
Consent to a search in criminal cases, to be legally effective, must be
in which case he shall be punished in accordance with the penalties fixed
by such law .... Whenever a public welfare official has reason to believe
that any person has violated any provision of this section, he shall refer
the facts and evidence available to him to the appropriatedistrict attorney
or other prosecuting official [emphasis added].

"A representative definition of probable cause is:
Probable cause exists where the facts and circumstances within their [the
officers'] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution
in the belief that an offense has been or is being committed.
Bringar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949).
" 303 F. Supp. at 943. The court deciding James suggested some alternatives
to home visits:
Proof of actual residence may be ascertained . . .by the submission of a

duly-executed lease upon the premises in question. Family composition
may be verified by the submission . . . of birth certificates. The physical

well-being of the child could be safeguarded by making available facilities
for periodic medical examinations rather than by requiring routine home
visits by caseworkers .... Information regarding goods or services which

the recipient may need in the management of her home can equally be obtained in the offices of the Department should the recipient wish to make
her needs known there rather than in the convenience of her home. The
regularity of school attendance, academic achievement . . . can more ac-

curately reflect the effects of a child's home environment than an interview
with his or her parents in the home.
Id.

The objection may be raised that home visits are necessary to discover the
presence of persons residing in the home who owe a legally enforceable duty of
support to the recipient or to discover possession of unreported gifts of personal
property. The answer is that visits for such purposes can be made by obtaining
a search warrant based on the requisite probable cause.
ZI Cf. Calhoun v. United States, 172 F.2d 457 (5th Cir. 1949).
"303 F. Supp. at 945; accord, Parrish v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 66 Cal. 2d 260,
425 P.2d 223, 57 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1967).
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given as an "understanding and intentional waiver of a constitutional
right." ' The burden on the government of demonstrating the voluntariness of the consent is heavier when the person whose home was
searched is illiterate.39 Professor Jacobus tenBroek has observed that
recipients of AFDC payments in California are "[o]nly slightly educated
-a third of them have not passed beyond grammar school and they
average a ninth grade education .
,,20 Perhaps any waiver to a search
that is given by a recipient with so little education is prima facie ineffective.
The disparity of position between the caseworker and the welfare
recipient makes it unlikely that any consent given is wholly without compulsion. To be effective, consent cannot have been granted in "submission to authority."4 1
[C]aseworkers .

.

. represent ...

authority to the recipient, authority

whose mere presence constitutes coercion to some degree and whose
request to enter, however politely phrased, is in the nature of an order.
Even more important, the readily available means by which authority
may be exerted is sharp in her mind. She is almost certain to feel
that refusal to consent will bear adversely on her aid grant and thus

deprive her and her children of their only source of support.42

In Parrish,the California Supreme Court relied on this inherent coercion
43
to nullify the recipients' consent to pre-dawn searches.
Since the recipient of welfare payments now has the right to demand
a search warrant before a welfare official can visit him in his private
residence, the only procedure likely to assure that consent to the visitation is freely given is for the official to advise the recipient of his fourthamendment rights. Especially should the official advise the recipient that
his refusal to consent to a visit will in no way affect his welfare payments. This method, which would be similar to the Miranda warnings,44
may not be an ideal solution, but informed, reliable consent is necessary
if caseworkers are ever to be able to visit welfare recipients in their homes.
" Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13 (1948).
"0 Kovach
United States, 53 F.2d 639 (6th Cir. 1931).
tenBroek,v. Californidas
Dual System of Family Law: Its Origin, Developwent, and Present Status, 17 STAN. L. REV. 614, 670 (1965).
"'Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948); accord, Pekar v. United
States, 315 F.2d 319, 324 (5th Cir. 1963), in which the court stated that if "superior authority had any place in the obtaining of the consent [to search], the
consent
is no consent at all . .. ."
'2 tenBroek,
supra note 41, at 669-70.
466 Cal. 2d at 270, 425 P.2d at 229, 57 Cal. Rptr. at 629.
"The warnings to be given to a person under custodial interrogation may be
found in Miranda v. Arizonia, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1965).
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The decision in James will no doubt be subjected to much criticism,
but in view of the dual nature of a public caseworker's duties, the court,
in requiring warrants for all home visits, reached a very practical solution.
To attempt to draw a distinction regarding the applicability of the
[Fourth] Amendment dependent upon whether the caseworker intends
to counsel the recipient as to how best to utilize his limited resources
or to look for evidence of fraud would invite a trial of every official's
purpose-a task which would undoubtedly pervert the intent of the
45
Amendment.
Although intrusion into a welfare recipient's home is motivated by the
highest public purpose, "[e]xperience should teach us to be most on our
guard to protect liberty when the Government's purposes are beneficent."4
F.

FINCHER JARRELL

Uniform Commercial Code-Checks-Cash Deduction from Check
Prior to Deposit as Final Payment under Article Four
The Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia in Kirby v. First & Merchants NationalBank1 recently applied Article Four of the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 2 to reach a result that may be surprising to bankers in the
states that have adopted the U.C.C.' The court held that the bank had
made a final cash payment under section 4-213 (1) (a) 4 of the U.C.C. when
it permitted a customer to make a cash deduction from a check that was
being deposited. 5
303 F. Supp. at 942.
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (dissenting opinion of
Justice Brandeis).
-210 Va. 88, 168 S.E.2d 273 (1969).
'The UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE [hereinafter cited as U.C.C.] has been codified in VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.1-.10 (1965). References infra will be to the Code
as adopted in Virginia, but the number 8 will be omitted.
'Every state except Louisiana has now adopted the U.C.C. The U.C.C. is
found in N.C. GEN. STAT. ch. 25 (1965). For a basic study of Article 4 as adopted
in North Carolina, see Davis, Article Four: Bank Deposits and Collections, 44
O

N.C.L.

REv.

627 (1966).

'§ 4-213(1) (a) provides:

(1) An item is finally paid by a payor bank when the bank has done
any of the following, whichever happens first:
(a) paid the item in cash;
210 Va. at -, 168 S.E.2d at 276.
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The transaction involved in Kirby is a common one. Mrs. Kirby, the
defendant-payee, handed to plaintiff's teller a check made out to and endorsed by her for 2500 dollars. The check had been drawn on the First
and Merchants National Bank by a local engineering firm. The defendant,
who had an account at First and Merchants, gave the teller a deposit slip
on which 2300 dollars had been entered in the "currency" column. The
teller then gave Mrs. Kirby 200 dollars in cash, and on January 3, the
next business day, the bank credited the defendant's account with 2300
dollars. On January 4 the bank discovered that the check was drawn
against insufficient funds and a day later telephoned the defendant to
inform her that the check had been dishonored and to request reimbursement.6 The defendant failed to cover the check, and on January 10 the
bank charged her account with 2500 dollars. This action created an
overdraft of 543.47 dollars. The bank instituted suit to recover the amount
of the overdraft.
In reversing a decision in favor of the bank, the supreme court held
that the transaction was a final payment in cash of the entire check and
rejected the bank's contention that "under the terms of its contract with
Mrs. Kirby, the settlement was provisional and therefore subject to revocation whether or not the check was paid in cash on December 30.2 7 The
court further found that even if payment had not been in cash, the bank had
no right to charge the item back to Mrs. Kirby's account' since the bank
neither returned the item nor sent written notice of dishonor before the
midnight deadline.'
In concluding that final payment in cash had been made, the court
relied heavily on the testimony of a bank officer who stated that the bank
"cashed" the check for 2500 dollars.1 Documentary evidence of the
manner in which the deposit slip had been made out and of the procedures
employed to record the transaction was also examined by the court:
The deposit of cash is evidenced by the word "currency" before
2,300.00 on the deposit ticket and by the words "Cash for Dep." on
the back of the check. The Bank's ledger, which shows a credit of
$2300 to Mrs. Kirby's account rather than a credit of $2500 and a debit
- Id.at - 168 S.E.2d at 274-75.
TId. at -- 168 S.E.2d at 277.

8Id.

SU.C.C. §4-104(h) defines "midnight deadline" as "midnight on its next
banking day on which it receives the relevant item or notice or from which the
time for taking action commences to run, whichever is later."
10 210 Va. at -, 168 S.E.2d 275.

19701

CASH DEDUCTIONS FROM CHECKS

1021

of $200, is consistent with a cashing of the Neuse check and a depositing of part of the proceeds."'
Section 4-213 (1) of the U.C.C. deals with those events that will make
final the payment of an item by a payor bank.
The concept of final payment is central to the scheme of Article 4
because the time of final payment of a check or similar item is the
starting point for determining the rights and obligations of a number
12
of parties in relation to an item.
Subsection (1) (a) is at least one provision within section 4-213 in which
there seems to be little room for confusion. An actual over-the-counter
payment of an overdraft relieves the payee of any liability to the bank
13
despite subsequent dishonor.
The transaction in Kirby did not, however, readily conform to this
provision since only a fraction of the face amount of the check was cashed
and paid directly to the customer. Concededly, an argument can be made
that there is a sound rational basis to the court's decision to treat the
transaction as if the entire check had been cashed and then a portion of the
proceeds deposited. Since the depository bank was also the payor bank, 4
little time would have been required for it to ascertain whether the check
had been drawn against sufficient funds. 15 Furthermore, in light of the
large number of checks handled daily by banks' and the need for prompt
finalization of such transactions, it may not be surprising that a court
'1 Id.at -, 168 S.E.2d at 275-76.
12 Comment, Bank Proceduresand the U.C.C-When is a Check Finally Paid?
9 B.C. IND. & Com. L. REv. 957 (1968). See also Love, How the Adoption of
the Uniform Commercial Code Wodd Affect the Law of Bank Deposits and Collections in Oregon, 32 ORE. L. Rsv. 288, 295-96 (1953).
8
This provision conforms to prior case law. See, e.g., National Bank v. Bank
of Magdalena, 21 N.M. 653, 157 P. 498 (1916); Cherokee Nat'l Bank v. Union
Trust Co., 33 Okla. 342, 125 P. 464 (1912); Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Planenscheck,
200 Wis. 304, 227 N.W. 387 (1929). See also Morris, The Law of Overdrafts, 16
CLEv.-MAR. L. REv. 574, 579 (1967).
, U.C.C. §4-105 provides in part:
(a) "Depository bank" means the first bank to which an item is transferred for collection even though it is also the payor bank;
(b) "Payor bank" means a bank by which an item is payable as drawn or
accepted;
15
U.C.C. § 3-506(2) permits deferred payment without dishonor so long as
payment is made "before the close of bisiness on the day of presentment."
" Malcolm, How Bank Collection Works-Article 4 of the Uniform Commercial
Code, 11 How. L.J. 71, 74 (1965) (stating that fifty-million items are handled every
day by banks).
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should be inclined to declare a payment final at the earliest reasonable
time. However, the court in deciding Kirby did not give adequate consideration to the probability that the bank allowed the customer to deduct
cash from her deposit solely as a convenience to her.
After deciding the issue of whether there had been a cash payment in
favor of the customer, the court considered arguendo the bank's contention that its contract with Mrs. Kirby made settlement of the check
provisional. The relevant portions of the contract provided:
All items are credited subject to final payment and to receipt of
proceeds of final payment in cash or solvent credits by this bank at
its own office ....

This bank may charge back, at any time prior to

midnight on its business day next following the day of receipt, any
item drawn on this bank which is ascertained to be drawn against
insufficient funds or otherwise not good or payable. An item received
after this bank's regular closing hour shall be deemed received the
17
next business day.

That transactions are provisional until final payment is expressly recognized by the U.C.C.' 8 The charge-back provision included in the contract

is not in derogation of the applicable Code provisions. Section 4-212 (3)
provides that:
[A] depository bank which is also the payor bank may charge
back the amount of an item to its customer's account or obtain refund
in accordance with the section governing return of an item received
by a payor bank for credit on its books (Section 4-301).
Section 4-301(2) provides:
If a demand item is received by a payor for credit on its books it
may return such item or send notice of dishonor and may revoke any
credit given or recover the amount thereof withdrawn by its customer, if it acts within the time limit and in the manner specified .... 19
' 210 Va. at -, 168 S.E.2d at 277 n.6.
18
See, e.g., U.C.C. § 4-212, Comment 1.

"Deferred posting" has been in use for

many years. See Leary, Deferred Posting and Delayed Returns-The Current
Check Collection Problem, 62 HARv. L. Rav. 905 (1949).
19U.C.C.

§ 4-301(2) applies the rules of deferred posting to situations in which
the depository bank is also the payor bank and thus is a departure from prior case
law. See, e.g., Cohen v. First Nat'l Bank, 22 Ariz. 394, 198 P. 122 (1921) ; W.A.
White Brokerage Co. v. Cooperman, 207 Minn. 239, 290 N.W. 790 (1940). For an

excellent discussion of § 4-301, see Love, How the Adoption of the Uniform Coinmnercial Code Wodd Affect the Law of Bank Deposits and Collections in Oregon,
32 Oa. L. Rav. 288, 314-16 (1953).
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The "time limit" is "midnight of the banking day of receipt" and the
"manner specified" is either returning the item or sending written notice
of dishonor or nonpayment.20 Thus under the U.C.C. the settlement
remains provisional until the expiration of the midnight deadline or the
prior occurrence of one of the two specified events.
Applying these provisions to the action taken by First and Merchants,
it is obvious that the bank's procedure did not comply with the Code. The
court stated that "even if the Bank's settlement for the Neuse check had
been provisional, the Bank had the right to charge that item back to Mrs.
Kirby's account only if it complied with U.C.C. §§ 4-212(3) and 4-301."21
The failure of a bank to send timely and proper notice would result in the
loss of the provisional status of the payment of checks, the court said.
Many banks in North Carolina employ a different method of recording
the type of deposit made in Kirby. Insisting that they will not accept a
deposit slip made out in the form Mrs. Kirby used, they require that the
total amount of the check be entered in the "checks" column and that
cash deductions be indicated within the column by the words "less cash."22
These banks operate under the theory that allowing such simultaneous
withdrawals is a service to the customer to save him the time and effort
of having to deposit the full amount and then draw a check for the cash
needed.23 This practice may be preferable to the one permitted by First
and Merchants in Kirby, but, arguably, even the type of transaction
commonly used in North Carolina could be construed as a final cash payment because the end result is the same regardless of the manner in which
the deposit is recorded. Courts should, however, treat the split-deposit
transactions that are common in North Carolina as though the bank had
provisionally accepted the check and then granted immediate right of
withdrawal. Since the bank requires the total amount of the check to
be entered in the "checks" column and allows the practice to prevent inconvenience to its customers, the intention of the bank to provisionally
accept the item should be recognized.24
The court in Kirby made no reference to sections that allow alteration
2

0U.C.C. §4-301(1) (a)-(b).

21210 Va. at -, 168 S.E.2d at 277.
22

This type of deposit will be hereinafter referred to as a "split-deposit."

22210 Va. at -, 168 S.E.2d at 278 (dissenting opinion giving other means by

which a cash withdrawal can be effected).
" For a decision reaching a result contrary to Kirby, see Citizens State Bank
v. Pritchett, 123 Colo. 497, 231 P.2d 462 (1951). The result was based in part on
the theory that the transaction was a service to the customer.
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of the U.C.C. by agreement. 25 While its drafters recognized the need
for some degree of flexibility in the future use of Article 4 of the U.C.C.,
they were faced at the outset with the basic problem of
whether the Article should consist of a set of rules cast in a rigid
form in order to protect customers of the banks, with only limited
variation of the provisions thereof by agreement or action permitted,
or whether the Article should consist of basic mechanical bank collection rules, a statement of permissive bank collection practices and, in
addition, a section or sections permitting liberal variation of the
provisions of the Article by agreement ....

26

The decision was in favor of flexible rules, and, in light of the ever changing
nature of bank-collection practices, this policy seems wiseT The central
provision to achieve flexibility is subsection 4-103(1), which states that
"the effect of the provisions of this Article may be varied by agreement
except that no agreement can disclaim a bank's responsibility for its own
lack of good faith or failure to exercise ordinary care .... 1128
Section 4-103 provides three methods by which the Code provisions
may be varied. The first is the "ordinary" agreement,2" which is frequently contained on the signature card signed by the customer when opening an account in a bank. The second method is through general banking usage, provided for in subsection (3). The third is the provision for
novel banking procedures found in subsection (4), which states that
"[t] he specification or approval of certain procedures by the Article does
not constitute disapproval of other procedures which may be reasonable
under the circumstances."
Any attempt of a bank to alter Section 4-213 (1) (a) by adopting the
policy that items paid in cash are provisionally accepted would fall within
subsection (4) since such a position would probably be regarded as
novel in any region of the country. It is improbable that the courts would
countenance this sort of procedure since the result would be a sub"For a general discussion of alteration by agreement, see J. CLARKE, H. BAILEY
& R. YOUNG, JR., BANK DEPOSITS AND COLLECTIONS 2846 (1963) [hereinafter
cited as CLARKE]; Leary, Check Handling Under Article Four of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 49 MA~g. L. REv. 331, 34149 (1965).
"0CLARKE at 28-29.

" See Malcolm, Article 4-A Battle With Complexity, 1952 Wis. L. REv. 265,
276.28
At least one author has serious doubts as to whether freedom to vary by
agreement is effective as a "preservative of flexibility." Id. at 269-70.
CLARKE at 31.
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stantial loss of protection to the customer as well as a reduction in the
3
speed and efficiency of the banking process.
In regard to split-deposits, however, banks should be able to stipulate
in a contract with its customers that such items are accepted provisionally,
at least with repect to those not drawn on the contracting bank. In order
to avoid the classification of split-deposits as final cash payments, they
should be deemed deposits of checks with immediate right of withdrawal.
Thus banks contracting for provisional acceptance of split-deposits to
provide greater convenience for customers would be protected by the
U.C.C.'s rules governing provisional settlement. Assuming that a bank
does make such a specific contract, it may still be desirable to include in
3
the agreement a term modifying the U.C.C.'s requirements for notice. '
Under the Code, notice must be sent to the customer before the midnight
deadline. According to Professor Clarke, there is little doubt that agree32
There
ments reasonably extending the time limitation are permissible.
would seem to be no reason under the Code why methods for sending
notice could not also be reasonably varied.
Officials of three banks in North Carolina who were interviewed said
that none of the banks have made any effort through "ordinary agreement" to vary any of the U.C.C.'s requirements for notice. One official
stated that in the event of dishonor of a deposited check, his policy is to
telephone the depositor-payee, as was done in Kirby. According to this
official, if the customer fails to resolve the matter quickly, a more formal
written notice is given. The official of the second bank stated that upon
dishonor of a check, written notice is sent in every case. The third
bank apparently sends written notice only when the item dishonored is
unusually large; for smaller items, the only notice given the depositor is
provided on the regular monthly statement.
Clearly the methods employed by the first and third banks do not fulfill
the strict requirements of section 4-301(1) of the U.C.C. For either
bank to overcome a depositor's claim that insufficient notice was given,
it would be forced to show alteration of the requirements either by general
banking usage or novel banking procedure since no use has been made
of a contract modifying the U.C.C. In order to establish the existence of
general banking usage, the burden "would be on the party seeking the

"1Id. at 40.
" For a comparison of requirements for notice under the traditional negotiable
instruments law and the U.C.C., see, C. FUNK, BANKS AND THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, 169-76 (1964).
B. CLARKE at 44.
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thereof.",'

benefit
Comment 4 to section 4-103 sets forth general guidelines and suggestions for defining the term "general banking usage":
The term "general banking usage" . . . should be taken to mean a
general usage common to banks in the area concerned . . . . Where

the adjective "general" is used, the intention is to require a usage
broader than a mere practice between two or three banks but it is
not intended to require anything as broad as a country-wide usage.
It would seem easier and perhaps more effective for a bank to argue that
the Code's provisions for notice had been validly altered by novel banking
procedure, defined by subsection 4-103(4). As long as the depositor
received actual notice of the dishonor within a reasonable time, neither
banking efficiency nor protection for the customer would be adversely
affected.
In order to avoid the necessity of making arguments based on general
banking usage or novel banking procedure during litigation, banks should
consider revision of their contracts with customers. An agreement extending the time and method of sending notice would have to fall within
the boundaries of reasonableness and good faith; arguably a term that
specifically provides for some form of actual notice within a reasonable
time would meet this test.34 The contract should also specifically provide
that split-deposits (or deposits that are split in substance, if not in form,
as in Kirby) are only accepted subject to provisional settlement to increase
the likelihood that courts will not interpret such deposits as final cash
payments.
TRAVIS W. MOON
8 1d.
I at 39.
"On the question of what courts would likely uphold as a reasonable time,
notice of a dishonored item made by regular bank statement, which might take
thirty days or more to reach the customer, undoubtedly will not prove acceptable.
Actual notice of dishonor--either orally or in writing-within five days probably is
reasonable.

